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Abstract 
 
This thesis will contextualise and critically explore how New Drama (Novaya Drama) 
has been shaped by and adapted to the political, social, and cultural landscape under 
Putinism (from 2000). It draws on close analysis of a variety of plays written by a 
burgeoning collection of playwrights from across Russia, examining how this 
provocative and political artistic movement has emerged as one of the most vehement 
critics of the Putin regime. This study argues that the manifold New Drama repertoire 
addresses key facets of Putinism by performing suppressed and marginalised voices in 
public arenas. It contends that New Drama has challenged the established, normative 
discourses of Putinism presented in the Russian media and by Putin himself, and 
demonstrates how these productions have situated themselves in the context of the 
nascent opposition movement in Russia. By doing so, this thesis will offer a fresh 
perspective on how New Drama’s precarious engagement with Putinism provokes 
political debate in contemporary Russia, and challenges audience members to 
consider their own role in Putin’s autocracy.  
The first chapter surveys the theatrical and political landscape in Russia at the 
turn of the millennium, focusing on the political and historical contexts of New 
Drama in Russian theatre and culture. The final four chapters focus on specific case 
studies. Chapter Two explores the development of political satire by contrasting 
Varvara Faer’s BerlusPutin (2012) and Viktor Teterin’s Putin.doc (2005). Chapter 
Three looks at Mikhail and Vyacheslav Durnenkov’s The Drunks (Pianii, 2009) and 
Pavel Pryzhko’s The Soldier (Soldat, 2011). Chapter Four discusses two plays by 
Vasilly Sigarev: Plasticine (Plastilin, 2000) and Black Milk (Chernoe Moloko, 2001). 
Chapter Five explores the documentary plays The Bolotnaya Square Case (Bolotnoe 
Delo, 2015) by Polina Borodina and Elena Gremina’s One Hour Eighteen Minutes 










	   4	  
Table of Contents 
 
 
Introduction         6 
 
Chapter One: New Drama and Theatre Contexts    33 
 
Chapter Two: Putin on Stage: Varvara Faer’s BerlusPutin and  50 
Viktor Teterin’s Putin.doc 
 
 
Chapter Three: Chechnya and Beyond: Staging     82 
the Soldier in New Drama 
 
 
Chapter Four: Social Divide and the Provinces     123 
in the Theatre of Vassily Sigarev 
 
 
Chapter Five: Dissent and Documentary:      160 
Performing Justice in Teatr.doc’s The Bolotnaya  
Square Case and One Hour Eighteen Minutes 
 
 
Conclusion         200 
 
 
















	   5	  
Acknowledgments 
 
I would firstly like to thank Royal Holloway, University of London with providing 
me with the funding that allowed me to undertake this thesis. It gives me a lot of 
pleasure to thank a number of people for their help and support during the research of 
my thesis. I am grateful to the staff at Teatr.doc for providing me with unpublished 
scripts, allowing me access to their archives, and for generally making me feel 
welcome whenever I visited their theatre in Moscow. I must also acknowledge the 
help of scholars from outside of my department, who have provided me with feedback 
on my writing and research: Oliver Double, Maria Kroupnik, Molly Flynn, and 
Alexandra Smith.  
 
My parents deserve special thanks for their constant support and encouragement 
during this project. I also want to express my love to Nadia, for keeping me sane 
throughout the writing on this thesis. 
 
Particular thanks goes to my advisor Bryce Lease, for his insightful feedback and 
encouragement through the writing of my thesis. Finally, I am indebted to my 
supervisor Chris Megson who went above and beyond in his supervision of my thesis. 
This project would not have reached fruition without his intelligent, patient, and 






















	   6	  
Introduction 
 
This thesis critically explores how New Drama (Novaya Drama) has been shaped by 
and adapted to the political, social, and cultural landscape under Putinism (from 
2000). Since the turn of the millennium, young playwrights have engaged with the 
political and social realities of contemporary Russia, playing a key role in articulating 
an oppositional discourse to the Putin regime. The work of these provocative theatre 
makers has been collated under the idiom of New Drama, a broad term that includes 
plays written and performed throughout the twenty-first century that interrogate 
contemporary cultural identities and articulate important political anxieties that have 
emerged in Russian society under the Putin regime.  
The emergence of New Drama at the start of the twenty-first century was the 
result of a variety of disparate factors and circumstances. These included, but were 
not limited to, the auspices of the Royal Court Theatre’s international programme for 
young playwrights in Russia, the foundation of theatre spaces dedicated to new 
theatre writing in both Moscow and the provinces, and the creation of a number of 
dedicated playwriting courses in universities across the country. The focal point of 
New Drama is a cluster of small theatres located in central Moscow, which are 
dedicated to producing new writing. The limited performance spaces and capacities of 
these theatres has become a signature of New Drama productions. As Marina 
Davydova, editor of leading Russian-language theatre journal Teatr, asserts: ‘we can 
imagine the plays of these young authors only in the cellar of "Teatr.doc" or another 
small and underground room.’1 Teatr.doc, founded in February 2002 by Mikhail 
Ugarov and Elena Gremina, has emerged as an important locus of politically and 
socially engaged theatre in contemporary Russia. Significantly, the company is run 
independently of the state and without government funding – a rarity in Russia, where 
historically most theatres are publically funded intuitions. Instead, Teatr.doc rely on 
private donations, online crowdfunding campaigns, the help of volunteers, and often 
the financial support of the artists themselves, who use their own money to keep the 
theatre afloat. In recent years, Teatr.doc has made headlines across the globe 
following the company’s forced eviction from its original space on Trekhprudnyi 
Pereulok in the Tverskoy district of central Moscow in December 2014, and again 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Davydova (2009) 
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from their new premises on Spartakovskaia Ulitsa in June 2015.2 Despite the 
significant setbacks faced by the company, Teatr.doc has continued to stage its 
diverse repertoire in Moscow and remains one of the focal points of New Drama. 
 This thesis argues that New Drama has emerged as one of the most exciting 
opposition movements against the increasing authoritarianism of the Kremlin. It 
demonstrates that contemporary playwriting has engaged with suppressed and 
marginalised discourses in public arenas. It focuses on four crucial facets of Putinism, 
which I identify as key political anxieties in Russia: Putin the politician; the legacy of 
the Second Chechen War; social divide; and the Kremlin’s manipulation of the legal 
system in a series of high profile trials. By considering the development of new 
playwriting alongside the political context of the Putin administration, this thesis 
demonstrates a fresh perspective on how New Drama’s precarious engagement with 
Putinism provokes political debate in contemporary Russia, and challenges audience 
members to consider their own role in Putin’s autocracy. 
This introductory chapter provides the context for the thesis. It includes a 
review of previous academic and critical work on contemporary Russian theatre and 
Putinism, and identifies how this thesis will situate itself in the field of study. It 
introduces and defines the key terms relating to New Drama and Putinism, which are 
utilised in my thesis. Finally, the methodological approaches used in carrying out this 
research will be explained. I begin, however, by setting out and defining my research 
question and aims. 
 
Research Questions and Aims 
This thesis identifies and examines the development of New Drama, and the 
movement’s relationship with the social and political context of the Putin era. In 
particular, this study considers how contemporary theatre makers have employed 
disparate theatrical modes to challenge the increasing authoritarianism of the Kremlin 
and provided alternative narratives to the official state discourse. Focusing on new 
plays produced in the period 2000-2015, this thesis asks whether New Drama has 
been able to create a new form of social and political engagement in Russian theatre. 
What is the role of new theatre writing in Putin’s Russia? What role have these theatre 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For example, writing for the BBC in 2015, Lucy Ash described Teatr.doc as being ‘Russia’s most 
daring theatre company.’ Ash (2015).	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makers played in facilitating the enlivening of political debate and the formation of 
new values that challenge the ideology of Putinism? 
 In examining the relationship between Putinism and contemporary Russian 
playwriting, ‘Politics and Putinism: A Critical Examination of New Russian Drama’ 
traces the development of one of the most exciting and original theatrical movements 
in the twenty-first century: New Drama. In doing so, it offers analysis of theatre 
makers whose powerful productions have yet to be explored in English-language 
scholarship. There are four correlative and primary aims of this thesis. The first is to 
contextualise New Drama in relation to the politics of Putinism through in depth 
analysis of the case studies. Secondly, it asks how theatre makers have challenged the 
normative discourse of the Putin regime and staged key political anxieties articulated 
and identified by scholars and Russian commentators. Thirdly, it investigates how 
New Drama engages with the nascent opposition movement in Russia. Lastly, in a 
world that is increasingly reliant on the Internet and social media to articulate 
contemporary social anxieties, this thesis considers how Russian artists foreground 
the inclusion of those marginalised by the Putin regime, and provoke and enliven 
political debate in the public sphere, challenging audience members to consider their 
own role in Putin’s autocracy. 
 
Key Theatrical Terms and Definitions 
The title of this thesis makes explicit reference to the term ‘New Drama’. The New 
Drama idiom has been used throughout the twenty-first century to describe new 
theatre writing in Russia. Originally applied by theatre practitioners eager to brand 
and promote the boom in new theatre writing that occurred at the turn of the 
millennium, it was seized upon by theatre critics and journalists who viewed this new 
cultural phenomenon as an exciting and controversial development in Russian theatre. 
New Drama emerged as a playwright-led development in theatre that privileged the 
writer in the creative process. At the turn of the millennium, a number of writers 
including Mikhail Ugarov, Elena Gremina, Nikolai Koliada, and Alexei Kazantsev 
founded their own independent theatres and started directing their own work. As 
Ugarov explicitly foregrounds in the New Drama Manifesto, the ‘rejection of 
contemporary authors by the theatre’ has served as a provocation for the movement.3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ugarov (2004). 
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The genealogy of New Drama is contended, but the revivification of 
playwriting in the 2000s is linked to a variety of disparate catalysts. In 1999 and 2000, 
the Royal Court Theatre’s International Department staged a series of workshops in 
Moscow prompted by Russian theatre makers’ fascination with the ‘In-Yer-Face’ 
theatre of British dramatists including Mark Ravenhill, Sarah Kane, and Anthony 
Neilson. Developed in the 1990s, ‘In-Yer-Face’ provoked its audience to re-consider 
their perception of what could be spoken about and presented on stage through the 
playwrights’ subversive use of language and violence.4 The Royal Court’s seminars 
introduced of the practice of verbatim theatre, which was a significant moment in the 
development of New Drama. As shall be discussed in Chapter One, the influence of 
British theatre on New Drama is contested, but for some Russian artists and cultural 
critics it belongs ‘outside the Russian tradition.’5  The founding of Moscow-based 
theatre Teatr.doc is another key moment in the evolution of the movement. In recent 
years, Teatr.doc has staged a series of provocative political productions, and remains 
the only independent theatre in Russia dedicated to producing new writing.  
 New Drama is used as an umbrella term to describe manifold theatrical genres 
and forms. Writers rarely concentrate on one specific genre, often shifting between 
producing documentary theatre, comic satire, and plays with more experimental 
theatrical structures. However, the extensive canon of New Drama is united by its 
examination of diurnal experience and the articulation of counter-narratives of 
individuals and communities that have been excluded and marginalised from the 
discourse of Putinism.6 In particular, writers employ the use of quotidian language 
and the inclusion of strong, obscene profanities, known as mat in Russian. Mat was a 
phenomenon that appeared in Russian literature during Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of 
perestroika in the 1980s as a means of challenging and subverting the linguistic 
constraints of official Soviet discourse and is defined by Russian literary scholar Eliot 
Borenstein as ‘forbidden words describing the human anatomy, sexual activity, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  ‘In-Yer-Face’ Theatre was the appellation first used by theatre critic Aleks Sierz to describe a new 
generation of young British playwrights who emerged in the 1990s. For more information on the plays 
and playwrights at the centre of ‘In-Yer-Face’ see Sierz’s book In-yer-face Theatre: British Drama 
Today (2000).	  
5 Bogaev in Freedman (2006) 19. 6	  In this thesis I use the term ‘counter-narratives’ as defined by political theorist Molly Andrews as ‘the 
stories which people tell and live which offer resistance, either implicitly or explicitly, to dominant 
cultural narratives’ Andrews (2004) 1.	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the rest of the physiological functions that Bakhtin so eloquently ascribes to the 
“lower bodily stratum”’.7  
 The focus on language, however, presents problems in defining New Drama. 
In the 2010s, the collaborations between theatre practitioners Pavel Pryazhko and 
Dmitrii Volkostrelov redefined the parameters of New Drama, playing with ideas of 
structure and form. Pryazhko’s play The Soldier (Soldat, 2011), which is a case study 
in Chapter Three, takes the form of fifteen minutes of silent, everyday actions 
performed by a single actor with only one line of text spoken at the end.  Pryazhko 
asserts that New Drama can take varied theatrical forms and is defined by its 
consideration of the ‘everyday individual experience. The language and structure of 
the text can take any form you want. It's not about them.’8 The productions of 
Pryazhko and Volkostrelov are examples that highlight how New Drama does not 
always depend on the presence of a theatrical text for its exploration of Russian 
society and politics. Although the parameters of the idiom have widened since the 
early 2000s, New Drama continues to interrogate contemporary political 
developments and asks its audience to think about their own role in civil society. In 
this thesis, therefore, the term New Drama is used to describe a canon of productions 
defined by their critical engagement with Russian politics and society.  
 
Literature Review 
As of writing, the only full-length book published on Russian playwriting in the 
twenty-first century is Birgit Beumers and Mark Lipovetsky’s 2009 study Performing 
Violence: Literary and Theatrical Experiments of New Russian Drama. This 
publication examines many of the playwrights that contributed to the explosion of 
new theatre at the turn of the millennium. In this work Beumers and Lipovetsky offer 
a detailed exploration of the phenomenon, arguing that the plays produced by Russian 
writers in the 2000s rendered ‘violence or trauma through language, through the 
interaction between characters, and through the organisation of theatrical 
performance’.9 Performing Violence contextualises New Drama within the framework 
of violence in Soviet and post-Soviet culture analysing how playwrights have 
articulated cultural and linguistic developments in modern Russia. By focusing on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Borenstein (2008) 58. 
8 Pryazhko (2011a).  
9 Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 301. 
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intersection between New Drama and brutality and violence in post-Soviet society, 
the study makes important insights into the developments of new play writing and the 
‘need to test new forms of social communication’.10 
Alongside Performing Violence, a number of academic articles have been 
published that trace and contextualise the rise of New Drama. Moscow-based theatre 
critic John Freedman’s article ‘Contemporary Russian Drama: The Journey from 
Stagnation to a Golden Age’ provides a summary of the evolution of New Drama, 
charting its evolution from the Liubimovka New Play Festival in the 1990s until 
2010. Freedman’s study examines New Drama geographically, between the cities of 
Moscow, Yekaterinburg, and Togliatti. By doing so, Freedman asserts the 
significance of the provinces - alongside the capital city - in the development of the 
movement. In his article, Freedman further observes the extensive parameters that 
define New Drama as applicable ‘to almost any new play challenging the theatrical 
establishment by way of language, form, or content.’11 A second article that provides 
an important overview of New Drama is ‘Russia's New Drama: From Togliatti to 
Moscow’ by scholar and theatre director, Yana Ross. Similarly to Freedman, Ross 
offers an account of twenty-first century playwriting based on the geographical 
locations of the primary protagonists. Ross explores the emergence of New Drama 
from the plays of Nikolai Kolyada in the 1990s and his influence on the subsequent 
generations of Yekaterinburg writers who attended his playwriting course at the 
Yekaterinburg State Theatre Institute.12 Ross’s article situates the emergence of New 
Drama in the historical context of Russian theatre. Ross argues that in the Russian 
theatre tradition: ‘fostering dialogue between playwrights and director has never been 
a priority in formal training programs, whose focus on old masters such as 
Shakespeare and Chekhov forms the basis for directing student’s vocabulary.’13 By 
making these observations, Ross offers important insights into the complex cultural 
background of New Drama, asserting that the movement has emerged as a reaction to 
the diminution of the creative role of playwrights in the 1990s. 
Moscow-based theatre critics have produced the majority of other written 
work on New Drama. In particular, the output of Pavel Rudnev, Marina Davydova, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. 135. 
11 Freedman (2010a) 408. 
12 Two of the writers considered in depth in this thesis, Vassily Sigarev and Polina Borodina, are 
graduates of Kolyada’s course.  
13 Ross (2006) 31. 
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Daniil Dondurei, and Elena Kovalskaya is referenced throughout this thesis. These 
writers primarily produce articles for Russian-language newspapers, magazines, and 
scholarly journals. In 2004, the journal Iskusstvo Kino published an edition dedicated 
to New Drama, which includes sections by Davydova and Dondurei as well as 
interviews and articles written by prominent figures in New Drama including two of 
the co-founders of Teatr.doc, Elena Gremina and Ivan Vyrypaev.  
 Further contributions to scholarship on twenty-first century Russian 
playwriting specifically attest to the development of documentary theatre and use of 
verbatim techniques by theatre makers. In their article ‘Reality Performance: 
Documentary Trends in Post-Soviet Russian Theatre’, Beumers and Lipovetsky 
analyse Russian documentary theatre in the artistic and social contexts of post-Soviet 
Russia. The study is concerned with the idea of the ‘other’ in modern Russian society, 
whom Beumers and Lipovetsky define as ‘perceived as potentially dangerous, as a 
source of violence’14 The article provides a historical context for the rise of 
documentary theatre, foregrounding the influence of British theatre practitioners who 
staged workshops on the verbatim technique in Russia in 2000. Additionally, 
Beumers and Lipovetsky contextualise Russian documentary theatre within global 
trends in western culture that emphasize ‘authentic’ artistic experience, including 
Danish ‘Dogma’ and Michael Moore’s documentary film Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004).15 In 
April 2015 Russian-language journal Teatr published an edition dedicated to 
documentary theatre practice entitled ‘Dokumental'naya Traditsiya v Teatr i v 
Iskusstve’ (The Documentary Tradition in Theatre and Art), which included a variety 
of scholarly articles as well as contributions from leading New Drama playwrights 
Maxsim Kurochkin, Alexander Rodionov, and Mikhail Kaluzhsky. 
The only full-length study of Russian documentary theatre in the twenty-first 
century is Molly Flynn’s unpublished thesis Documentary Theatre in Twenty-First 
Century Russia: teatr, v kotorom ne igraiut. Flynn’s study asserts that Russian 
documentary theatre practice ‘addresses important contradictions imbedded in the 
daily life of contemporary Russia’.16 Her thesis details how documentary theatre 
makers have addressed anxieties surrounding the nature of documents in 
contemporary Russia, creating theatrical interrogations of history, memory, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Beumers and Lipovetsky (2008) 301. 
15 Ibid. 294. 
16 Flynn (2015) 176.	  
	   13	  
national identity.  
This varied output of scholarly and critical literature on playwriting in the 
twenty-first century reflects the diverse range of theatrical works in the New Drama 
repertoire. It critically examines how playwrights have engaged with post-Soviet 
society and demonstrates the importance of new writing in the development of 
Russian theatre practice. As Beumers and Lipovetsky write: ‘[New Drama] has 
proven the need for a new stage language and for new plays, whether they are Russian 
or foreign. Thus, New Drama has placed Russian plays onto the theatrical map both 
home and abroad’.17 In other words, New Drama has revivified the role of the 
playwright in Russia and helped underscore the country’s dynamic theatrical 
traditions.  
As discussed here, a range of important scholarly and journalistic writing has 
examined New Drama in the social and political context of the Putin years. While 
both Flynn, and Beumers and Lipovetsky’s writings, consider documentary theatre 
practice in the context of the social and political setting of the 2000s and 2010s, they 
do not explicitly articulate their findings within the framework of Putinism and an 
oppositional discourse. Although these works are invaluable in furthering the 
understanding of contemporary Russian theatre, to date no study has examined New 
Drama within the explicit political context of the Putin regime and its policies. By 
considering the case studies within the framework of four key facets of Putinism, this 
thesis demonstrates how playwrights in Russia have directly interrogated the 
normative discourse of the Kremlin, providing vital oppositional narratives to those 
that saturate the state-controlled media.  
 
Research Methodology 
In my exploration of New Drama, I employ a variety of approaches to address my 
research questions and aims. Through both close textual readings and detailed 
analysis of the performances, this study focuses on both the linguistic aspects of New 
Drama, but also the important implications of each production’s staging. In this way, I 
question how New Drama is able to provoke its audience into a wider dialogue about 
their own engagement with contemporary Russian politics. Through contextual 
analysis that draws on wider scholarship from political theory and Slavonic studies, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Beumers	  and	  Lipovetsky	  (2009)	  33.	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situate New Drama within the political and historical contexts. Furthermore, my use 
of contemporary theatre scholarship provides an important dialogue for how New 
Drama is positioned in the Russian theatre tradition and global theatre practices in the 
twenty-first century.  
My case studies were selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, I chose a 
number of productions still running in repertoire in Russia, as I was able to attend 
performances of these productions. Secondly, I have attempted to cover productions 
staged throughout the development of Putinism. Therefore I include Vassily Sigarev’s 
play Plasticine (Plastilin, 2000), which was first professionally staged in 2001, and 
The Bolotnaya Square Case (Bolotnoe Delo, 2015) by Polina Borodina, which was 
produced in 2015. Finally, I have attempted to select writers who are still producing 
New Drama plays and remain involved in the promotion of new theatre writing in 
Russia. 
This study draws on fieldwork I conducted in Moscow and St Petersburg that 
consisted of attending theatre productions, conducting interviews, and engaging in 
archival work. I chose to focus my fieldwork primarily on Moscow for the following 
reasons. Firstly, a key part of my research in Russia took the form of attending as 
many live performances as possible. My aim was to inform my analysis of selected 
productions by observing them live in their original performance spaces. The majority 
of the case studies analysed in depth in this chapter are performed in repertoire at 
theatres in central Moscow. By attending these performances, not only was I able to 
strengthen my analysis of the productions, but I was also able to immerse myself in 
the working practices of the theatres and observe and participate in the post-show 
discussions that occur after many New Drama shows. Furthermore, by attending the 
productions I was able to engage in informal conversation with both audience 
members and staff at the theatres, which provided an important context for my 
research as it provided insight into how seriously theatre is taken in Russia, and its 
importance as a social and political art form. In hindsight, Moscow and St Petersburg 
proved to be very useful for my research due to the fact that I was able to attend a 
wide range of theatres and performances during my time in Russia, exposing me to 
the wider theatregoing culture in the capital.  
 Another important reason for basing my fieldwork in Moscow was to carry 
out interviews with theatre makers and critics who are active in the New Drama 
movement. In Moscow and St Petersburg I also attended a number of talks and after 
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show interviews with theatre practitioners, including Teatr.doc artistic directors 
Ugarov and Gremina, playwright Natalya Vorozhbit, and directors Dmitrii 
Volkostrelov and Andrei Mai. While the playwrights analysed in this thesis originally 
come from across the country (and in the case of Pavel Pryzahko, Belarus), the 
majority live and work in Moscow.18 For this reason it was vital to base my 
groundwork in the capital. It is worth pointing out that New Drama is explicitly 
centred around Moscow, and despite the disparate geographical origins of the 
playwrights, New Drama remains a Moscow-centric artistic movement. Visiting 
Moscow also enabled me to access archival material stored at Teatr.doc, which 
included programmes and promotional material, video recordings of previous 
productions, and transcripts of post-show discussions.  
A challenge that arose during my research in Russia is the fact that the subject 
of political art and opposition to the Putin regime are sensitive topics, as the spectre of 
artistic repression is a real possibility. During the course of writing my thesis, 
Teatr.doc was evicted from two separate buildings, and, at the time of writing, 
prominent theatre director Kirill Serebrennikov is under house arrest on what are 
believed by some to be politically motivated charges of embezzlement and fraud. 
Some theatre makers are, therefore, understandably reluctant to discuss their theatre 
within a political context, especially relating to the Putin regime. This was something 
I had anticipated, and as a result the majority of my questions did not explicitly ask 
about Putinism or the oppositional nature of the practitioners’ work. Instead, I focused 
on what the original inspiration for their plays were, the research methods, and how 
they thought their play were received by their audience.  
My status as a foreign researcher also caused some difficulties while 
conducting my research. In Russia, Western influence is often treated with mistrust, 
compounded by claims made by the Kremlin that Western-backed NGOs are 
interfering in the country’s democratic process. Anti-Putin protests and opposition to 
the state’s official discourse on the arts is taboo in Russia, and understandably 
individuals were unwilling to discuss their involvement in demonstrations or the 
political nature of their theatre. Therefore, my questions and fieldwork in Russia did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The statement that most New Drama writers live in Moscow was more accurate at the start of my 
thesis in 2013 than it is now. Due to the increasingly repressive artistic policies of the Putin regime, a 
number of high-profile theatre artists and playwrights have moved abroad. For example, in the last year 
Moscow based playwrights Natalya Vorozhbit and Maksim Kurochkin have both moved back to their 
native Ukraine.  
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not explicitly ask about anti-Putin sentiment, but nonetheless provided me with 
important insight into political attitudes. While the majority of people I contacted in 
Russia were extremely generous with their time and complimentary about the nature 
of my thesis, on occasion I encountered the attitude that only Russian scholars and 
critics were qualified to analyse the political nature of Russian theatre. Despite this, 
my fieldwork in Russia provided to be invaluable to this thesis and my understanding 
of Russian theatre in general. 
My positionality as a non-Russian researcher working in a Russian context 
also provided an important opportunity for this thesis to make an original contribution 
to the field of Russian theatre scholarship and performance studies. By drawing on 
new material not readily accessible to an English-speaking readership this thesis 
offers a unique insight into contemporary Russian theatre practices for non-Russian 
speakers. Through undertaking translations of play-texts, scholarly articles, and other 
contemporary sources that are either unpublished or only available in Russian-
language publications, I have provided new insight into this important body of 
theatrical work and its engagement with the politics of the Putin regime. 
Foregrounding these texts in an English-language thesis offers the chance to provide 
an original contribution and expand on the extant knowledge and understanding of 
these plays and theatre makers in an academic context. My status as a foreign scholar 
has also been of advantage when undertaking research. As noted elsewhere in this 
thesis, New Drama has developed and proliferated due to a series of enduring cross-
cultural artistic dialogues with international theatre makers and intuitions including 
the Royal Court Theatre and the Royal Shakespeare Company. I have actively 
participated and engaged with this dialogue, by attending workshops, talks, and 
rehearsed readings staged by Russian theatre makers in the United Kingdom, which 
has offered me a further opportunity to consider these plays within the wider field of 
performances studies.  
My research trips in the period 2013-2016 occurred at a time of unprecedented 
flux in twenty-first century Russian politics and theatre. Following the wave of mass 
protests during Putin’s presidential election campaign in the winter of 2011-12, there 
was a turn in the cultural policies of the Kremlin, with the authorities implementing 
censorship and disrupting the working practices of artists and theatres. In the summer 
of 2014, the government banned the use of mat in literature, film, music, and theatre. 
Due to the frequent use of mat in New Drama plays, venues staging new writing had 
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to reconfigure their repertoires and a number of New Drama productions were 
removed from regular performance.19 Furthermore, as noted above, in widely 
publicised events, Teatr.doc was evicted from its premises twice in the space of six 
months. The meant that for a prolonged period of time the artists at Teatr.doc had no 
access to their offices or archives.  
Finally, a further methodological issue I have had to address is the fact that the 
majority of the theatre practitioners I contacted during my research do not speak 
English. Furthermore, while there has been a great effort made to translate New 
Drama plays into English-language texts, the majority of the canon is, 
understandably, only available in Russian.20 To complete my study I have been 
required to engage in conversations in Russian, and also translate both published and 
unpublished scripts. In the summer before I started this thesis I spent four months 
residing in Moscow, studying and immersing myself to improve my Russian-language 
ability. Throughout my research I have continued to improve my Russian-language 
ability with continued study. 
 
Putin and Periodisation 
The plays examined in depth in this study were originally produced between 2001 and 
2015. In justifying the starting point of this thesis, I have considered a diverse range 
of cultural, political, and artistic factors. The first reason is related to this project’s 
consideration of contemporary Russian playwriting in the political context of the 
Putin era. The years 2000 to date incorporate Putin’s first two presidential terms 
between 2000 and 2008, and his current third term that runs from 2012 to 2018. This 
period also includes Putin’s tenure as Prime Minister between the years 2008 and 
2012 while Dmitrii Medvedev served as president, which has been observed as the 
perpetuation of ‘Putinism without Putin.’21 The date of Putin’s ascendency to the 
interim presidency on 31 December 1999, following Boris Yeltsin’s unexpected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It should be noted that the only Moscow theatre to ignore the ban and continue to stage productions 
that included mat was Teatr.doc. 
20 It must be noted that there has been a concerted effort made to translate the work of New Drama 
playwrights for an English speaking audience. These translators include: Noah Birksted-Breen, Sasha 
Dugdale, and John Freedman. 
21 For example, Sakwa has used this term to describe the Medvedev administration. See Sakwa (2010) 
71. Additionally, J. L. Black observes that the term ‘tandem’ was used in Russia to delineate the 
working relationship between Putin and Medvedev. Black argues that this ‘tandem’ unofficially 
privileged the authority of the prime minister over the president. Black (2014) 17. As an editorial in 
Novaya Gazeta succinctly phrased it, ‘the Tandem: Putin is at the helm’. Novaya Gazeta (2011)  
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resignation, marks a specific turning point in the development of post-Soviet politics 
in Russia. This is acknowledged by Sakwa, who observes that ‘the 1990s have now 
gained almost mythical status in contemporary Russia as a period of disaster and 
collapse.’22 The idea that Putin’s succession to the presidency at the turn of the 
millennium was an emblematic juncture where the country emerged from the ‘chaos’ 
of the Yeltsin-era is echoed by Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova: ‘after the 
presidential election [won by Putin in March 2000] the process of turning Yeltsin’s 
political chaos into a “democracy” controlled by the center had begun.’23 
Furthermore, January 2000 has been identified as a crucial turning point in Putin’s 
popularity with the Russian electorate. White and McAllister assert the importance of 
this date as turning point for Putin, observing that his inauguration as president and 
his vigorous pursuit of the Second Chechen War meant that by January 2000 he had 
the support of 62% of the Russian electorate who planned to vote in the March 
election of that year.24 
Before reviewing the burgeoning body of work on Putinism and the Putin 
administration, it is worth reflecting on the criteria for my selection of literature on 
contemporary Russian politics and society. As will be considered throughout this 
thesis, Putinism is a complex and multifarious political ideology. In order to examine 
New Drama in the context of the Putin era, I have drawn on a diverse range of 
materials on Putinism from both English and Russian-language sources. It is 
important to note here that since Putin’s election to the Presidency in 2000 
independent media in Russia has been gradually co-opted by the state. Freedom of the 
press has been curtailed and restricted. Additionally, the Kremlin seized control of 
independent media outlets including television channels NTV and ORT during 
Putin’s first term in office in what was labelled the ‘war on the oligarchs’.25 
Moreover, the upsurge in state endorsed studies and biographies of Putin that serve to 
promote the ideologies and narratives tendentious to the regime have created an 
idealised image of Putin as President in some Russian-language publications.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Sakwa (2008b) ix. 
23 Shevtsova (2005) 101. 
24 White and McAllister (2010) 143. 
25 For more information see Kovalev (2000). This will be discussed in further detail below and in 
Chapter Three. 
26 For example, Helena Goscilo has listed a number of biographies and studies dedicated to Putin that 
saturate the market in Russia. Goscilo (2013a) 30.  
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In selecting source material on Putinism I have paid particular attention to its 
relevance to the individual plays discussed in the main body of the thesis. At the crux 
of the thesis is a detailed analysis of the eight productions that serve as case studies 
and the significance of their staging in twenty-first century Russia. While I have 
drawn on various and multifaceted academic and contemporary sources - including 
Slavonic studies, Russian history, and journalistic work - the parameters for the 
selection of materials on Putinism referenced in this study has also been defined by 
the dramatic output of the playwrights and relates to the topics and issues raised in the 
productions. Therefore, this thesis’s close reading of the plays in performance utilises 
key materials by leading scholars and journalists on contemporary Russian politics to 
consider how playwrights have interrogated the rhetoric of the Kremlin and 
articulated an oppositional discourse that reflects wider protest movements within 
contemporary Russia. By examining these fundamental facets of Putinism alongside 
New Drama productions this thesis provides a contribution to the study of 
contemporary Russian playwriting as well as to the field of theatre and performance 
studies. The intersection between New Drama and Putinism demonstrates how theatre 
makers employ manifold theatrical forms and aesthetics to provide one of the most 
vital forms of opposition to the Putin regime.  
I will now move on to consider some of the key scholarly debates on the 
ideology of Putinism. Since Putin’s re-election as president of Russia in 2012, there 
has been a plethora of new English-language political biographies and publications on 
Putin and Putinism. While it would be almost impossible to give a concise account of 
all literature written on Russian politics over the previous fifteen years, this section 
aims to synthesise the prominent academic literature on Putin and Putinism, and to 
identify how Putinism has manifested itself and evolved since 2000. 
Putin’s political stance and ideology is often held by both scholars and 
journalists to be encapsulated in a single line from a speech he gave during the earliest 
days of his curtailed term as prime minister between August and December 1999, in 
which he rallied the Russian nation to ‘get off its knees’ and demonstrate its power. 
This memorable personification of the nation as a fallen fighter on its knees, which 
can be interpreted in a variety of ways, is often quoted as it resonates with a variety of 
scholarly appraisals of Putinism as a fluid and indefinable political ideology. One of 
the most prominent scholars of contemporary Russian politics is Richard Sakwa. 
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Among his large body of work, his two seminal monographs - Russian Politics and 
Society and Putin: Russia’s Choice - elucidate Putinism as follows:  
 
the political amorphousness of the quasi-centre but at the same time 
potentially transcend[ing] it […] Putin himself is an enigma. It was clear that 
support for Putin in the 2000 presidential elections was not based on any real 
appreciation of his policies, since other than the vigorous pursuit of the war in 
Chechnya, it was unclear what these policies were.27  
 
Sakwa views Putin’s policies as paradoxical, in that his attempts to fill centrist ground 
have resulted in the creation of a contradictory political identity that cannot be 
delineated in traditional terms. He further cites Russian sociologist Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya who argues that Putinism is simultaneously both of the left wing 
and right wing of the political spectrum.28 To Sakwa, the discernible contrasts in the 
political facets of Putinism are further exemplified by Putin’s use of both ‘neo-Soviet’ 
and ‘post-Soviet’ rhetoric and public performances for the Russian media.29 ‘These 
two faces’, Sakwa argues, ‘allowed Putin within the space of a few weeks to 
inaugurate a plaque in the Lubyanka honouring Andropov, the head of the KGB from 
1967-82, and then to place flowers at the grave of Andrei Sakharov, one of the most 
outstanding liberal dissidents and victim of Andropov’s “second Cold War” of 1979-
82’.30 A further example of Putin’s seemingly paradoxical attitude towards the legacy 
of the Soviet Union in twenty-first century Russia can be seen by his address to the 
Federal Assembly in March 2005, where he called the break-up of the Soviet Union ‘a 
tragedy for the Russian people’ and ‘the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
twentieth century’.31 This contrasts with the sentiments expressed in his manifesto 
Russia at the Turn of the Millennium: 
 
Communism and Soviet power did not make Russia a prosperous country with 
a dynamically developing society and free people […] However bitter it may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Sakwa (2008a) 473. 
28 Kryshtanovskaya in Sakwa (2014) 27. 
29 Sakwa (2008b) 39-40 and 152. 
30 Ibid. 40. 
31 Putin (2005)  
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be now to admit it, for nearly seven decades we were moving along a blind 
alley, far from the mainstream of civilisation.32 
 
 The pre-existing collection of academic literature on Putin’s Russia is driven 
by an attempt to define the ideology of Putinism, and explain his widespread 
popularity with the Russian electorate. This view of Putinism as a nebulous political 
ideology, which has bolstered its support through vague and contradictory policies, 
has been challenged by a number of scholars of contemporary Russian politics and 
society. Simon Pirani suggests that key to Putin’s rise to power and his continued 
success and popularity with the Russia electorate is the administration’s ability to 
harness the global oil boom in the early 2000s to increase the general standard of 
living in Russia.33 This point is reiterated by Stephen White and Ian McAllister. They 
argue that the ‘Putin phenomenon’ can be associated with the high value placed by 
the regime on economic prosperity during Putin’s first two terms in office between 
2000 and 2008.34 Furthermore, in her work on the Putin administration’s cultural 
policies, political scientist Lena Jonson summarises: ‘just as during the harsh realities 
of Soviet times there had been the promise of a glorious future and a better life, Putin 
now promised stability, and a harmonious and corporate striving towards the goal of a 
golden economic future’.35 Jonson further argues that Putinism has a firm ideological 
stance, suggesting that:  
 
while Western scholars claimed that the Putin regime lacked an ideology, this 
[has become] less and less the case as the outline of a Putin consensus 
gradually took on a more distinct form. Western scholars may be forgiven as 
this policy was initially not formulated on paper but took shape in interactions 
with major actors, among them the church. The evolving consensus was, 
however, reflected in words and deeds by high-level state representatives.36 
 
Jonson highlights four aspects that she identifies as part of the ‘Putin consensus’: 
State nationalism, Russia the Nation, Russia the Orthodox Nation, and A Unique 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Putin (2008) 320. 
33 Pirani (2010) 1-2. 
34 White and McAllister (2010)153-5. 
35 Jonson (2015) 33. 
36 Ibid 32. 
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Russian Path.37 For Jonson, the celebration of Russia’s history (and in particular the 
Second World War), coupled with the revivification of the Orthodox Church, and a 
growing anti-Western sentiment in Russia, are key aspects of Putinism. At the core of 
Jonson’s thinking is that Putinism can be defined through its increasingly nationalistic 
agenda. Jonson’s theory has been bolstered by the ongoing Russian military 
interventions in Ukraine, which have been justified as the reunification of a pan-
Orthodox axis united by language and religion.  
Extant work on Putinism by Russian critics has become increasingly limited 
during Putin’s presidency, as the regime seeks to repress dissenting voices that 
subvert the official discourse of Putinism. Examples of the Kremlin’s brutal silencing 
of anti-Putin critics can be seen in the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaia outside 
her apartment in central Moscow in October 2006. Scholar of Russian politics 
Stephen White claims that Politkovskaia’s front line reports on the bloody reality of 
the Second Chechen War were ‘an obvious motive for the attack.’38 Another example 
is the jailing of Nikolai Andrushchenko, editor of newspaper Novy Peterburg in 2007 
on charges of defamation and obstruction of justice after his coverage of a 2006 
murder investigation in St Petersburg that exposed corruption among high-profile 
members of the city’s authorities. Despite the spectre of authoritarian repression by 
the regime, there remains vital journalistic work that provides an oppositional stance 
against the Kremlin. The majority of this coverage is published in the Russian-
language broadsheet newspaper Novaya Gazeta, which is where Politkovskaia 
published her coverage of the Second Chechen War. This publication has articulated a 
number of salient anxieties around Putinism and has been a key source in challenging 
the official state narrative.  
 In the context of New Drama, there have been numerous instances of theatre 
makers incorporating facts and materials from Novaya Gazeta’s coverage of Russian 
society and politics into their plays. This trend is particularly apparent in the 
documentary theatre productions created by Gremina at Teatr.doc. For example, her 
play One Hour Eighteen Minutes (Chas Vosemnadtsat’, 2010, expanded in 2012), 
which is examined in detail in Chapter Five, includes reports from Novaya Gazeta 
editor Dimitrii Muratov in the script. Another example of the staging of Novaya 
Gazeta reportage is the 2016 production New Antigone (Novaya Antigona, 2016), a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid. 32-7. 
38 White (2011) 199. 
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collaboration between Gremina and Novaya Gazeta journalist Elena Kostyuchenko.39  
The play documents the arrest of six mothers whose children died in the Beslan 
school hostage crisis in September 2004. The women were subsequently incarcerated 
for protesting against the Kremlin’s refusal to provide an adequate investigation of the 
massacre, while wearing t-shirts emblazoned with the provocative slogan ‘Putin – the 
executioner of Beslan’. The diminution of a free press in Russia has seen theatre and 
new playwriting take the place of traditional journalism by providing the 
amplification of marginalised voices and the foregrounding of topical events and 
discourses excluded from official state rhetoric.40  
In the scholarship cited above, the start of the new millennium serves as 
kariotic moment in the development of post-Soviet Russian politics. In the official 
discourse of Putinism, this date also serves as a key point of departure: Putin himself 
has defined the turn of the millennium as a significant and singular moment in the 
development of the Russian nation. On 29 December 1999, two days before the start 
of his premiership, Putin published his ‘Millennium Manifesto’, Russia at the Turn of 
the Millennium, online and in daily broadsheet newspaper Izvestia. Here, Putin 
abrogated Yeltsin’s post-Soviet project and outlined the basis of his own ideology, 
underscoring a set of key concerns and principles that he identifies as traditional 
Russian values that the country needed to re-embrace. Putin’s manifesto marked the 
new millennium as the start of a new political epoch and an important historical 
moment in the shaping of the Russian nation:  
 
The contemporary world lives under the sign of two global events: the new 
millennium and the two-thousandth anniversary of Christianity. In my view 
the enormous interest in these two events represents something greater and 
deeper than just the tradition of celebrating significant dates.41 
 
2000 was also a significant year in the defining of Putinism. In the first of his annual 
State of the Nation addresses on 8 July 2000, Putin set out the state-building rhetoric 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Kostyuchenko is a prominent investigative reporter and LGBTQ activist. She was one of the first 
journalists in Russia to report on Pussy Riot.	  
40 For example, Molly Flynn notes that two contemporary playwrights, Nina Belenitskaia and 
Ekaterina Bondarenko, originally trained as journalists before turning their attention to theatre. See 
Flynn (2015) 10. 
41 Putin (2008) 317. 
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that would form the ideological foundations of Putinism, including his desire to 
strengthen the power of the state and the president, as well as laying out the economic 
principles of Putinism.42 
Finally, in my consideration of the significance of the year 2000 as a starting 
point for this thesis, it is important to consider the outbreak of the Second Chechen 
War in October 1999, which continued into the 2000s. For a number of Russian 
commentators, the violent conflict is indelibly associated with the emergence of 
Putinism and Putin’s state-building programmes. Editor of Novaya Gazeta, Dimitrii 
Muratov, wrote in 2014 that ‘all that is happening today is but a consequence of this 
war.’ 43 Similarly, Russian human rights activist Sergei Kovalev asserts that Putin’s 
initial popularity with the Russian electorate was due to his success in the war, but 
reflecting on Putin’s nascent authoritarian stance observes that ‘I fear it is very likely 
that the year 2000 will someday be referred to as the “twilight of Russian freedom”’.44  
 The second reason this study takes the year 2000 as a starting point is that the 
turn of the millennium saw the explosion of new theatrical modes and techniques 
practised by Russian theatre makers and playwrights. This important shift in the 
artistic practice of new theatre writing has been identified by a number of prominent 
academics and critics. Theatre critic for the Moscow Times John Freedman, observes 
that the late 1990s and early 2000s marked the revivification of the Russian theatre as 
an artistic force.45 Furthermore, Freedman argues that ‘the extraordinary fruits of the 
boom in dramatic writing that began in the late 1990s and continues to this day’ have 
been a vital influence on the development of Russian theatre and drama in the twenty-
first century.46 Beumers and Lipovetsky agree with Freedman’s assertion that the start 
of the millennium marked a key moment in the development of new writing: 
 
Russian culture of the beginning of the twenty-first century has been 
characterized by a powerful boom of drama. In the late 1990s and early 2000s 
young writers have actively engaged in playwriting – producing no less plays 
than there were poems or novels.47    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Putin (2000).  
43 Muratov (2014). 
44 Kovalev (2000). 
45 Freedman (2015). 
46 Freedman (2010a) 81. 
47 Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 28. 
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Russian academic Ilya Smirnov also contends that a new playwriting culture emerged 
contemporaneously with the 2000s.48  
 In particular, 2000 was an important year in the development of new 
playwriting in Russia. Firstly, a significant moment in the development of the 
thematics of contemporary playwriting was the performance of a rehearsed reading of 
Sigarev’s play Plasticine at the Liubimovka New Writing Festival in 2000.49 
Plasticine is one of the case studies analysed in depth in Chapter Four, and is 
described by Freedman as being the ‘play that kicked off the term “new drama” in 
earnest’.50 Furthermore, in December 2000 the first Russian festival of documentary 
theatre in Moscow, provided the opportunity for numerous young playwrights to stage 
their documentary plays and introduced Russian audiences to the verbatim 
playwriting techniques imparted to Russian theatre makers at the Royal Court’s 
workshops.51 Another important development was the critical and commercial success 
of Yevgenii Grishkovets’s debut play How I Ate A Dog (Kak Ia Sel Sobaku, 1998), a 
one-person show about his experience of being drafted into the Soviet navy as a 
teenager. How I Ate A Dog, which was written, directed, and performed by 
Grishkovets, premièred at the Central Academic Theatre of the Russian Army in 1998 
and toured numerous Moscow theatres for two years before winning both the 
‘Innovation’ category and ‘Critics’ Prize’ at the 2000 Golden Mask festival - the 
national theatre award for drama, opera, ballet and modern dance. The production 
subsequently toured Europe, including a run at the Royal Court Theatre in 2000. 
Grishkovets became the first of a new generation of playwrights to achieve 
widespread popularity and critical acclaim, raising the profile of new Russian theatre 
writing in the country and abroad.  
 Among Russian theatre makers and critics, there is a similar sentiment echoed 
that the start of the 2000s marked a significant moment in the evolution of post-Soviet 
playwriting. Moscow based critic Pavel Rudnev argues that there was a lacuna 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Smirnov (2000). 
49 The Liubimovka New Writing Festival was originally founded in 1991 by playwrights Elena 
Gremina and Alexei Kazantsev as retreat for playwrights, actors, and directors to come together to 
perform and discuss the variety of new plays that were being written across Russia, but could not find a 
theatre to produce them. The event was held annually in the grounds of Stanislavskii’s country estate 
just outside Moscow, from which the festival took its name. The festival is now staged every 
September at Teatr.doc, under the direction of playwright Mikhail Durnenkov.  
50 Freedman (2011). 
51 The festival was held across three venues in central Moscow, the Children’s Musical Theatre of 
Young Actors, the School of Modern Drama, and Konstantin Stanislavski’s house museum. 
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between Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s plays in the 1980s and the 1990s that resulted in a 
‘lost generation’ of playwrights.52 According to playwright and co-founder of 
Teatr.doc Ivan Vyrypaev, the 1990s were a ‘vacuum in modern drama’.53 
Additionally, Alexander Rodionov, whose documentary play The Battle of the 
Moldovans for a Cardboard Box (Voina Moldovan Za Kartonnuiu Korobku, 2003) 
was one of the first productions included in Teatr.doc’s repertoire, underscores the 
significance of the Royal Court Theatre’s workshop in April 2000: ‘for me, something 
really changed only in April 2000.’54 As observed above, the influence of the Royal 
Court Theatre’s International Department in Russia is controversial and contested, but 
it is clear that it provided an important demarcation between what came before and 
after.  
 Another consideration for why New Drama emerged in the 2000s can be 
attributed to a generational change in who was writing new plays. While this shift in 
generations did not occur across all of Russian theatre, Freedman notes that, ‘in the 
1990s, most of the major writers of the previous era - Liudmila Petrushevskaia, Nina 
Sadur, Liudmila Razumovskaia, and Mikhail Roshchin, to name just a few - either 
wrote less, stopped writing altogether, or were produced significantly less often than 
they had been during the 1980s.’55 Gremina has also attested that in the 2000s, there 
was a transformation in the audience members attending new writing productions in 
Moscow, stating that the audience members who attend Teatr.doc are ‘very young’.56 
My own experience of attending theatre productions in Russia during my research 
corroborates Gremina’s suggestion. In the context of this study’s consideration of 
New Drama’s relationship to the nascent anti-Putin protest movement, it is important 
to note the part played by this young generation, who had come of age after the 
collapse of communism, in the demonstrations against Putin’s re-election as president 
in 2011 and 2012. In his ground-breaking study Protest in Putin’s Russia, Mishca 
Gabowitsch observes that ‘the new importance of street protests gave new 
prominence to youth-centred opposition groups and parties’ youth wings.’57 
Gabowitsch argues that, for many young protestors participating in the protests 
against Putin’s inauguration for a third term as president on 6 May 2012, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Rudnev (2004) 5. 
53 Vyrypaev (2004).  
54 Rodionov and Kurochkin (2015). 
55 Freedman (2010b) 390. 
56 Gremina (2006) 135. 
57 Gabowitsch (2017) 122. 
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experience was akin to ‘a romantic revolutionary spring.’58 This view has been 
echoed by playwright Borodina, author of The Bolotnaya Square Case, who describes 
her participation in a protest in her home city of Yekaterinburg on 6 May 2012 as 
‘terribly safe and terribly romantic’59 
A final reason for the starting point of this thesis is that a crucial factor which 
facilitated the growth of New Drama in the 2000s and 2010, was the rise of the 
Internet. Political scholar Sarah Oates observes that the turn of the millennium 
heralded the start of an unprecedented rise of Russians with access to the Internet. 
Oates writes that: 
 
from 2000 to 2010, the numbers of Russians online grew twenty-fold, reaching 
59.7 million users or 43 percent of the population by the end of 2010. This growth 
not only out-stripped virtually anywhere in Western Europe, but also meant that 
Russia added far more in sheer numbers than other post-Soviet countries with 
high internet growth in the same period […] This also has contributed to the 
growth of the Russian language online, as Russian became one of the top 10 
languages used in the online sphere by 2011.60 
 
The Internet has been utilised as a fruitful source to generate theatrical material. 
Gremina and Ugarov’s play September.doc (Sentyabr.doc, 2005) is a collection of 
monologues and dialogues originally posted on internet blogs, forums, and chat 
rooms, in the immediate aftermath of the Beslan massacre. Gremina and Ugarov’s use 
of online diatribes to create the text for September.doc examined anti-Chechen 
attitudes in Russia and exposed the outpouring of racist vitriol and political cynicism 
that occurred online in the aftermath of Beslan.  
The Internet has also played a key part in facilitating a frisson of energy and 
excitement around New Drama. New Drama’s parallel rise with the Russian-language 
Internet is highlighted by the name of prominent New Drama venue Teatr.doc. The 
use of file extension ‘.doc’ in the theatre’s name knowingly refers to the numerous 
documentary productions included in the theatre’s repertoire since it opened in 2002, 
but also links the online culture and social media website that Teatr.doc’s artistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ibid. 9. 
59 Borodina (2015b). 
60 Oates (2013) 55-6  
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directors utilise to promote the theatre and New Drama in general.61 Theatre makers 
and audience members use online platforms to exchange ideas, post news, advertise 
upcoming events, and share photographs and reviews. In particular, the use of blogs 
and the websites LiveJournal and Facebook have provided important online platforms 
for disseminating this material.62 The use of social media has become part of 
Teatr.doc’s policy of encouraging their audience to participate in wider civic 
engagement. As well as gaining revenue from a number of successful crowd-funding 
campaigns, one of which was entitled ‘Save Teatr.doc’, the theatre regularly holds 
volunteer days that are organised on Facebook, where members of the public help 
maintain the space along with the actors, playwrights, and directors who work for the 
company. After the eviction of Teatr.doc from their original space in December 2014, 
the company used Facebook and other social media platforms to galvanise a small 
army of volunteers to help rapidly secure a new venue and transform it into operating 
functioning theatre venue. In this way, the promotional and organisational tactics 
utilised by the New Drama practitioners are comparable to the anti-Putin protest wave 
that swept across Russia in 2011-13. Analogously, social media was used as a primary 
form of communication for the protestors as well as a way to mobilise grassroots 
action.63 More recently, Teatr.doc have utilised the Internet to disseminate and share 
their productions to audience members unable to attend performances in Moscow. For 
example, in November 2016 a performance of The Bolotnaya Square Case and the 
subsequent after show discussion was filmed using multiple cameras and live-
streamed on YouTube around the world. 
The use of the Internet and social media platforms as a way to promote wider 
civic engagement and disseminate material to a global audience is not peculiar to 
Russia. In considering the global growth of the Internet since the turn of the 
millennium it is worth reflecting on how the rise of social media has impacted on 
global protest movements in relation to New Drama and the Russian protest wave of 
2011-13. Theatre scholars Mohamed Samir El-Khatib and Sophie Nield observe that 
the Internet and transnational social networks online played an important role in the 
global protests at the start of the 2010s, including the Occupy movement and the Arab 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Similar observations have been made by Beumers and Lipovestsky (2008) 298, and Flynn (2015) 9. 
62 For example, as of September 2017, Teatr.doc is currently followed by over 18,000 people on 
Facebook. Anecdotally, I have found Facebook the easiest way to communicate with the theatre 
makers I have connected with during the writing of this thesis. 
63 See Gabowitsch (2017) 151-3.  
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Spring in 2011.64 Considering the occupation of Cairo’s Tahrir Square by Egyptian 
protests in January 2011, El-Khatib argues that ‘while the revolution in technology 
gave Egyptian dissidents the power to reject the past and its outdated values, global 
cyberspace also allowed them to keep abreast of what was happening in the world 
around them and to form alternative political ideas about liberty, social justice and 
different ways of living.’65  
In his article ‘Tahrir Sqaure as Spectacle: Some Exploratory Remarks on 
Place, Body and Power’, El-Khatib frames the Egyptian revolution of 2011 as the 
contestation of the official political rhetoric of the state, which was challenged 
through the rejection of this official state discourse and the ‘liberation’ of space 
through public occupation.66 His article analyses the Egyptian revolution from the 
perspective of theatre and performance studies, in an attempt to examine how protest 
lifts ‘the curtain on an explosive, performing body that has slipped away from the grip 
of power and sought to challenge its sociocultural and linguistic constraints.’67 
Although some scholars have argued that anti-Putin protests have operated within a 
specific Russian context, the political concerns of New Drama overlap with wider 
international contexts of dissent and protest in the twenty-first century identified by 
El-Khatib, which have in part been facilitated by the rise of the Internet.68 In this 
thesis’s inquiry into the political nature of contemporary theatre practice in Russia, it 
can be seen that at the crux of New Drama playwrights have comparatively addressed 
anxieties over official state narratives and discourse. The international context of New 
Drama is an important framework for understanding the emergence and development 
of the movement. Situating New Drama within a global context and international 
theatre scholarship provides a useful context for discussing the political nature of 
these productions. 
As I have demonstrated, the rationale for the historical framework of my thesis 
centres on, not only the shift in theatre practices at the start of the 2000s, but also the 
emergence of a number of significant cultural and political developments. The sudden 
arrival of the charismatic figure of Putin who embodied Russia’s revival on the global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 El-Khatib (2013) 109-10 and Nield (2015) 121. 
65 El-Khatib (2013) 110. 66	  Ibid.	  
67 Ibid. 104. 
68 For example, Gabowitsch argues that - with the notable exception of the feminist punk-rock group 
Pussy Riot - the anti-Putin protests in the early 2010s were often surprisingly disengaged from the 
actions and rhetoric of the cotemporaneous globalised protest movements. 
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stage, facilitated the emergence of a new political engagement by theatre makers, who 
have looked for new ways to articulate and interrogate the political and social relates 
of twenty-first century Russia. 
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis explores the intersection between New Drama and Putinism through five 
themed chapters. The first chapter surveys the theatrical landscape in Russia at the 
turn of the millennium, focusing on the political and historical contexts of New 
Drama in Russian theatre and culture. The subsequent chapters focus on specific case 
studies. Chapter Two explores the development of political satire throughout Putin’s 
presidency by contrasting Varvara Faer’s BerlusPutin (2012) and Viktor Teterin’s 
Putin.doc (2005). These plays demonstrate two distinct modes of satirical intervention 
and foreground divergent attitudes towards Putin. The analysis of these productions 
provides an introduction to key elements of Putinism and contemporary Russian 
theatre’s engagement with the anti-Putin protest movement that emerged in the 2010s.  
 Chapter Three considers the complex legacy of the Second Chechen War 
(1999-2009) and the revivification of a militarised society in modern Russia. The 
Second Chechen War was the defining feature of Putin’s first term as President 
between 2000 and 2004. He viewed its success as his making or breaking, declaring, 
‘my […] historical mission - it may sound lofty, but it's true - is to resolve the 
situation in the Northern Caucasus’.69 The war saw the first gagging of the Russian 
media by Putin, with reporters pressurised to capitalise on the patriotic sentiment that 
surrounded the war in its early months. This chapter analyses Mikhail and Vyacheslav 
Durnenkov’s The Drunks (Pianii, 2009) and Pavel Pryzahko’s The Soldier (Soldat, 
2011), which both subvert the idealised stereotype of soldiers and veterans propagated 
by the Kremlin. Central to this chapter is my argument that Russian playwrights have 
subverted the strengthening of militarised gender identities under Putinism. Using 
these two very different productions, I propose writers have aimed to undermine an 
idealised notion of masculinity and the war hero, focusing their depictions of soldiers 
and war veterans on their frailties and fears, and suggesting they have been 
marginalised by the policies of Putinism. 
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 Chapter Four examines the consequences of the expanding social divide under 
the Putin administration as depicted in two plays by Vasilly Sigarev: Plasticine 
(Plastilin, 2000) and Black Milk (Chernoe Moloko, 2001). Putinism has focused on 
modernising European Russia in the west to the detriment of provincial cities in the 
north and south of the country, which have experienced growing poverty and social 
deprivation. Sigarev creates alternative narratives that focus on marginalised sections 
of Russian society at the turn of the millennium. The plays raise important questions 
that challenge the discourse of Putinism that the 2000s were characterised by stability, 
in contrast with the social and economic chaos of the Boris Yeltsin era.  
Chapter Five investigates the relationship between Russian documentary 
theatre and the Kremlin’s politicisation of justice and the legal system through close 
analysis of two Teatr.doc productions, The Bolotnaya Square Case (Bolotnoe Delo, 
2015) by Polina Borodina and One Hour Eighteen Minutes (Chas Vosemnadtsat’, 
2010, expanded in 2012), by Elena Gremina. Exploring the two case studies in the 
context of notions of justice and the ‘fictitious legalism’ of the Putin regime, I argue 
that the status of documents in samizdat literature of the Soviet Union is reflected in 
the documentary theatre of the 2000s and 2010s. By examining these two plays in the 
context of samizdat, this chapter contends that the act of documentation and the 
privileging of the document is a vital feature of documentary theatre in Russia, and is 
key to understanding how theatre-makers have employed the aesthetics of ‘theatre of 
the real’ to undermine the official discourse of the Putin regime and challenge their 
audience to consider their own role in challenging these manipulated judicial 
narratives.70  
 
Translation and Transliteration.  
It is important to take a moment to discuss my use of translations and transliteration 
throughout this thesis. Where English translations of play-texts and other Russian-
language sources already exist, these have been used. In cases where no English-
language translation has been published or is readily available, translations are my 
own. Throughout this thesis I use the Library of Congress (ALA-LC) system of 
transliteration for transliterations from the Cyrillic to the Latinate alphabet. For ease 
of readership and in order to avoid confusion, I render well-known names in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 ‘Theatre of the real’ is a term used by theatre scholar Carol Martin. For a definition, see Martin 
(2013) 5. 
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familiar transliterated form (for example Ilya rather than Il’ya; Natalya rather than 
Natal’ia. 
 Having introduced the primary aims for this thesis, I will now turn my 
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Chapter One: New Drama and Theatre Contexts 
 
Introduction 
As I have set out in the introduction to this thesis, the turn of the millennium marked 
an important moment in the development of new theatre writing in Russia. The 
unanticipated arrival of New Drama resulted in a contentious debate about what the 
origins of the movement were. The precipitous emergence of a new cultural 
movement had historical precedent in Russian theatre history. As theatre scholar Amy 
Skinner has observed in her article ‘Exploring the hinterlands: avant-garde 
temporality, socialist realism, and Pogodin’s Aristocrats’, the mid-1930s were a 
period when state supported socialist realism was implemented to replace the avant-
garde theatre practices of directors such as Vsevolod Meyerhold. Skinner defines such 
periods as ‘hinterlands’, ‘the moments when avant-garde practice shifts and develops 
into new, post-avant-garde, theatrical languages.’1 
In the case of New Drama this emergence of a new theatre moment was 
ascribed to foreign influence, as opposed to an official shift in state policy on the arts 
as occurred in the Soviet Union. The impact of the Royal Court Theatre’s 
International Department in Russia is paramount to understanding why there was such 
a hotly contested debate about the origins of New Drama. In 1999 and 2000 the Royal 
Court held a series of workshops and seminars that introduced young Russian writers 
to the British tradition of a playwright-led theatre and documentary theatre forms. In a 
country where Western influence is often treated with mistrust and the Russian 
theatrical tradition is a source of national pride it was perhaps unsurprising that there 
was a backlash towards the Royal Court influence on young Russian playwrights.  
Both Russian and foreign critics levelled claims of cultural imperialism at the 
Royal Court, accusing it of debasing Russian theatre in a quest for new productions 
that complemented the theatre’s artistic policies. Playwright Oleg Bogaev stated ‘we 
have a notion these days called “New Drama” The language used there is not mine. 
It’s a naïve kind of art that exists outside the Russian tradition’.2 Theatre critic 
Grigorii Zaslavskii (2004) described ‘a foreign bottle with poisoned ink [that had] 
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2 Bogaev in Freedman (2006) 19 
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sailed from England’.3 Some commentators went further, linking the influence 
exerted by the Royal Court and British Council on Russian theatre to the NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, implying a tacit link between the West’s political 
and artistic policies in Eastern Europe.4 Ross (2006) has also compared the British 
Council’s role in post-Soviet Russian culture to the Allied efforts in post-World War 
II Germany.5  
I situate my chapter within this debate about the origins of New Drama and 
the importance of the Royal Court’s influence on the development of new 
playwrigting at the turn of the millennium. I start by addressing the new writing scene 
in the 1990s. I then give an account of the workshops staged by the Royal Court in 
1999 and 2000, surveying the reception of the theatre’s influence by Russian theatre 
makers and critics. I also introduce the technique of verbatim theatre that was 
introduced to the Russian playwrights by the Royal Court during these lectures. I then 
finish this chapter by providing a second important influence on New Drama: the 
plays of Liudmila Petrushevskaia in the 1970s and 80s. 
 
Theatre in the 1990s 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the introduction of a market economy had a 
huge impact on Russian theatre. In the 1990s box office revenue became of far greater 
importance and, as a result, lavish and heavily-financed productions became de 
rigueur, resulting in the closure of many of small, experimental studio theatres that 
had previously relied on state funding. Those that survived ultimately succumbed to 
the pressures of commercialisation and integrated themselves into the mainstream, 
producing plays by established writers that would draw in large and stable audience 
numbers. In the mid-1990s, the opportunities for practising playwrights to have their 
work published or staged in an established theatrical space were greatly reduced.6 
Writers were often limited to creating commission-based adaptations of classic novels 
or foreign plays, and many subsidised themselves by writing for prime-time television 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Zaslavskii in Otkasatcya ot… (2004). 
4 ‘The list of organisations that sponsor this transformation of [Russian] theatre (the British Council, 
the French Cultural Centre, and the Goethe Institute in Germany) and hurry to enlighten us about New 
Drama, are the same powers who bombed Yugoslavia’. Smirnov (2000)  
5 Ross (2006) 39 
6 Two notable exceptions during this period were the Moscow Art Theatre’s staging of both Elena 
Gremina’s Behind The Mirror (Za Zerkalom, 1994) and Oleg Bogaev’s The Russian National Postal 
Service (Russkaya Narodnaya Pochta, 1995) in 1994 and 1998 respectively. 
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series.7  
It was not until the creation of spaces such as Teatr.doc and the Playwright 
and Director Centre at the turn of the millennium that provided writers a creative 
outlet to stage their own productions, develop their craft through rehearsed readings, 
and the opportunity to establish a dialogue with their coevals in the theatre scene. The 
need for the creation of new theatres to accommodate the rise in new writing goes 
beyond the financial implications on the theatre scene as a result of the collapse of 
communism in Russia. Historically, training for directors and actors in Russian 
theatre schools has focused on classic texts, and the fostering of a dialogue with active 
playwrights has never been a priority in the formal education of young directors8. 
Duška Radosavljević further makes the point that Russian theatre directors have a 
much less text-centered approach to theatre making than, for example, their associates 
in the United Kingdom9. These combined factors have long resulted in Russian 
directors assuming the role of auteurs, whose control and authority over the 
production is unquestioned. Director Yuri Liubimov has articulated this, arguing that 
‘the director must ensure both the construction and the articulation of the production 
himself’.10 
It was in this artistic climate, immediately after the collapse of communism, 
that a narrative emerged among cultural critics that new theatre writing ceased to exist 
in Russia. Russian theatre scholar Mikhail Shvydkoy, dates the start of this perceived 
theatrical period of transition back to Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika policies:  
 
after the launching of a perestroika in theatre, certain voices were heard 
asking, ‘But where are the masterpieces? Why is it that after four years of 
unconstrained activity the theatre has produced fewer outstanding plays?’ It 
appears as if some of my colleagues are beginning to create a theory about 
how the quality of theatre was better during the stagnation period.11 
 
Shvydkoy argues that the dearth in the writing of new plays that followed the 
perestroika of the mid 1980s was the result of a generation of leading playwrights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Yuri Kaldiev and Vyacheslav Durnenkov were involved in the writing of the controversial show 
School, while Gremina has continued to write for television to help fund Teatr.doc. 
8 Ross (2006) 31. 
9 Radosavljević (2013) 53. 
10 Liubimov in Beumers (1997) 6. 
11 Shvidkoi (1989) 10. 
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including Alexander Gelman, Liudmila Petrushevskaia, Alexei Kazantsev, and 
Alexander Galin ‘pausing to look around’, and ‘like all other Soviet people […] 
winning the rights necessary for a full participation in public life beyond the realm of 
their professional work’.12 Thus, an established narrative had already arisen that 
proclaimed the death of the playwright in Russian theatre even prior to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and that the interlude in playwriting that occurred in the 1990s was, 
at least partially, a lingering result of the policy of perestroika.  
John Freedman observes that a ‘myth’ has arisen about the perceived 
stagnation in the Russian theatre in the late 1980s and 1990s. 13  Freedman notes that: 
‘the 1990s in Russia were a time when it was the fashion to proclaim everything 
theatrical dead. There were, the pundits said, no new directors, no new actors, no 
theatres worth attending and certainly no new writers worth staging.’14 This can partly 
be explained by the rescinding of state censorship that provoked an explosion in the 
consumption of art that had previously been banned in the Soviet Union, resulting in 
new artistic and theatrical developments becoming overlooked. As academic of 
Slavonic studies Helene Melat argues: ‘during the first years following the Soviet era, 
the conventional forms of literature dissolved and diversified: perhaps the most 
striking phenomenon was the sudden emergence of popular culture on a very large 
scale. Hitherto banned, or severely restricted, literary experiments flourished.’15 
Indeed, the 1990s was an important period in the development of new theatre writing, 
and the burgeoning of what would become known as New Drama. In 1991 the 
playwrights Gremina, Alexi Kazantsev, and Mikhail Roshchin established the annual 
Liubimovka New Play Festival. Throughout the decade, the event grew, nurturing 
many talents who would become synonymous with the New Drama. The 1997 
Liubimovka marked one of the paramount moments of the cumulative new writing 
movement in Russia. Freedman has called the 1997 festival at Liubimovka a 
catalyzing event that united individuals, theatrical styles, and geographical locations. 
Freedman claims that ‘it provided a legitimate break separating what came “before” 
from what came “after”. From this point on, Russia’s theatre community could no 
longer look at developments in the field of drama as a random string of disparate and 
insolated incidents; subsequently, each individual development had to be understood 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid. 11. 
13 Freedman (1997) xiv. 
14 Freedman (2006) 18. 
15 Melat (2013) 78-9. 
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within the context of a greater whole’.16 
The festival hosted the inaugural readings of Olga Mukhina’s YoU (1997), and 
Oleg Bogaev’s The Russian National Post Service (Russkaya Narodnaya Pochta, 
1995). YoU is a scathing expose of the vacuous nihilism of middle class Moscow 
during the Yeltsin era. The play is set during the contemporary events of the First 
Chechen War during the mid-1990s, and depicts a young conscript solider named 
Nikolai in his final days of leave before returning to the front line. Mukhina 
interrogates the indifference and acquiescence of the Muscovite characters to the war 
that envelops their everyday life through radio broadcasts and newspaper reports. The 
Russian National Post Service is a play about an elderly war veteran falling into 
senility, whose only contact with the outside world is the correspondence he believes 
he keeps with his old army comrades, Boris Yeltsin, and Elizabeth II. Bogaev’s play 
directly engages with the social and political reality of Yeltsin’s Russia. As political 
scientist Andrea Chandler argues, pensioners became increasingly marginalised and 
impoverished in the 1990s as their living standards were eroded by the new economic 
policies implemented after the end of communism.17 In their portrayal of 
contemporary Russian life and social issues, YoU and The Russian National Post 
Service were key plays in developing the thematics of New Drama. Their staging of 
individuals excluded from the normative public sphere, raising questions of who is 
culpable for the effects of political decisions on the most vulnerable members of 
Russian society. 
Another important development in the emergence of New Drama in 1990s was 
the founding of festival and performance spaces across the country by playwrights 
who aimed to promote new theatre writing. In 1994 Nikolai Kolyada founded a 
playwriting course at the Yekaterinburg State Theatre Institute with the intention of 
galvanising a new generation of playwrights to experiment with theatrical 
conventions and language, providing them with the space to produce rehearsed 
readings. Kolyada’s graduates include Bogaev, as well as two of the writers 
considered in depth in this thesis, Vassily Sigarev and Polina Borodina. In Togliatti, 
in the south of Russia, the inaugural ‘May Readings’ festival was organised by 
playwright Vadim Levanov at the Golosova 20 theatre centre in 1999. The festival 
similarly provided a platform for young participants interested in theatre writing, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Freedman (2010b) 393-5 
17 Chandler (2004) 60-71.  
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resulted in the discovery of three of the vanguards of New Drama, the brothers 
Mikhail and Vyacheslav Durnenkov, and Yuri Klavdiev, who subsequently became 
known as the ‘Togliatti phenomenon’. Finally, in Moscow Alexi Kazantsev, and 
Mikhail Roshchin opened the Playwright and Director’s Centre (CDR) in 1998, a 
space dedicated to producing new writing.  
Finally, is also clear that during the 1990s the recognition given to new theatre 
writing grew. One explicit reason for the rising profile of new writing was the 
establishment of Russian literary award the Anti-Booker Prize in 1995. The Anti-
Booker was an annual award staged by the daily broadsheet newspaper Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta between 1995 and 2001 as contra to the British-sponsored Russian Booker 
Prize. In 1997 the Anti-Booker introduced a new stage play category awarded to the 
author of a new production. The Anti-Booker played a prominent role in bringing 
wide spread national attention to the new plays being produced in Russia in the 1990s, 
and emphasised the role of the playwright in the artistic process of producing a play. 
The award helped challenge the artistic status quo, and provoked the general public to 
challenge their ideas about the role of theatre in post-Soviet Russia. The winners of 
the prize in the 1990s, Bogaev, Maksim Kurochkin, and Evgeni Grishkovets, gained 
notoriety and facilitated a demand for the publication of their plays and similar texts. 
Notably, Grishkovets found widespread fame and critical success after receiving the 
award in 1999. He achieved something of a celebrity status at the turn of the 
millennium, appearing on talk shows, performing in films, and releasing recordings 
his one-man performances on DVD. Furthermore, the Anti-Booker prize marks an 
early connection between New Drama and Putinism. Owner of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
Boris Berezovsky, is a vocal critic of Putin, whose media-empire had adopted a 
strongly polemical stance toward the Kremlin since 2000. 
Although the new theatre writing in the 1990s did not gain great recognition 
until the end of the decade, it is apparent that the decade was important in laying the 
artistic and cultural groundwork for the emergence of New Drama at the turn of the 
millennium. The establishment of playwriting schools, festivals, and dedicated new 
writing venues provided exciting opportunities for young playwrights to have their 
work performed in either rehearsed readings or full scale productions. The recognition 
of playwrights through awards such as the Anti-Booker and the Golden Mask also 
facilitated a renewed interest in new dramatic texts, and helped to codify the new 
works being produced in Russia. In the next section, I will consider another vital 
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factor in the emergence of New Drama.  
 
The Royal Court in Russia 
In the 1980s the influence of the British Council in Russia was at an all time low. 
Diminishing Anglo-Russian relations, combined with a sharp reduction in 
government funding to the British Council as a result of the Berrill Report of 1977, 
resulted in the closure of the Moscow office. The collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe, however, resulted in a bolstering of relations between Russia and the West, 
and saw growing demand for English-language culture throughout the former Soviet 
Union. This resulted in a dramatic rise in funding from the British Council in Russia, 
and in 1992 they opened their first information centre in Moscow. In 1995 Sasha 
Dugdale was appointed as head of Council’s art commission, and her introduction to 
playwrights Gremina and Kazantsev in 1998 set the course for a series of events that 
changed how the role of the playwright was perceived in Russian. 
The late 1990s saw the acquaintance of Russian theatre makers with 
contemporary ‘In-Yer-Face’ Theatre, synonymous with the Royal Court Theatre in 
London. This was precipitated by funding from the British Council, who paid for 
Russian-language translations of the plays and their publication.  In 1999 the CDR 
staged Ravenhill’s Shopping and Fucking (1996) in a production directed by Olga 
Subbotina and translated by playwright Alexander Rodionov, and in 2003 Some 
Explicit Polaroids (1999) was directed by Kirill Serebrennikov on the small stage of 
the Pushkin Theatre in Moscow.  
In 1998, inspired by the British ‘In-Yer-Face’ theatre phenomenon, Elena 
Gremina and Sasha Dugdale of the British Council in Moscow contacted the Royal 
Court Theatre’s International Department and invited them to visit Russia in the hope 
of forging a relationship between Russia’s new generation of playwrights, and an 
internationally recognised venue for new writing. The resulting workshops and 
lectures organised by the Royal Court across Russia in the subsequent years would 
have an impact on new theatre writing in Russia that few commentators would have 
predicted at the time.18 This influence was twofold: young Russian playwrights drew 
creativity from both the ‘In-Yer-Face’ theatre of writers such as Mark Ravenhill and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For example, Beumers and Lipovetsky have noted that: ‘the Royal Court carried out similar seminars  
in almost every European (and not only European) country but only in Eastern Europe (mainly in 
Poland and in the countries of the former Yugoslavia) the “export” of verbatim has had a similar 
impact as Russia.’ Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 212.  
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Sarah Kane, and also from the techniques of documentary and verbatim theatre 
imparted to them at the Royal Court’s seminars. The Russian newspapers and critics 
who covered the theatre writing boom in Russia in the early 2000s made little 
distinction between these two styles, instead discussing the plays under the umbrella 
term of New Drama. For the critics, the binary in Britain between ‘In-Yer-Face’ and 
documentary theatre was overlooked, arguably because theatres staged both 
documentary and non-documentary productions and Russian playwrights 
experimented with multiple theatrical forms. Instead, the critics spoke in general 
terms about the ‘Royal Court phenomenon’ and its influence on Russian dramatists. 
Gremina and Dugdale’s arrangement with Elyse Dodgson of the Royal 
Court’s International Department to stage a series of seminars for young playwrights 
and directors in Russia came to fruition in 1999. The first event was held in Moscow 
in February 1999. Graham Whybrow, the literary manager at the Royal Court, gave a 
talk on the working practices of the theatre. Whybrow made the point that the 
playwright was an integral part of the creative process at the Royal Court, and was 
consulted on the choice of director and the casting process, and had the right to attend 
the rehearsals of the production. This was a revelation to the young playwrights in 
attendance who had previously only worked with Russian directors who frequently 
edited and re-wrote plays, and often banned writers from attending their own 
rehearsals.19 In July 1999 a first week-long seminar was held in Moscow, run by 
Royal Court representatives Dodgson, playwright Meredith Oakes, and director Mary 
Peate. The seminar focused on how to exploit the world around the playwright, and 
the language of real people. It was attended by a burgeoning group of young writers, 
including Kurochkin and Grishkovets. The short pieces produced by the playwrights 
at the workshop were subsequently performed at the Playwright and Director Center 
in Moscow, and then at the Royal Court’s International season under the collective 
title Moscow – Open City (1999). As a direct result of the work he produced at the 
seminar, Kurochkin was commissioned to write the full-length play Kitchen 
(Кukhnya, 2000), under the direction of Oleg Menshikov. 
One of the Royal Court productions that was discussed during these initial 
lectures was Stephen Daldry’s verbatim play Body Talk (1996), a dramatisation of 
candid interviews with men discussing their relationship to their bodies, staged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Alexander Rodionov and Kurochkin have recalled their thoughts on the challenging and provocative 
subject of Whybrow’s lecture. See Rodionov and Kurochkin (2015).  
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upstairs at the Royal Court in July 1996. Although the events introduced the 
participants to a multiplicity of approaches to new writing, the playwrights in 
attendance - in particular, Gremina and Ugarov - were captivated by the concept of 
verbatim theatre and invited the Royal Court to return to Moscow in April 2000 to 
hold a further, three-day seminar, exclusively on the verbatim technique. This time, 
Dodgson was accompanied by Stephen Daldry, James Macdonald, Ramin Grey, and 
playwright Stephen Jeffreys. During the workshop, Daldry described the process of 
creating verbatim theatre:  
 
At the beginning of a project you know neither the theme nor the characters: 
you only have a subject that you study. You have to rely on the fact that the 
process will lead you to the theme, the characters, the plot, and structure. If 
you tried to determine this in advance, you would not listen [to the 
interviewee]. The process is pretty intimidating because you're starting from 
scratch, and there is a possibility you will end up with no results, but you have 
to trust yourself, trust the subject, and - most importantly - to trust the people 
who you interview.20  
 
The participants – including Elena Isaeva. Alexander Rodionov, Kseniia Dragunskaia, 
Kurochkin, and Grishkovets - were dispatched to interview the homeless at metro 
stations and underpasses. These initial experiments with the verbatim technique 
formed the basis of a number of Teatr.doc’s early productions, including Rodionov’s 
War Of The Moldovans For A Cardboard Box (Voyna Moldavan za Kartonnuyu 
Korobku, 2003). Gremina and Ugarov recorded the seminar and sent it to colleagues 
and theatre schools across the country. Soon the technique had disseminated across 
Russia, and was being employed by the Babii Company in Cheliabinsk, and Theatre 
Lozha from Kemerovo.  
In his article ‘What is Verbatim?’, published on Teatr.doc’s website, Ugarov 
allies Russian documentary theatre of the 2000s with the international trend for 
documentary and fact-based theatre practices that emerged after the Second World 
War including:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This statement is quoted by Ugarov in his article ‘What Is Verbatim?’ See Ugarov (2012). 
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English verbatim […] the solo performances of Anna Deavere Smith in the 
early nineties [and] The Vagina Monologues (1996) by Eve Ensler.21 
 
By recalling a wide range of international productions and theatre makers, Ugarov 
invites comparisons between contemporary Russian verbatim and its European and 
North American predecessors, while also acknowledging the wide ranging influences 
on Teatr.doc that accounts for their diverse employment of verbatim techniques.  
The Royal Court’s verbatim productions in the 1990s were part of a larger 
resurgence of ‘theatre of the real’ by British practitioners at the turn of the 
millennium. During this decade, the Tricycle Theatre in Kilburn, under the artistic 
direction of Nicolas Kent, produced a number of tribunal theatre pieces in 
collaboration with Guardian journalist Richard Norton-Taylor. These included the 
dramatisation of the Scott Arms-to-Iraq Inquiry Half the Picture (1994), and The 
Colour of Justice (1999), which was created using the transcripts of the Macpherson 
Report into the death of Stephen Lawrence. The British tribunal plays of the 1990s 
and 2000s had an international precedent in the documentary theatre that emerged in 
West Germany in the 1960s. Directors and playwrights including Peter Weiss, Heinar 
Kipphardt, and Rolf Hochhuth created productions that re-enacted historical 
documents as a means of publicly interrogating both the historical past and 
contemporary global politics. The German documentary plays of the 1960s included 
Weiss’s production The Investigation (1965), which utilised the documentation and 
reports from the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials that ran from 1963 to 1965, staging them 
in a courtroom setting.22 In their interrogation of the Russian legal system, Teatr.doc 
draw upon elements of tribunal theatre, recalling theatre scholar Chris Megson’s 
definition of tribunal theatre as ‘the form of a forensic simulation of the inquiry’s 
disputations and setting, with actors playing the roles of the actual witnesses and 
judicial personnel’.23 The staging of these productions, however, departs from Paget’s 
delineation that ‘where tribunal theatre is concerned, mise-en-scéne and acting style 
alike must be realistic, and ‘authentic’ in that space’.24 At Teatr.doc, the actors do not 
attempt an ‘authentic’ performance style when depicting the real life individuals 
featured in the plays. Instead they casually dress in their own street clothes and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ugarov (2012). 
22 See Irmer (2006). 23	  Megson (2009) 195.	  
24 Paget (2008) 137. 
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deliver their lines directly to the audience with little emotion or emphasis, conforming 
to the theatre’s famous aphorism ‘Theatre With No Acting’ 
 Arguably, the most important development to occur as a result of the Royal 
Court’s workshops in Moscow in 1999 and 2000, was the founding of Teatr.doc by a 
group of playwrights led by Ugarov and Gremina in February 2002. Teatr.doc’s 
original space was located on Trekhprudny Pereulok in the Tverskoy district on 
central Moscow. The performance space was located in the basement of a residential 
housing block, and was arguably an archetypal black box space. The technical aspects 
of the space are limited, with the theatre making use of only twelve lights and a 
projector.25 In the year it was founded, Teatr.doc co-hosted the inaugural New Drama 
Festival in May and June. The festival was organised by Gremina and Ugarov along 
with Eduard Boiakov, then director of the respected Golden Mask Festival, Sasha 
Dugdale of the British Council, and the Moscow Arts Theatre, as a means to promote 
and discover new playwriting talent. Anatoly Smeliansky, the deputy artistic director 
of the Moscow Arts Theatre acted as the jury chairman at the initial event in 2002. 
The festival proved significant in providing a platform for young playwrights to be 
performed, and was instrumental in helping many artists make the transition into 
mainstream theatre, and some of the plays staged in 2002 entered Teatr.doc’s early 
repertoire.  
Furthermore the seminars held by the Royal Court galvanized existing writers 
into exploring new creative outlets, and were significant in assembling a group of 
like-minded writers inspired by the ethos and playwriting techniques of the London 
theatre, leading to the foundation of new venues in Russia dedicated to staging new 
writing. As well as discovering new playwrights, the Royal Court visits brought 
exposure to more established writers, resulting in the increased staging of new writing 
at more established venues such as the Moscow Arts Theatre. The Royal Court also 
provided New Drama writers with opportunities to have their plays performed at the 
theatre’s space in London. For example, between 2002 and 2004, three plays by 
Vasilly Sigarev were performed at the Royal Court’s Jerwood Theatre Upstairs. 
Sigarev’s play Plasticine was first foreign winner of the Evening Standard’s Charles 
Wintour Award for most promising playwright, which brought Sigarev greater 
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acclaim in the west, and served to highlight the emergence of New Drama outside of 
Russia.  
At this point, it is worth reflecting on the reception of the Royal Court’s visits 
to Russia. Many Russian critics and commentators have denied the international 
influence and the Royal Court’s impact on the ascendance of documentary theatre 
techniques in Russia in the 2000s. Instead, they attempt to claim a stake in the cultural 
ownership and genealogy of the genre, arguing that its origins could be traced back to 
pre-existing dramatic traditions originally developed in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet 
Union.  The desire to entrench Russian verbatim and New Drama in the tradition of 
Russian theatre and culture betrays an anxiety over the perceived influx of foreign 
theatre from the West, and in particular the United Kingdom. In a country where 
Western influence is often treated with mistrust and the Russian theatrical tradition is 
a source of national pride, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is a backlash towards 
the Royal Court’s influence on young Russian playwrights. Theatre critic Marina 
Timasheva argues that any claim by the British to inventing the documentary theatre 
genre was remarkably naive, recalling Soviet playwright Nikolai Pogodin, and the 
agitprop of the Blue Blouse theatre troupe in the 1920s and 1930s.26 Similarly, theatre 
director Vladimir Mirzoev draws parallels between twenty-first century Russia 
documentary theatre and Proletkult performances that coincided with the 1917 
Revolution.27 As I shall argue throughout this thesis, however, the political nature of 
New Drama differs from the strongly polemical productions staged by the 
revolutionary agitprop theatre and Blue Blouse groups. While Blue Blouse theatre 
was created with the aim of promoting the benefits of communism, New Drama does 
not frame its opposition stance to the Putin regime within a specific political ideology. 
Instead, New Drama practitioners aim to provoke a wider dialogue on the nature of 
Russian politics in general.  
The subsequent cultural backlash against the influence of the Royal Court, 
which labelled New Drama as a theatrical movement inspired by foreign practitioners 
and bankrolled by British institutions instigates an important consideration on New 
Drama’s global outlook. Despite a rich history of transnational exchange and 
collaborations between Russian theatre practitioners and their foreign peers, it can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Timasheva (2002). The editor of Teatr journal, Marina Davidova, makes a similar assertion that the 
origins of documentary theatre can be traced back to the Soviet revolutionary theatre of the 1920s. See 
Davidova (2015). 
27 Mirzoev (2004).  
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argued that Russia’s varied performance traditions and its eminence in the evolution 
of twentieth century dramaturgy has been a longstanding source of national pride 
throughout the country.28 Covering the opening night of Igor Stravinsky’s The Rite of 
Spring (Vesna Sviashchennaia, 1913) at the Théâtre des Champs-Élysées in Paris in 
May 1913, Russian critic Nikolai Kostilyov wrote in the pages of newspaper Russkaia 
Molva that in the realm of dramatic art ‘Russians have turned out to occupy the first 
place. This is an undeniable strength and we can only take pride in it.’29 The 
vehement derogation of New Drama as a theatre of foreign influence and Western 
cultural imperialism by some critics juxtaposed with attempts to situate the movement 
into the pre-existing Russian tradition demonstrates that in part, the endurance of a 
nationalistic attachment to Russia’s theatre traditions and achievements.  
Putin’s own political discourse displays a comparative nationalistic attitude 
towards art and cultural as an integral reinforcement of traditional Russian values. In 
April 2014, the Culture Ministry published a report entitled ‘Foundations of State 
Cultural Politics’, which subsequently appeared in broadsheet newspaper Izvestia. 
Putin prefaced its publication by calling for the rejection of foreign influence in 
Russian culture, proclaiming that ‘in Russian society, it is necessary to form the kind 
of culture and values which could buttress our history and traditions, unite times 
and generations and allow for the consolidation of the nation’.30 The document argued 
for the eschewal of culture alien to the national and cultural features of Russia and a 
rejection of the principles of multiculturalism on the grounds that ‘Russia is not 
Europe’.31 Additionally, the article sent a warning to contemporary artists that 
‘experimentation’ could not justify an attack on the ‘traditional values’ of Russian 
society.32 This manifesto was put into practice in March 2015, when Boris Mezdrich, 
executive director of Russia’s largest opera theatre, the Novosibirsk State Academy 
Opera and Ballet Theatre was fired after complaints by activists from the Orthodox 
Church who deemed the theatre’s production of Richard Wagner’s Tannhauser 
(1845) offensive to Russia’s religious heritage. In summer 2014, the Duma imposed a 
ban on the use of mat (vulgar language and swearing) in theatre, film, literature, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For evidence of the long-standing historical transmission of ideas between Russian and British 
theatre makers see theatre scholar Jonathan Pitches’s edited booked Russians in Britain: British 
Theatre and the Russian Tradition of Actor Training. 
29 Cited in Taruskin (1996) 1010. 
30 Golubock (2014)  
31 Izvestia (2014)  
32 Ibid. 
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the media.33 The fact that the law was passed in the same month as a similar decree 
banning the use of foreign words in Russian vernacular positioned the ruling on mat 
as a continuation of Putin’s nationalistic stand against undesirable aspects of Western 
influence in Russian culture and art.  
Scholar of Russian politics Robert Horvath has further identified that ‘the 
Putin regime’s authoritarian reforms during 2005-2007 were a defensive move to 
protect Russian sovereignty from Western influence’.34 Horvath argues that the 
Kremlin and pro-Putin supporters identified the success of the ‘coloured revolutions’ 
in in Georgia and the Ukraine in 2003-2005 as due to the intervention and funding of 
Western institutions and NGOs. The Putin regime’s depiction of NGOs and protests 
movements as the agents of Western propaganda and geopolitical interests reflects the 
fears of Russian critics who saw New Drama as theatre of foreign influence. The 
imposition of controls on NGOs has impacted on the staging of New Drama, most 
notably in December 2014 when the Sakharov Centre was labeled a ‘foreign agent’ 
under the newly introduced Russian foreign agent law that required NGOs receiving 
foreign finical support to officially register themselves as ‘foreign agents’ The 
Sakharov Centre, which has staged a number of documentary plays, including 
Grandchildren. The Second Act (Vtoroi akt. Vnuki, 2012) by Alexandra Polivanova 
and Mikhail Kaluzhsky, was subsequently fined 400,000 rubles for failing to 
declaring itself a ‘foreign agent’ in September the following year.35 
The international outlook of many New Drama practitioners remains in 
conflict with the Kremlin’s nationalistic policies and discourse on Russian culture and 
the arts. Of the eight case studies discussed in this thesis, four have been performed 
abroad in the UK: Plasticine and Black Milk at the Royal Court in 2002 and 2003 
respectively, The Drunks premiéred at the Royal Shakespeare Company in 2009, and 
in 2012 One Hour Eighteen Minutes was staged by Sputnik Theatre Company at the 
New Diorama theatre in London. In addition to the collaborations with the Royal 
Court, many other leading New Drama productions have been performed at festivals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 While the sweeping ban covered a wide variety of art forms in Russia, it has been noted that the act 
explicitly targeted theatres with New Drama plays in their repertoire due to the prevalence of mat in 
many productions. For example, see Kiselev (2014). The only venue to defy the ban and continue to 
stage performances with the uncensored use of mat was Teatr.doc. 	  
34 Horvath (2013) 1. 
35 In a separate incident, Moscow Police interrupted a performance of the documentary play Moscow 
Trials (Moskovskiye protsessy, 2013) at the Sakharov Centre. Officials delayed the performance of the 
piece that, in part, dramatised the trial of Pussy Riot to check the visa of the play’s Swiss director Milo 
Rau. 
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in Europe and the United States and playwrights have participated in further 
international collaborations. For example in summer 2012 Mikhail Durnenkov, Pavel 
Pryazhko, and Natalya Vorozhbit were invited to New York City by the Public 
Theatre to produce a series of plays entitled The Boardwalk Trilogy (2012) that 
examined the community of Russians emigrants living in Brighton Beach.  
In this way, New Drama pratitioners have attempted to resist Putin’s neo-
Slavophile ideology and his promotion of nationalist patriotism. The forging of strong 
and enduring transnational relationships with theatres abroad underscores the 
international outlook of New Drama writers. Although New Drama is primarily 
concerned with the amplification of marginalised voices and the articulation of salient 
political anxieties at national or even local level, the effect of theatrical transmission 
on the development of new playwrigting in twenty-first century Russia is important to 
acknowledge. The international dimension of New Drama further moves beyond 
theatrical and aesthetic considerations. The staging of these plays internationally 
attempts to raise the awareness of social and political issues in contemporary Russia 
abroad, as well as foregrounding the authoritarian repression of marginalised voices 
by the Putin regime to a global audience. 
 
Historical Precedents: Liudmila Petrushevskaia 
I contend that an important historical president for New Drama is playwright 
Liudmila Petrushevskaia. Petrushevskaia has been previously cited as exhibiting the 
rudimentary aesthetics and preoccupations of the New Drama movement. 
Petrushevskaia is considered a member of the ‘post-Vampilov’ group of playwrights 
active during the stagnation period of the 1970s and 80s. 36  Although she wrote 
prolifically throughout the 1970s, as a result of not being an officially sanctioned 
playwright she was not professionally staged until December 1980, when Yuri 
Liubimov directed her one-act play Love (Liubov) at the Taganka Theatre in Moscow.  
Russian critic Alena Solnstseva suggests that Petrushevskaia is the only 
playwright from the previous generation to reflect the language and motifs of New 
Drama.37 Journalist Pavel Rudnev writes that ‘the approach that Petrushevskaia 
rejected was picked up by the playwrights of the new millennium, who were inclined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The post-Vampilov playwrights were influenced by the themes and linguistics of Soviet playwright 
Alexander Vampilov. 
37 Solntseva in ‘Otkasatsia…’ (2004)  
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to document and record carefully some inmost corners of reality without ironing out 
the everyday language, admiring instead the roughness of threadbare speech.’38 In 
addition, Vyrypaev has suggested, that had her plays been written during the twenty-
first century, Petrushevskaia would have found a home at Teatr.doc.39 Beumers and 
Lipovetsky also state the important of Petrushevskaia’s influence on New Drama, 
noting that the new playwrights of the twenty-first century have taken from her the 
dramatic language and the everyday absurdity displayed in her plays.40 
A key scholarly argument on Petrushevskaia’s drama is its relation to the 
aesthetics of the Theatre of the Absurd. In her monograph on Petrushevskaia’s 
theatre, Katy Simmons argues that:  
 
of all the Western European Absurdists, Petrushevskaia’s work is perhaps 
most similar to Harold Pinter’s: both place their plays firmly in contemporary 
society, but neither can be described as a social realist, because the problems 
that they concern themselves with are not the soluble, inessential ones of 
everyday life, but questions of the survival of self, which Pinter describes as 
more real than social realism with its didactic solutions.’41 
 
Elements of the Absurd in Petrushevskaia’s plays are also noted by Nina Kolesnikoff, 
and Melissa Smith, the latter suggests that ‘an undercurrent of the absurd and the 
grotesque runs throughout Petrushevskaia’s works’.42 Contrary to this is Stephen 
Mulrine’s conclusion that ‘Petrushevskaia is an unashamed realist: her work is almost 
wholly devoid of non-naturalistic devices’.43 These two contrasting readings of 
Petrushevskaia’s theatre has been coalesced by Beumers and Lipovetsky who 
proclaim that ‘the paradox and novelty of Petrushevskaia’s language lies precisely in 
a combination of fine, realistic psychologism with the poetic of the absurd’.44 
Although, as Beumers and Lipovetsky point out, Petrushevskaia experimented 
with elements of the Absurd, her plays are rooted in the reality of modern day Soviet 
life during the era of stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev. Central to many of her plays 	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39 Vyrypaev (2004)  
40 Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 75-89 
41 Simmons (1992) 2-3 
42 Smith (1994) 197-8 
43 Mulrine (1991) viii 
44 Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 75 
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is the character of the single, older mother, widowed by the Second World War, and 
the children raised in matriarchal family units – the generation that came of age 
during the period of stagnation. Petrushevskaia brought to the stage an alternative 
voice that contrasted with the official depiction of life in Russia propagated by the 
Soviet regime. She portrays characters who are unable to operate in the realm of 
‘normal’ Soviet society, such as the alcoholics in Cinzano (1973). 
 
Conclusion 
The influence of the Royal Court and global trends in documentary theatre making as 
well as the long lineage of fact and reality based theatre in Russia are all significant 
factors in the development of verbatim techniques in the 2000s. Russian documentary 
theatre of the 2000s draws from a hybrid of reality based theatrical forms, including 
verbatim techniques imparted by the Royal Court’s workshops, tribunal theatre, as 
well as Russian realism and the political theatre of the inter-war years. It is 
impossible, however, to tie the documentary productions of the 2000s to one 
theatrical form. Instead, I contend that in the genealogy of New Drama there are a 
number of theatrical lineages. Alongside the Royal Court, the emergence of a number 
of new playwrigting talents, the founding of dramaturgical awards, and the 
establishment festivals and spaces dedicated to staging new writing all provided a 
fertile ground for the emergence of New Drama at the turn of the millennium. 
Furthermore, I acknowledge the important influence of the theatre of Petrushevskaia, 
whose linguistic and thematic concerns about contemporary life in the Soviet Union 
have been recognised as an inspiration by a number of New Drama writers.  
 In the next chapter, I will turn my attention to Putin himself, and how theatre 
makers have satirised his public performances and media image. Focusing on Varvara 
Faer’s BerlusPutin (2012) and Viktor Teterin’s Putin.doc (2005), I will explore how 
satirical images of Putin in New Drama have developed during his presidency. I 
contend that BerlusPutin insists that attending a theatrical performance at Teatr.doc is 
a direct extension of the opposition protests of 2011-12.
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Chapter Two: Putin on Stage: Varvara Faer’s BerlusPutin 




In her book Jokes and Their Relationship to Society, anthropologist Christine Davis 
contends that once Russians had freedom of speech in the late 1980s they ‘stopped 
joking’, suggesting that the use of satire was lost during the transformation from 
Soviet dictatorship to democracy.1 Satire, which had been a popular literary and 
theatrical mode during the Soviet Union, did indeed suffer a downturn in the 1990s, 
which could possibly be explained by writers looking instead at experimenting with 
previously banned genres of art and literature such as post-modernism and chernukha. 
This chapter considers the revival of political satire and its relationship to the Putin 
regime, specifically Putin’s own public persona and the wave of oppositional 
demonstrations that took place across Russia in the winter of 2011 and 2012. 
 This chapter aims to examine how playwrights subvert and disrupt the 
administration through the trope of satire, which mocks and opposes the normative 
representation of Putin as promulgated by the Kremlin and the official state-
sanctioned media. Extant scholarship on the satirical treatment of Putin is limited. In 
her article ‘Putin and Emptiness: The Place of Satire in the Contemporary Cult of 
Personality’, Slavonic scholar Emily Johnson argues that Putin’s public performances 
and the creation of an official narrative that supports his media persona is ‘more about 
the act of worship than the godhead, per se’.2 Johnson contends that the satirical 
treatment of Putin is motivated by a self-aware praise and adulation of the president, 
rather than a serious attempt to undermine the autocracy of Putinism. To date, no 
study has been made into the role played by satire in the Russian theatre during the 
Putin era. By considering New Drama’s satirical treatment of Putin I aim to define 
new territory for the role of political satire in contemporary Russia and demonstrate 
that in a performance context it is still a highly relevant and important medium. 
The case studies for this chapter are Varvara Faer’s BerlusPutin (2012) and 
Viktor Teterin’s Putin.doc. BerlusPutin has run at Teatr.doc for over five years, and is 
arguably one of the most provocative and controversial plays in the theatre’s 
repertoire. The performance is one of a few in Russia to represent Putin on stage in a 	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critical light, using biographical material and popular cultural references to define his 
character. A methodical challenge with the consideration of BerlusPutin in this thesis 
is that the production is centered on a basic framework and plot, with the actors 
freshly editing and updating the script with Faer for each new run of the production at 
the theatre. In a conversation with me in 2014 Faer estimated that there were already 
around 50 different versions of the text.3 In order to address this, my analysis of 
BerlusPutin is informed by numerous visits to see the show at Teatr.doc between 
2013 and 2015, as well as watching archived video recordings of other performances. 
Putin.doc premiéred at the KC Home Theatre in 2005, and was published in a 
Russian-language anthology of new plays edited by Pavel Rudnev - the translation I 
use in this chapter is my own. 
In my consideration of the contrasting use of satire in BerlusPutin and 
Putin.doc, it is important to define the use of the term satire in this chapter. In an 
interview given prior to the opening of BerlusPutin at Teatr.doc, Faer states that the 
production fits within the traditional of western political satire and claims that her 
intention for the production is to create laughter among the audience: ‘[Laughter] is a 
strong weapon against the powers, against inflated and hypocritical ghouls. Laughter 
is a very powerful weapon that attacks all arrogance.’4 The language used by Faer 
here implies her distain for Putin and his entourage, and reveals the anger that 
influences her satirical approach in BerlusPutin. In her assertion that the satirist’s 
primary weapon against their targets is the evocation of humour and laughter, Faer 
draws an important comparison between her production and traditional definitions of 
the satiric mode as defined by scholar Matthew Hodgart in his book Satire: Origins 
and Principles, who writes that ‘the satirist's anger is modified by his sense of 
superiority and contempt for his victim; his aim is to make the victim lose “face”, and 
the most effective way of humiliating him is by contemptuous laughter’.5  
Hodgart’s definition of satire is important because it foregrounds the political 
dimension it can take and its ability to subvert contentious political figures: ‘there is 
an essential connection between satire and politics in the widest sense: satire is not 
only the commonest form of political literature, but, insofar as it tries to influence 
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4 Shary (2011). 
5 Hodgart (2010) 7. 
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public behaviour, it is the most political part of all literature.’6 Hodgart’s argument 
that the foundations of satire are found in its engagement with the political further 
underscores that for satire to be effective and persuasive, it needs to speak to 
contemporary political concerns and anxieties. Gilbert Highet has also observed this 
important facet of satire in his seminal study The Anatomy of Satire. He writes that 
‘we can say that the type of subject preferred by satire is always concrete, usually 
topical, often personal. It deals with actual cases, mentions real people by name or 
describes them unmistakably (and often unflatteringly), talk of this moment and this 
city, and this special, very recent, very fresh deposit of corruption.’7 In other words, 
satire is at its most efficacious when targeting current events and individuals who are 
immediately recongisable to the satirist’s audience. Indeed, as Faer states, the ability 
of BerlusPutin to be urgent and relevant is a vital proponent of the show and its comic 
satire against Putin. Faer underscores this point by stating that she regularly updates 
the script to include topical news reports, jokes, and Internet memes circulating about 
Putin.8   
Satire can therefore be defined as a genre that holds a unique political 
dimension that privileges the satirist as a commentator on contemporary social and 
political developments who aims to subvert their targets through the power of humour 
and laughter. The two plays considered here both conform to this definition of satire, 
but as this chapter demonstrates satire can still take distinctly different forms and 
approaches in its treatment of contemporary political events. In this chapter I draw on 
two disparate forms of satiric comedy – Juvenalian and Horatian – to consider how 
satirical treatment of Putin has shifted during his presidency.  
My consideration of these plays in this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I argue that 
satirical treatment of Putin and Putinism in the twenty-first century has evolved, while 
the focus on satirical targets has sifted. In my consideration of this point I use Holbert 
et al.’s observations that satire is not a fixed genre and is instead ‘comprised of a 
variety of distinctive techniques and modes.’9 Secondly, I contend that BerlusPutin 
uses political satire to facilitate a wider discussion of the anti-Putin protest movement 
that emerged in 2011 and 2012. In this way, I consider how New Drama engages with 
the oppositional discourse against the Putin regime. 	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8 Faer (2014).	  
9 Holbert et al. (2008) 192. 
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This chapter starts with a wider consideration of Putinism. Following from 
this, I engage in a more specific discussion of how Putin’s own public performance 
and media persona forms an important part of Putinism and his success with the 
Russian electorate, further considering how Putin has been depicted in other art forms 
in Russia. Next, I examine BerlusPutin. Through detailed performance analysis I 
examine how satire of Putin facilitates a wider consideration of the role played by 
theatre and Teatr.doc in the opposition towards Putin. In the final section of this 
chapter I examine Putin.doc in the context of BerlusPutin to consider how political 
satire has developed in Putin’s Russia. 
 
Putin and Putinism 
When Boris Yeltsin ceded the Russian presidency on 31 December 1999 the mood in 
Russia was buoyant.10 As Russian scholar Eliot Borenstein notes, ‘the Yeltsin years 
considerably lowered the bar [of public expectation] for the country’s next leader’, 
and Anders Aslund chronicles that many Russians were happy to see the departure of 
a leader who they felt had become an incompetent alcoholic and an embarrassment to 
the nation on the international stage.11 Despite the momentum behind Putin, the first 
months of his premiership were tentative and his perceived lack of charisma amongst 
the Russian electorate was a matter of concern for the new president and his public 
relations team.12 In particular, the news coverage of the Kursk submarine tragedy in 
August 2000 highlighted Putin’s enervated charisma and the importance of the media 
to his long-term success. Sixteen years later, the Kremlin’s subsequent creation of a 
prevailing public persona for Putin has proved to be highly successful and propitious, 
to the extent that Putin has become the totemic representation of Russia’s 
revivification after the collapse of Communism.  
It is clear that an important part of Putin’s success at the polling booth is 
agnate with the contrived public image and persona he has constructed for himself. In 
their meticulous study of Putin’s public image, Stephen White and Ian McAllister 
note that in a survey of Muscovites conducted in December 2001, ‘it was Putin’s 
appearance and manner that attracted approval, and the way in which they contrasted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Baker and Glasser (2007) 39-41. 
11 Borenstein (2008) 227; Aslund (2007) 207. 
12 See Judha (2013) 48. 
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with those of his immediate predecessor’.13 An analogous argument is provided by 
Helena Goscilo, who suggests that at the core of Putin’s myriad of public relations 
stunts is an emphasis on his physical prowess and his embodiment of ideal 
masculinity.14 Political stagecraft and the ability to manipulate a target audience are, 
of course, imperative skills for any modern politician. As Max Atkinson observes in 
his book Our Master’s Voices: The Language and Body Language of Politics: ‘an 
ability to speak effectively in public is one of the oldest and most powerful weapons 
in the armoury of professional politicians.’15 What is divergent about Putin’s 
approach is that the focus is specifically on the corporeal. Russian newspapers and 
television have been inundated with human interest stories and images of the 
president engaging in invigorating activities that include diving into the sea to 
discover Greek amphorae, lifting weights in his private gym, and most famously 
riding shirtless through the wilds of the Tuva region in Siberia. This emphasis on the 
physical presentation of Putin, both in the media and arts, is particularly relevant in 
the context of the re-emergence of political satire in theatre. It places theatre and live 
performance in a unique position to satirise him, due to it being a live medium that 
focuses on the actor and their bodily semiotics.  
One of the primary reasons Putin has been able to manipulate his well-defined 
charisma and public persona in the Russian media is a restraint of the freedom of the 
press, which began early in Putin’s first term in office. The outbreak of the Second 
Chechen War on 20 September 1999 presented Putin with the opportunity to seize 
control of Russia’s independent media. According to Mikhail Berger, editor of the 
daily Russian newspaper Sevodyna, then owned by Vladimir Gusinsky’s Media-Most 
company, Putin saw the media not only as a tool to bolster support for his regime with 
the electorate, but also as a polarised battleground of different political factions in 
Russia:  
 
Putin has divided the media into two categories - those organisations that give 
him total, utter, unquestioning support and those that don't. He views the latter 
not simply as papers or television companies, but as enemy units which he has 
to fight […] Under the Soviet Union, everything was categorised either as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 White and McAllistar (2010) 149. 
14 Goscilo (2013b). 
15 Atkinson (1984) 1. 
	   55	  
Soviet or anti-Soviet. Now under Putin, everything is either state or anti-
state.16 
 
In the direct line of fire were the media empires of oligarchs Gusinsky and Boris 
Berezovsky who owned the television channels NTV and Russian Public Television 
(ORT) respectively. Putin’s ‘war on the oligarchs’, as it became known, saw the 
Kremlin seize control of both television networks by the end of 2000, while Gusinsky 
and Berezovsky fled into exile in Western Europe facing charges of corruption and 
embezzlement.17 Putin’s concentration of control of the mass media and entertainment 
was demonstrated late in 2000 when one of the first conditions imposed on NTV was 
the abrupt censoring of topical satirical show Puppets (Kukly). Described as ‘one of 
the most prominent examples of post-Soviet political satire’, the programme was 
modeled on the pioneering British show Spitting Image and lampooned Russia’s 
political élite throughout the late 1990s.18  In the run up to the March 2000 
presidential elections, Puppets rendered Putin as ‘a wimpy czar reluctant to perform 
his bedroom duties for his bride, Russia; a medieval monk praying to St. Felix (an 
allusion to Felix Dzerzhinsky; the founder of the Soviet secret police); a judo master 
defeated by Bill Clinton; a crazed psychiatrist from Chekhov’s Ward No.6; and E. T. 
A. Hoffmann’s Little Zaches, a vicious monkey-like dwarf who bewitched a city into 
regarding him as a handsome a wise minister.’19 The abrupt neutering of Puppets left 
a dearth of satirical and critical depictions of Putin in the arts, and furthermore 
signalled the onset of state control of both the media and arts in Russia. 
The purge of the oligarchs was a momentous success and personal triumph for 
Putin and resulted in over 90% of all Russian media coming directly or indirectly 
under his control by 2008.20 This media monopoly has allowed Putin to calibrate a 
specific public persona that carefully fits the Russian paradigm of a vozhd - a strong, 
decisive, patriarchal leader. Simon Shuster writes that: 
 
the Western principle that the people have a right to know has not been 
embraced in Russia. [There is] a prevailing sense left over from Soviet and 	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17 See Judha (2013) 42-7; Sakwa (2008b) 150-5;White (2011) 172 ff. 
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19 Ibid. 177. 
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czarist time that a strong leader – or vozhd’ – should remain aloof from the 
masses if not totally inscrutable.21 
 
By associating himself with the iconography of the vozhd both through his public 
performances, such as his presidential inauguration ceremony which took place in the 
renovated tsarist halls of the Kremlin, and in his cultural and education policies, 
which positively reappraise Stalin’s role in Russian history, Putin is able to legitimise 
his state control of civil society and the media, as well as reinforce his own influence 
and the vertical of power. This view is substantiated by Lena Jonson, who notes that 
Putin has made ‘a pragmatic selection of historical leaders of whom to be proud, 
regardless of whether they were from tsarist or Soviet times.’22  
In the context of Putin’s calibration of a public image to fit the archetypal 
Russian leader, or vozhd, it is worth considering the reasons for Putin’s success. Is it 
the policies of the regime or his personal charisma and ability to harness the sentiment 
and mood of the Russian electorate in the 2000s? Some have argued that Putin’s 
success is a result of the economic policies of Putinism, which have seen the economy 
stabilise after the crash of the Russian stock market in 1998.23 In contrast, Borenstein 
notes that ‘Putin’s specific policies and actions arguably matter far less than his 
reassuring symbolic function as “a real man” who can husband the nation’s resources 
and promise a return to greatness’.24 Political scientist Marlene Laruelle makes a 
similar suggestion:  
 
The Kremlin’s success is Vladimir Putin’s own personal feat. Indeed he has 
generated an increasingly visible cult of personality, which is marked by a 
proliferation of photos, portraits, busts of the head of state, and endorsements 
in opinion polls and the literary world as being not only the father of the 
nation, but also the ideal husband.25 
 
 Finally, agnate to this is the contention that Putin is concerned more with 
strengthening and consolidating his own personal grip on power than the power of the 	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state. One example of this is a school textbook published by the Kremlin in 2000 to 
coincide with Putin’s inauguration: the volume included a biography of Russia’s new 
president concluding with the words, ‘Russia, Putin, Unity!’26 Here, the connotation is 
that Putin and the state are linked symbiotically. This is the establishment of a 
discourse, which placed Putin with other vozhds, such as Stalin, who became 
inseparable from the state, and a human representation of it. Furthermore, the desire 
for a vigorous, unyielding, and patriarchal leader that represented Russia and the state 
in a positive and consummate light on the global stage returns to the opening 
paragraph of this section, where I described how Yeltsin’s alcoholism had become a 
national embarrassment for Russia. Putin’s vigour and leadership became 
synonymous with the Russian re-emergence on the world stage.  
Given that Putin has aimed for his public image to become synonymous with 
his policies and politics – an almost anthropomorphic embodiment of an antithesis to 
the chaos of the post-Communist 1990s – it is of little surprise that the state has 
attempted to censor political satire that parodies and travesties the president. As 
creator of BerlusPutin, Faer attests, political comedy has been driven ‘underground’, 
primarily to the Internet.  
In this opening section I have identified key issues surrounding Putin’s 
creation of a media image, noting that what is interesting about his approach is that, 
firstly, it was achieved through control of the media, and, secondly it is specifically 
corporeal, and also that it is set within specific Russia parameters of the idea of the 
vozhd. These are important considerations to make in regards to this chapter and its 
discussion of BerlusPutin and satire in contemporary Russia.  
 
Putin in the Arts 
Examining the case of Puppets makes it clear that the Kremlin has been quick to 
censor art that it views as disrupting the official state narrative on Putin. In the context 
of Faer’s view that political satire is an ‘underground’ art form in contemporary 
Russia, it is also worthwhile exploring in depth how Putin has been represented in 
mainstream culture.  
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 The 2000s has seen a flurry of artistic output that romanticises and praises 
Putin. One example is the song ‘Man Like Putin’ (2002) by pop-trio Singing 
Together, which prompted speculation in the western press that it was part of a public 
relations stunt organised by the Kremlin.27 Another example is the 2014 art 
exhibition, The Twelve Labours of Putin. The twelve portraits portrayed Putin 
completing twelve Herculean tasks, including battling western sanctions, and purging 
the oligarchs.28 Exhibit organiser Mikhail Antonov claimed the event was a sincere 
celebration of Putin’s leadership to mark his sixty-second birthday, but scholars such 
as Emily Johnson question the seriousness of such art: ‘should we really take [such 
examples] as a straightforward attempt to glorify the president?’29 The 
obsequiousness towards Putin has been further problematised by Peter Baker and 
Susan Glasser, who ask if contemporary art and culture provide evidence of an 
emerging ‘cult of Putin’.30 Johnson disputes this idea: 
 
for all that the Putin cult may seem superficially to resemble the cults of 
personality of the Soviet period, I wonder if it isn’t, at least in certain respects, 
a fundamentally new animal, a product of distinctly contemporary social and 
communicative relations that speaks less of true unadulterated hero worship 
[…] or even organised promotion than it does of rhetorical and perhaps 
philosophical indeterminacy.31  
 
Johnson’s argument can be called into question, however, in the consideration of her 
claim that there is no ‘organised promotion’ of a Putinist agenda by the Kremlin in 
contemporary Russia. Russian sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh argues that one of 
the Putin regime’s greatest triumphs has been to buy off the majority of the creative 
intelligentsia, which he identifies as the greatest threat to Putinism.32 Indeed, the 
majority of the creative class in Russia have toed the official party line, and many 
have participated in official actions that both favour the regime and disseminate its 
dogma.33 Furthermore, unlike the Soviet state, Putin has a wide-reaching and well-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Rainsford (2002). 
28 Rosenberg (2014)  
29 Johnson (2009) 3. 
30 Baker and Glasser (2007) 39-40. 
31 Johnson (2009) 4.  
32 Shlapentokh (2010) 54-6.  
33 See Shlapentokh (2010) 54, Jonson (2015) 39. 
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assembled PR team, which is responsible for the mobilisation and promotion of state-
sanctioned popular culture. Alongside Putin’s use of western-style media relations, I 
suggest, however, that Putin’s manipulation of the culture sector bears more in 
common with the Soviet Union than is initially apparent. Although it often eschews 
more austere artistic dogmas - such as Soviet Realism employed under communism – 
opting instead for high kitsch, Putinism operates under the same stratagem of Soviet 
art: the rewarding of artists with lucrative and career progressing contracts for those 
who toe the party line, coupled with harassment and censorship for those who do not. 
This policy has been acknowledged in a publication by the ministry of culture, which 
states that art subverting ‘traditional state culture […] should not receive government 
support’.34 
It is apparent from the examples of ‘Man Like Putin’ and ‘The Twelve 
Labours of Putin’ that artists who do conform to the regime, endorse Putin as a strong, 
dynamic and decisive leader, whose machismo reflects Russia’s revivification on the 
world stage after the chaos and deprivation of the 1990s. As we shall see, the satire of 




Unquestionably, Putin enjoyed great support in the 2000s as well as during his term as 
prime minister between 2008-2012, which became known as ‘Putinism without 
Putin’. Despite the ‘coloured revolutions’ in many former Soviet republics, Russia 
saw very little mass unrest during Putin’s first two terms in office. This would 
change, however, when in 2011 Putin announced his intentions to run for an 
unprecedented third term as president. In December 2011, thousands took to the 
streets across Russia to protest against this perceived unconstitutional act of hubris. 
On 7 May 2012, Vladimir Putin was inaugurated for his third term as 
president of Russia. The day before, on a wet and grey Sunday in Moscow, over 
20,000 protestors participated in the March of the Millions furious about Putin’s 
return to power.35 The disparate and varied gathering of demonstrators, including 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Izvestia (2014). 
35 The number of people who attended the demonstration is disputed. Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev 
declared there to be over 100,000 marchers, while the Moscow police estimated only 8,000. The figure 
I use here is one regularly cited by both Russian and Western news outlets. 
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young families, pensioners, prominent members of the Left Front movement in 
Russia, nationalists, liberals, LGBTQ activists, anarchists, and cohorts and supporters 
of Pussy Riot, wearing the group’s trademark multi-coloured balaclavas, marched 
from Okyabrskaya metro station, along Bolshaya Yakimanka Street towards Bolotny 
Island, located across the Moskva River from Red Square. Gathering in Bolotnaya 
Square, less than a mile from the Kremlin walls, waving banners and placards 
mocking Putin and his government, the crowd sang revolutionary songs and 
provocative chants including: ‘Russia without Putin’, ‘Putin is a thief’, and ‘37 won’t 
work’ - a reference to the first year of Stalinist purges in 1937.  
As evening approached, the police blocked activists from advancing on the 
Kremlin, partially kettling them in the Square, blocking off the city centre, and 
closing metro stations. Bottles and other missiles were thrown in the direction of the 
police. Putin’s press secretary, Dmitri Peskov, appeared on the Dozhd television 
channel inflaming tensions by announcing that he thought the police were being too 
soft on the protesters, whilst the march organiser and leftist leader Sergi Udaltsov 
called for the demonstrators to hold their ground and strategised a sit-in. As the 
authorities attempted to clear the area scuffles broke out. A battalion of riot police and 
‘shock troops’ wielding batons arbitrarily attacked and fought with the protestors 
before throwing them into the back of police trucks. By the end of the day more than 
four hundred arrests had been made, including the protest movement’s leaders 
Udaltsov, anti-corruption activist Alexy Navalny, and former deputy prime minister 
and outspoken critic of Putin, Boris Nemtsov. The popular Russian-language online 
newspaper Lenta.ru reported that Moscow ‘had not seen such large-scale street battles 
in twenty years, maybe more’.36 
Three days later, a splinter group of civic activists congregated across town in 
the Basmanny District of central Moscow, forming a camp around Christye Prudy 
(Clear Ponds). Unlike the March of the Millions, the organisers repudiated the 
traditional protest banners and chants, and instead staged improvised concerts, poetry 
readings, and lectures. The camp became known as Occupy Abai, taking its name 
from Kazakh poet Abai Kunanbaev, whose statue is located on Chistoprudny 
Boulevard next to where the protesters had gathered. Although the moniker also 
aligned the demonstration with the global ‘Occupy’ movements, the aims of those in 	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attendance were entrenched in the oppositional cause in Russia and they sought 
primarily to undermine the Putin regime. Late on 14 May, Teatr.doc attended the 
camp, performing BerlusPutin to a crowd of over 300 audience members. Theatre 
critic Larisa Chernova describes the performance: 
 
The space was not designed for such shows and the acoustics were so-so […] 
The performers broke off for mobiles in the audience, the noise of the wind, 
[and] to improvise jokes with the crowd […]. Because of the inability to use 
the video projection, actors spoke out loud instead […] The gathered 
oppositionists were delighted, but applauding the performance was banned so 
that the noise of the applause did not wake up the residents of nearby houses, 
although people were still clapping and whistling gently.37 
 
Teatr.doc’s decision to perform BerlusPutin at Occupy Abai clearly evidences their 
intent that the play speaks to polemics familiar to those expressed in the protests of 
the winter of 2011-12. Furthermore, as will be explored in greater detail in the 
ensuing analysis of the show, it linked the play and Teatr.doc directly with the anti-
Putin protest movement. It also marks a paradigm shift in Russian theatre that 
reflected the anger of the protestors of 6 May. 
 
BerlusPutin 
Writer and director of BerlusPutin, Varvara Faer, describes the play as a conduit ‘to 
show our political position after 20 years of silence and passivity’.38 The production is 
one of the most politicised theatre pieces to be staged in Russia since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. When Teatr.doc was forced from their original space on 
Trekprudny Pereulok in December 2014 rumors quickly started to circulate in 
Moscow that it was a political decision motivated by the theatre’s staging of the play.  
In addition to being a successful film director, Faer has worked closely with 
Teatr.doc since its inception, writing, directing, and performing in the documentary 
play Crimes of Passion (Prestupleniya strasti, 2002) during the theatre’s inaugural 
year. As well as directing a variety of other productions at Teatr.doc, she has also 
directed Natalia Vorozhbit’s Slave Tail (Raba khvosta, 2007) at the Playwright and 	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Directors Centre. She has recently become one of the most active political voices in 
the Russian theatre scene, co-creating a piece of testimony theatre with Mikhail 
Ugarov on the trial of Pussy Riot members Maria Alyokhina, Nadezhda 
Tolokonnikova, and Yekaterina Samutsevich: Khamsud: Continued (Khamsud, 
Prodolzhenie, 2012). In 2015 she performed at Teatr.doc in Polina Borodina’s 
verbatim play The Bolotnaya Square Case about the protests of 6 May 2012.  
BerlusPutin is a re-working of Dario Fo’s 2003 play The Two-Headed 
Anomaly that starred Fo and his wife Franca Rame. The Two-Headed Anomaly was a 
barbed, satirical attack on then Italian president Silvio Berlusconi, and tells the story 
of how he survives a terrorist attack by having half of Putin’s brain transplanted into 
his head. In her re-writing of the piece, Faer draws on a variety of disparate source 
material, including derisive Internet cartoons, popular anekdoty (oral joke telling), 
official interviews with Liudmila Putin, and the memoirs of Marina Salye to 
transform Fo’s original concept into a topical and subversive critique of Putin’s 
presidency and the nefarious nature of contemporary Russian politics. 
In her 2011 monograph Biographical Theatre: Re-Presenting Real People? 
theatre scholar Ursula Canton explores how satirical theatre employs factual material 
to stage public figures. Canton writes: 
 
In terms of biographical theatre, the challenge to Empiricist history and to the 
belief in a clear dichotomy of factual Truth and fiction was expressed in the 
playful use of historical and biographical references. One could argue that the 
way for these forms had been paved by the growing popularity of satire that 
engaged with contemporary events and figures, but was not supported by an 
explicit political agenda.39 
 
In BerlusPutin, however, the use of historical and biographical references takes on a 
more politicised aspect. Salye was a Russian politician who audaciously exposed the 
massive corruption and financial transgressions executed by Putin during his tenure as 
advisor on international affairs to the Mayor of St. Petersburg in the early 1990s. She 
was one of the first public critics of the Putin regime, and spent the majority of the 
2000s in hiding in the north of Russia before her death in 2012. The use of testimony 	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from Salye and Putin’s estranged wife Liudmila to construct Putin’s biography and 
provide satiric material for the play is fundamental to the construction of an image of 
Putin that contests the Kremlin’s official biography. As scholar Andrei Rogatchevski 
notes, even the officially sanctioned book First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-
Portrait of Russia’s President reveals ‘little of profound significance’ about Putin’s 
accomplishments prior to his ascendance to prime minister in 1999.40 Salye and 
Liudmila are both figures from Putin’s public and private past in St. Petersburg: both 
women were marginalized after his election, both supposedly exiled to the north of 
Russia, and in a Stalinesque manner expunged from Putin’s history by the Kremlin. 
The use of Salye’s work shows a deliberate politicised agenda in Faer’s use of 
biographical source material and helped form a dominant satirical motif in the play 
based around Putin’s malfeasance in the 1990s.  
BerlusPutin premièred at Teatr.doc in February 2012, and at the time of 
writing remains in the theatre’s repertoire. The date is significant for two reasons. 
Firstly, the play premièred less than a month before the presidential elections in 
March, and also coincided with Teatr.doc’s ten-year anniversary. Before the show 
even entered the theatre’s repertoire, the contentious subject matter caused 
controversy when the printing company refused to print the promotional material for 
the show as it depicted Putin’s face. This occurrence demonstrates the precarious 
nature of theatrical events that attempt to subvert Putin’s image. Despite attempts to 
arrange shows outside of Moscow, the production has to date only been staged at 
Teatr.doc, and the company’s website describes the play as ‘unofficially banned in all 
regions of Russia’.41 In March 2012 a performance at the Palace of Culture in Putin’s 
home city of St. Petersburg was cancelled and authorities have similarly blocked 
further attempts to tour to other theatres outside Moscow. 
Faer regards the performance as ‘political satire’, noting that ‘the principle is 
similar to Puppets’.42 Faer’s assertion that the play is a piece of satire is interesting as 
prominent theatre critic Pavel Rudnev observes that the dominant methods for 
examining political issues in twenty-first century Russia have been the techniques of 
documentary and verbatim theatre, which have flourished to the exclusion of political 
satire and topical review shows known as Estrada, both of which were popular 	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throughout the Soviet years.43 Rudnev elucidates this by suggesting that for, many 
theatre practitioners in Russia, ‘political = documentary’.44 This view has been echoed 
in Beumers and Lipovetsky’s 2009 study of New Drama, which notes that ‘doc-
theatre acquired a reputation as the first post-Soviet political theatre’.45 By evoking 
the trope of political satire and recalling one of the most popular examples of its use 
in post-Soviet culture, Faer links BerlusPutin to a strong lineage of political 
subversion in the Russian arts. As scholar of Russian literature Karen Ryan argues, 
‘satire […] has always played a significant role in social and political debates in 
Russia.’46  
 
Waiting for Putin 
In this section, I will undertake a detailed analysis of BerlusPutin in order to show 
how the production employs the mode of satire, specifically for comic effect, and also 
how the play addresses different facets of Putin’s presidency. 
In common with all performances at Teatr.doc, the audience for BerlusPutin 
congregates in the theatre’s small basement foyer prior to the performance. At the 
time the play premièred in February 2012, the communal spaces in the theatre were 
adorned with banners from the December protests, emphasising Teatr.doc’s position 
as an oppositional space - or as journalist Lucy Ash summarises: ‘Russia’s most 
daring theatre company’.47 The show begins with a video projection onto the stark 
back wall of the performance space. The audience watch as actor Yevdokia 
Germanova stands in front of a phalanx of riot police during the March of the 
Millions (this segment was only added to the production after this date) reciting a 
monologue from Aristophanes’ satirical comedy Lysistrata (411BC). As Germanova 
reads her lines to the camera, she is jostled by the throng of heavily-armed enforcers 
and continues her performance as she moves down the wide boulevard with a group 
of protestors to escape the advances of the police. The video captures the confusion 
and tumult of the demonstration, helping frame the performance and encouraging the 
audience to consider the relationship between theatre, protest, and politics in 
contemporary Russia. Documenting Germanova’s involvement in the march, the film 	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draws a direct link between the protests of 6 May 2012 and the production, while the 
use of Aristophanes’ text acts a reminder of theatre’s long history as a site for 
embodied political dissidence. Furthermore, the use of video projection is a 
commonly used staging device in New Drama. Here, Faer is reviving a traditional 
format of political satire, and incorporating the modern, Russian specific staging 
devices of New Drama. 
As I have argued above, Putin has exploited his control of the media and used 
television to disseminate and manipulate a pro-Putinist agenda across the country. In 
this context the use of multimedia in BerlusPutin takes on further importance. The 
footage of Germanova at the March of the Millions is particularly salient, as in more 
recent years pro-Putin propaganda has manifested in the coverage of anti-government 
protests. In his analysis of the winter protests in 2011-2012, Dennis Volkov, a 
member of the independent sociological research group the Levada Centre, argues 
that, while a broad demographic of the population attended the rallies, the footage was 
spun by state television to give the appearance that it was primarily attended by 
wealthy, ‘middle-class’ Moscovites.48 At a talk at the Frontline Club in central 
London in Janurary 2016, John Freedman - who has participated in many opposition 
demonstrations along with members of Russia’s theatre community – further 
illuminates the skepticism towards the coverage of anti-government protests. 
Freedman recalls a rally he attended with his wife, actress Oksana Mysina, where 
Mysina confronted a film crew from the state operated NTV channel about their 
failure to document the demonstration until police riled a group of participants into 
violence. By projecting an alternative image of the protests of 2011 and 2012 in an 
independent theatre space, the production signals one of its primary intentions: to re-
address and rebalance the political narrative in contemporary Russia.  
As the projection fades out, the audience is confronted by a heated 
conversation between an unnamed film director (played by Sergei Yepishev) and an 
actress (Yevdokia Germanova). In keeping with Teatr.doc’s theatrical manifesto, the 
staging is simplistic. The performance space is void of set dressing and props with the 
exception of two chairs, while Yepishev and Germanova are dressed in unassuming 
street clothes. From the inception, Germanova performs her role for laughs, 
emphasising her character’s traits as an ageing diva, more concerned about her fee 	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and whether the film will flatter her looks, than the potential plot or political motives 
of the movie. The film actress is horrified to discover that she has been cast to play 
the part of Putin’s estranged wife Liudmila in the director’s new film: a political satire 
that will travesty both Vladimir and Liudmila Putin. At the performances of 
BerlusPutin that I have attended, this revelation created a susurration of laughter and 
generated an atmosphere of anticipation in the theatre for the comedic potential of the 
situation. The audience is well aware of the political and personal consequences that 
can face artists who provoke the Putin regime.49 Here the script is asking spectators to 
reflect on the place of political satire in Putin’s Russia, as well as the realities facing 
artists and journalists who choose to eschew and challenge the officially-sanctioned 
discourse of the Kremlin. This plot device also evokes a traditional component of 
satiric performance that dates back to the theatre of Aristophanes. As literary theorist 
Kenneth Burke famously writes: 
 
The most inventive satire arises when the artist is seeking simultaneously to 
take risks and escape punishment for his boldness, and is never quite certain 
himself whether he will be acclaimed or punished. 50 
 
In other words, an important premise of satire is the concept of it being perceived as a 
dangerous occupation for those making it, regardless of whether this attestation of risk 
is fictional or legitimate. This can help to invest the audience in the production and 
galvanise a connection between performer and audience through the creation of a 
shared frisson in the illicitness of the event. Although in Aristophanic comedy, as well 
as most contemporary British satire, the danger is often constructed as part of the 
performance and is intended ironically, the recent evictions of Teatr.doc from their 
original space, and then from their new venue in the summer of 2015, gives this 
element of the production a different context.  
The opening scene continues to highlight the precarious place of political 
satire in contemporary Russia by playing on the ambiguity between reality and the 
malaise of Germanova’s character. As the actress continues to worry about the 
potential repercussions of satirising Putin, she enquires: ‘will we be able to mock him 
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without his permission?’51 Here, the comedy revolves around the audience’s 
awareness that the play is a departure from official artistic depictions of Putin that 
have been discussed above, and draws attention to Teatr.doc’s position as one of only 
a small cluster of independent theatres in central Moscow that operates without 
government funding or official state backing.  
The opening section of BerlusPutin thus emphasises the play’s satiric 
credentials. Its meta-analysis of what can and can’t be said in Putin’s Russia 
highlights the risk Teatr.doc and the performers are taking by staging the 
performance. The comic dialogue also asks the audience to consider the restrictions 
on artistic freedoms imposed by the Kremlin as authoritarian and ridiculous.  
 
Putin Appears 
As the director continues to convince the actress of the importance of his project, they 
start rehearsing scenes from the movie in an attempt to relieve her concerns. In the 
plot of the movie, Putin and his close friend and political ally Silvio Berlusconi 
become victims of an attempted assassination by terrorists while holidaying together 
in Sochi. Both leaders are shot in the head, killing Berlusconi immediately. Putin is 
only saved through a phantasmagorical medical procedure, where neurosurgeons 
transplant half of Berlusconi’s brain into his head. The operation, however, has 
unforeseen consequences, and Putin suffers severe memory loss and is unable to 
recall his political past. Furthermore, the transplant miraculously transforms Putin 
into a benign and altruistic individual, or as it is explained in the text: ‘two negatives 
cancel each other out creating a positive’.52 
In an attempt to restore his memory and rediscover his identity, Putin travels 
to the secluded Spaso-Yelizarovsky Monastery in the north west of Russia, where his 
wife Liudmila is living in seclusion. Initially, Liudmila is concerned at what kind of 
political monster has been created by the amalgamation of Putin and Berlusconi’s 
personalities. She recommends that such an aberration should be locked up in the 
monastery, and curses her lack of arsenic and polonium to poison him. This is another 
comic recall to Putin’s political ruthlessness, which is immediately picked up on by 
the audience at Teatr.doc. Under Putin there have been a number of suspicious deaths 	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linked to the Kremlin involving these poisons, and perhaps most pertinent for a 
British readership was the murder of whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko, who died 
in London of polonium poisoning in 2006.  
Putin approaches the monastery on skis clutching an amphora under his arms, 
which is a play on the publicity stunt televised on Russian television in 2011 that saw 
the president unearth two ancient Greek urns on the bed on the Black Sea. The acting 
out of Putin’s famous public performances are an integral part of this scene. The aim 
is not to make the audience aware of Putin’s actions; indeed, the humour revolves 
around their awareness of them. Instead, the scene aims to provoke a reaction 
described by Swiss dramatist Friedrich Dürrenmatt:  
 
In laughter, man’s freedom is manifested in tears, his necessity; our task today 
is to demonstrate freedom. The tyrants of this planet are not moved by the 
work of poets […] They fear only one thing: our ridicule. That is why parody 
has crept into every genre, into the novel, into drama, into lyric poetry. Much 
of painting, of music, has been conquered by parody, and in its wake, 
overnight, often in disguise, the grotesque has made its appearance as well: it 
is simply suddenly there.53 
 
Discussing BerlusPutin, Faer herself has re-iterated the terms of Dürrenmatt’s 
dialogue:  
 
[The reaction I want from the audience is] laughter. It is a strong weapon 
against the powers, against inflated and hypocritical ghouls. Laughter is a very 
powerful weapon that attacks all arrogance. I think Dario Fo counted on this 
when he created his play.54 
 
In other words, Faer and Dürrenmatt argue that comedy and laughter can have a 
profound effect on the impact of a play on its audience and how they interpret its 
message. By acting out these scenes, BerlusPutin not only implores the audience to 
examine the absurdity of the fact that Putin’s presidency is built on such media 
images, but also to revel in the idea of collectively being able to laugh at an 	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authoritarian figure in a way that is generally unavailable to Russians due to the 
regime’s censorship of satire. In light of the play’s previous discourse on the nature of 
censorship of the arts in contemporary Russia when the actress worries about the 
possibility of the film being censored, laughter acquires a greater pertinence, as it 
becomes an act of opposition towards the Putin regime. 
When Putin meets with Liudmila he asks her to detail to him what kind of 
president he was, hoping this will trigger his memory. To his consternation, he is 
presented with a detailed enumeration of his abuses of power stretching from their 
wedding night to his premiership. Ashamed by these revelations, he begs Liudmila to 
stop talking and instead have sex with him. This provokes her to castigate him and 
shout ‘you will not be able to rape me, because I am not Russia.’55 The dialogue 
raises the spectre of Stalinism when Liudmila catalogues her husband’s transgressions 
against Russia and its people, and the Stalin era is further evoked during Putin’s 
subsequent denouncement of his action in the Duma. Putin’s posturing as a vozhd had 
led to wide-ranging comparisons between Putin and Stalin, and here the text is 
concerned with the question of why Russia should have to wait for Putin to lose 
power before it can ask difficult questions about his presidency. De-Stalinsation has 
been an agonizing process that has continued throughout the Soviet period and post-
Communist Russia for decades, and Faer suggests that acquiescence to the regime 
will result in Russia only being able to consider the true implications of Putin’s 
presidency after he leaves power.  
 As detailed above, one of the core facets of Putin’s success with the Russia 
electorate has been his ability to distance himself from the unpopularity of the Yeltsin 
era in the 1990s. Putin has painted himself as both the antithesis of this period, as well 
as Russia’s savior from the turbulence of the post-Communist era. Drawing on 
Salye’s portrayal of Putin in the 1990s reminds the audience that he is not a 
disembodied figure of the perceived relative stability of the new millennium. 
BerlusPutin accentuates that Putin was an integral part of the corruption of the 1990s 
and exploited it for personal gain. Liudmila’s listing of Putin’s corruption from the 
1990s to the present day in an unbroken lineage suggests that Putin’s exploitation of 
Russia’s political system is continuous, and has simply manifested in different ways.  
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Putin returns to Moscow and, in an attempt to seek atonement for his 
transgressions, addresses the Russian parliament, exhorting them to be principled 
politicians and to forgive his past actions. He announces a plan to dissolve the Duma, 
calls new elections, and re-opens a criminal investigation into his venal actions. As 
Yepishev delivers this speech, a video is played of documentary footage of the current 
Duma laughing hysterically at Putin’s suggestions. Foregrounded in this footage is 
politician and chairman of the Central Election Commission of Russia, Vladimir 
Churov, who has close ties to Putin since working under him during the latter’s tenure 
as Mayor of St. Petersburg in the 1990s. Churov was singled out for particular 
criticism by the December protestors who demanded his resignation after he had 
claimed that the results of the 2011 Russian legislative elections had not been 
falsified, contrary to the belief of many opposition supporters. A popular anekdoty at 
the time went as followed: ‘Breaking news: Vladimir Churov has been badly injured 
in a fire. He sustained burns over 150 percent of his body’. In this scene, the capacity 
of laughter to wound authoritarian figures is indicated through the laughter of fellow 
politicians at Putin’s address. This time the laughter is directed at Putin because he 
has lost the Machiavellianism he has employed to entrench his power. Putin’s 
memory loss and ridicule by the Duma is a signifier that Putin’s control of Russia is 
based on the precarious concept of his image as a powerful leader or vozhd, and that if 
this is savaged and attacked it could result in his entire façade as Russia’s savior 
collapsing. This corresponds with White and McAllister’s salient and compelling 
conclusion that the power base of Putinism and the ‘“Putin phenomenon” has weak 
roots’ and is bolstered by a ‘basis of support that is “a mile wide but an inch deep”’.56 
Demoralised by the Duma’s response to his proposals, Putin decides to 
undergo electric shock therapy in an attempt to restore him to his past self. This is, in 
part, a success as Putin is able to restore his memory. The treatment, however, has an 
adverse side effect that results in Putin’s accumulated years of Botox injections 
running down his face, transforming his facial features into those of Dobby the House 
Elf from the Harry Potter movies. As Putin comes to terms with his appearance, 
Liudmila blithely informs him that, due to his prior decree in front of the Duma, he is 
due to stand trial for abuse of office and embezzlement of state property. Furthermore, 
he also learns that on his own orders he has transferred presidential powers to his 	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great rivals Navalny and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Devastated, Putin asks Liudmila ‘Is 
it the end of the world?’ ‘No’ she replies, ‘you’ve just become unfashionable!’57  
As I observe in the introduction to this chapter, an attempt to survey the jokes 
and satire of BerlusPutin is fraught with potential difficulty as, in keeping with Fo’s 
employment of the commedia dell’arte technique of on-stage improvisation, 
BerlusPutin is centered on a basic framework and plot, with updates being added each 
time the production is performed. 
One of the few constants in the show’s run has been the physical depiction of 
Putin. When Yepishev appears as Putin, he is dressed in a grotesque foam rubber 
prosthesis of a naked torso with prominent muscles, parodying the official images 
released by the Kremlin of his posing topless. Yepishev points out that the focus of 
BerlusPutin’s satire is not Putin’s policies and politics, but instead the ‘character’ that 
he projects in the media.58 Yepishev’s reading of the satire is analogous to both 
Putin’s substitution of politics with his own persona, and the art that celebrates him 
and supports the ideology of Putinism. The emphasis of the costume focuses on 
paradigmatic representations of Putin rather than a deep, politicised depiction of his 
psychology. The corporeal focus of the costume, ironically reverses its typical 
function: instead of covering the body, it reveals it in all its grotesque detail. The 
grotesque aberration from the normative celebration and fetishisation of Putin’s 
corporeal identity in public elicits humour by reducing Putin’s dynamic public 
persona through absurd travesty.  Putin’s Botox forms a purulent mask over his face, 
resembling Dobby the House Elf. Unlike Putin’s torso, the use of a mask to comically 
caricature Putin’s facial features is not simply an exaggeration of his physical 
features, it also recreates a popular Internet joke circulating on the Russian-language 
Internet that Putin resembles the CGI of Dobby.  
This close reading of BerlusPutin has aimed to highlight and contextualise the 
comic satire employed by Faer and the actors throughout the play’s narrative. The 
comedy reinforces Faer’s contention that the piece is an attempt ‘to show our political 
position after 20 years of silence and passivity’.59 Faer’s comment that laughter is a 
forceful weapon again Putin and Putinism is important as it highlights the satirical 
comedy, but also raises questions about how, like satire, laughter can unite performers 	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and audience on a topical theme. Unlike typical impersonators, Yepishev does not 
attempt to look like Putin, and neither does he mimic the president’s physical 
mannerisms or diction. Instead, the comedy derives from seeing these well-known 
jokes about Putin and his most famous public performances acted out on stage. In a 
society that has censored political diversity and criticism of the Putin regime, 
Yepishev’s performance stands as an act of defiance and protest, in which the 
audience can revel.   
 
The Importance of Protest 
So far, my analysis of BerlusPutin suggests that the play holds a unique position in 
New Drama through its representation of Putin on stage and its use of aggressive and 
comic satire to mock and travesty him. These observations lead to the questions: is 
BerlusPutin simply a show that provides the audience with something lacking in the 
mainstream discourse of contemporary Russian media and society, and a chance to 
laugh at the absurdities of Putin’s public performance? Can we conclude, as Faer 
indicates, that the audiences’ laughter is the performance’s primary ‘weapon’ against 
the Putin regime?60 Is the play a straightforward piece of comic satire, or is it a more 
subversive piece of theatre that articulates a greater consideration of the widespread 
dissent that captured Russians in the wake of Putin’s return to the presidency in early 
2012? 
To answer these questions, it is important to examine the final section of the 
play. In the last scene, the film actress breaks character, unable to continue her 
performance: ‘I’m betraying all my political principles’ she shouts.61 ‘I love Putin! I 
love Berlusconi!’ At this point, the actress’ true identity is revealed as a spy for the 
government. Despite this revelation, however, her plan to disrupt the making of the 
film is unsuccessful and ironically the film transpires to be huge success. The 
performance concludes with a video clip of Secretary of State for the United States, 
Hillary Clinton, thanking the actress for her work in making the film a blockbuster, 
and revealing that it was in fact financed by the United States Department of State. 
Clinton’s appearance plays on well-known political apprehensions in Russia about 
Western influence, which have been exploited by the Kremlin to attack NGOs and 
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artists who oppose the state as agents of foreign influence.62 In the projected film, 
Clinton also acknowledges the audience as plants who have been enticed into 
attending the production for financial rewards, referring to claims made by Putin at 
the end of 2011 that Clinton had been responsible for fomenting the wave of 
December protests in Moscow of that year.   
 As the play finishes, Yepishev and Germanova take their curtain call to a 
recording of 1950s pop tune ‘Blueberry Hill’ recalling Putin’s absurd performance of 
the song at a celebrity charity event in St. Petersburg. As the audience leave their 
seats and exit the auditorium, a further link is made back to the anti-Putin protests of 
2011 and 2012 when they are offered biscuits to eat on their journey home. State 
television channel NTV had claimed that protestors at rallies in the run up to the 2012 
presidential elections were offered free biscuits by opposition leaders as an incentive 
to turn out in order to unnaturally augment the numbers in attendance.63 In the 
narrative of BerlusPutin, the biscuits are the audiences’ bribe for their participation as 
extras in this piece of propaganda organised by the Western-backed opposition 
movement.   
The conclusion of BerlusPutin suggests a further dimension to the play 
beyond its comic and satirical survey of Putin’s iconography and documentation of 
his corruption. The performance invites the audience to consider their own position in 
the increasingly polarised narrative of Putin’s Russia. The production ends on such a 
note as to make clear that the audience has implicitly, and presumably in some cases 
unwittingly, taken part in a protest themselves. While many of the audience may not 
have taken part in the wave of anti-Putin opposition of 2011-12 or consider 
themselves politically active, BerlusPutin challenges this acquiescence to the regime, 
implicitly asking if they are with them or against them. The ending suggests that 
coming to see political theatre, and in particular Teatr.doc, is now an act of protest 
against the regime. In this way, BerlusPutin reintroduces the idea that attending the 
theatre can be a political act. The audience at a performance of the play are not 
passive observers of political dissent, but also complicit actors in it themselves.  
Although the evoking of theatre as a conduit of social change and political 
activism is not new in Russia - theatre director Kama Ginkas states: ‘Russian theatre 	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is not a time killer. It is and always has been something of consequence’64 – it was 
one of the first occasions that Ginka’s provocative statement had been tacitly implied 
in a piece of New Drama. Faer’s contention that the performance is an attempt ‘to 
show our political position after 20 years of silence and passivity’ replicates the mood 
of the protest movement in Russia.65  The play is a highly successful piece of topical 
satire, but it is also an extension of the wider dissent of the winter of 2011-12, a 
kairotic moment where civic life in Moscow became politicised, and acquiescence to 
the Kremlin was no longer accepted by members of the opposition.  
 
Satirical performance on stage and the importance of the live act 
The permute nature of the performance puts the emphasis on the skilled improvisation 
of Yepishev and Germanova. As Svetlana Belova - who was part of the play’s 
original creative team – attests, the material performed can change from production to 
production, one day to the next, to accommodate current news stories, and re-work 
material that does not work comedically.66 In many ways, the creative approach taken 
by Faer and the cast of BerlusPutin in incorporating improvisational techniques to 
maintain the topicality of the humour, recalls the ethos of Soviet Blue Blouse theatre 
makers: ‘Agitki [agit-prop performance pieces] come into being, sharp, whip-like, up 
to the minute, directly linked with our everyday life, vivid, bright, easy to 
remember.’67 This suggests that for satirical theatre to have the most visceral effect on 
its audience, spontaneity of performance and thematic topicality are vital in 
productions of political theatre. 
In the performance of the play, Germanova’s physicalisation of Liudmila 
Putin is relies on  comedic stock traits. Unlike the amplified costume utilised for 
Putin, Luydmila is portrayed by the actor wrapping a scarf around her head and 
employing a gaunt posture. Throughout her performance, Germanova accentuates her 
characterisation in response to the audiences’ laughs and responses. Analysing comic 
performance, Ian Wilkie highlights the importance of the relationship between actor 
and audience in the creation of artistic reciprocity. ‘In live performance the interplay 
of comic message transmitted by the actor(s) and the received response from the 
audience occur both instantaneously and as part of an exponential process throughout 	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the performance and it allows for mutual evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
theatrical event to be simultaneously and continuously undertaken.’68 Wilkie further 
elucidates: 
 
In live performance, even a simple pause to allow a laugh to punctuate the 
performance signals that acting in a comedy requires an, albeit tacit, 
acknowledgement of the audience’s responsiveness. The unacknowledged 
‘acknowledgement’ of a response, cued by an audience’s laughter, in turn can 
affect the actor’s playing of a moment, her/his holding of a pause, 
emphasising of a look or stressing of a word or line.69 
 
In BerlusPutin’s performance the comedic connection between actor and audience 
adds a further dimension to the performance. It allows a link to be made between 
theatre and political dissent, and as we shall see, helps Teatr.doc forge a sense of 
collectivism, which has been vital it helping it survive after being target by the 
authorities.    
Furthermore, in the context of this chapter’s analysis of BerlusPutin, 
Findlater’s emphasis on the actor’s ability to ‘kindle an instant collective response’ 
recalls the discussion on the opposition demonstration in the winter of 2011 and 2012. 
The concept of a shared sense of collectively among the protestors was a 
preoccupation for many Russian writers in their immediate analyses of the first large-
scale protest movement in Russia for a generation. Writing in daily business 
newspaper Vedomosti, journalist Alexei Levinson argues that the defining feature of 
the demonstrations was the wide demographic of protestors united in a collective 
spirit of opposition towards the Putin regime. Levinson suggests that this set these 
protests apart from previous anti-Kremlin rallies, which were centred around ‘middle-
class’ identities or single issues such as pensions.70 Russian scholars Oleg Zhuravlev 
et al have echoed a similar position: 
 
in the specific, narrow sense, we could say that [the] Bolotnaya [Square 
Protest – the culmination of the demonstrations of 6 May 2012] was not a 	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revolution, but had a revolutionary ‘component’, insofar as it, like all 
revolutions beginning with the French, created a collective identity, not only 
uniting all the protesters but also aspiring to universality, to representation and 
unification of the entire country.71  
 
These accounts suggest that the protests of 2011-12 were defined by different political 
and social alliances becoming united in a collective opposition of Putinism. The 
theatrical experience of watching BerlusPutin with an audience allied by laughter and 
comedy in a shared communal space, gives the play an important link to the recent 
anti-Putin protests. In BerlusPutin, Faer and her collaborators tapped into a feeling of 
togetherness created by opposition towards Putin and the perceived political 
corruption of the government.  
 
Putin.doc: Comparing the Satiric Modes 
Although Russian critics received BerlusPutin as a performance unrivalled in twenty-
first century Russia for its boldness in travestying Putin in a live performance, it is not 
the only piece of theatre to have satirically engaged with Putin’s presidency. Viktor 
Teterin’s play Putin.doc (2005) premièred at the KC Home Theatre in 2005 under the 
direction of Olga Fedoseeva, and was subsequently published in the anthology 
Putin.doc: Nine Revolutionary Plays compiled by Rudnev and Andrei Malgin, which 
included work by students from Nikolai Koliada’s playwriting school in 
Yekaterinburg.72 Teterin, originally from the city of Saransk, is based in Moscow and 
among his influences are many prominent writers of New Drama including Vasily 
Sigarev and Mikhail and Vyacheslav Durnenkov. Although many of Teterin’s plays 
are written in the linguistic style of these playwrights, Putin.doc is a stylistic 
departure, described by Teterin as including ‘elements of the absurd’.73 
The Home Theatre is a cramped proscenium arch space, and in Fedoseeva’s 
staging of the play the actors sat on either side of the raised stage, often static and 
motionless. The formality of the auditorium results in a lack of intimacy contrasting 
with performances of BerlusPutin, where Teatr.doc’s performance space allows for a 
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delineation between actor and audience and greater chance for comic interaction 
during the show. 
The play is a dialogue between Ivan and Peter, two ‘ardent supporters of the 
President of Russia’, and members of the United Russia party who go to extra lengths 
to display their loyalty to Putin.74 In the Home Theatre production, costume was used 
to emphasize the importance of Ivan and Peter’s respective occupations. Ivan, a 
stereotypical corporate manager is dressed in a suit, while Peter wears full military 
dress signaling his position as a colonel in the Russian Ministry of Defence. Ivan and 
Peter represent two very specific figures of the 2000s: the affluent New Russian, a 
symbol of Russia’s newfound wealth and consumer society, and senior military 
figures, or siloviki. That Teterin chooses to portray Ivan and Peter as these two 
archetypes is unsurprising and clearly deliberate. Both groups are core supporters of 
the Putin administration and in the 2000s their prominence and importance in Russian 
society and politics rose.  
As the show opens, the two men are engaged in a debate about the merits of 
Putinism and the effect of its policies on the country.  Peter informs Ivan of Putin’s 
announcement to double Russia’s GDP by 2010, and both men agree with the 
importance of this statement. Ivan then evokes Putin’s famous speech of 24 
September 1999, which has been equally lionized and deplored by political 
commentators in Russia. Responding to the wave of apartment bombings instigated 
by Chechen terrorists in the same month, Putin announced at a press conference that 
he would endeavor to:  
 
pursue terrorists everywhere. If they are in the airport, we will pursue them in 
the airport. And if we capture them in the toilet, then we will waste them in 
the outhouse […] The issue has been resolved once and for all.75 
 
Ivan’s use of Putin’s famous idiom ‘waste them in the outhouse’ and the duo’s 
positive appraisal of Putin’s promise to raise GDP imply that their reverence for Putin 
is built on a single facet of Putinism that was a prominent feature in the rhetoric of his 
first term, and recalls a speech he made as prime minister in 1999. In a phrase that has 
come to encapsulate Putin’s political stance and ideology, he rallied the Russian 	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nation to ‘get off its knees’ and demonstrate its power. Ivan and Peter’s praise of 
Putin raises concerns that his support was based on short-term, demagogic policies 
that aimed to restore Russian pride after its abatement on the world stage in the 1990s. 
That the pair agree with Putin’s jingoism and instigation of the Second Chechen War 
is further demonstrated by an extremely prescient joke that Putin should consider 
military action against Ukraine after the Tuzla Island territorial dispute between the 
two countries in October 2003. 
The ‘absurdist’ elements of the play are revealed when Ivan and Peter engage 
in rivalry to determine which of them is the biggest fan of Putin, which they hope will 
be judged by the president himself. In the second scene, Peter reveals he has spent 
20000 rubles commissioning a life-size portrait of Putin while Ivan recites a poem he 
has written celebrating Putin’s political accomplishments. Ivan’s poem further 
traverses two of the key features of Putin’s first term: the Chechen war and the 
Kremlin’s co-option of the media through the purge of the oligarchs.  In the second 
round of their competition Ivan covers the walls of his apartment with giant posters of 
Putin commanding a submarine, while Peter reveals he has taught his regiment of 
soldiers the lyrics to the oleaginous contemporary pop song ‘Man Like Putin’. The 
competition becomes increasingly absurd when Ivan legally changes his name to 
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and is subsequently outdone by Peter who undergoes 
plastic surgery to transform his facial features into Putin’s. 
Teterin’s inspiration for Ivan and Peter clearly come from the bizarre actions 
of real-life supporters of Putin. A Siberian man is reported to have adopted Putin’s 
surname, while a former deputy prime minister of Bashkortostan wrote a three-page 
ode to Putin that consisted exclusively of words beginning with the letter ‘p’.76 In 
contrast to BerlusPutin, Teterin views Putin’s public persona as a construct of his 
supporters rather than the Kremlin. As discussed above, Johnson argues that Putin’s 
public performances and the creation of an official Kremlin narrative that supports his 
media persona is ‘more about the act of worship than the godhead, per se’.77 Johnson 
suggests the general Russian public consume pro-Putin news stories and pop culture 
such as the song like ‘Man like Putin’ and enjoy them for their irony viewing it as 
harmless fun. Furthermore, Johnson argues that Putin and his administration played a 
‘secondary role’ in the creation and importance of his public image, asking: ‘isn’t the 	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real subject of the Putin cult, and hence of any book that focuses on it, the cult’s 
diffuse army of creators and consumers?’78 
Although Faer and Teterin both use satire to examine Putin’s public persona 
and presidency, they use the form in strikingly different ways. As Holbert et al write, 
satire is comprised of a variety of distinctive techniques and modes: ‘it is clear that we 
should not be describing satire as a single entity’.79 In the Anatomy of Satire, Gilbert 
Highet identifies two of the most significant facets of satire as stemming from the 
Latin poets Horace and Juvenal. Horatian satire, Highet contends, is optimistic and 
‘believes that folly and evil are not innate in humanity, or if they are, they are 
eradicable. They are diseases that can be cured. They are mistakes which can be 
corrected.’80 In contrast, Juvenalian satirists write ‘in order to punish […] there is not 
joy in it, no healing warmth. [They laugh] with contempt at their pretensions and 
incongruities and base hypocrisies.81 In other words, Highet suggests a dominant 
dichotomy of satire between Horatian and Juvenalian models, which aim to persuade 
and critique in divergent ways. 
Putin.doc takes a softer, Horatian approach focusing on Putin’s supporters 
rather than Putin’s own idiosyncrasies, suggesting that Putin has maintained power 
through an emerging cult of personality that mobilises support amongst the electorate 
and gains votes this way. The play poses questions about the shortcomings of Russian 
democracy and the political system in the 2000s. BerlusPutin instead targets Putin 
directly, arguing that he is a monstrous aberration, who has used media manipulation 
and corruption to maintain his grip on power.  
In scene five, after Peter recites Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly on 16 
May 2003, Ivan comments that he particularly enjoyed it due to its ‘imperial 
[державностью]’ tone.82 Returning to the initial discussion of Putinism in this 
chapter, Ivan’s comment recalls Putin’s deliberate calibration to fit the persona of a 
vozhd. By appointing Putin as the judge of their competition, Teterin’s Putin is a 
patriarchal authority figure who is wise and powerful, aligning with Shuster’s 
description of a Russian vozhd as ‘a strong leader […] aloof from the masses’.83 In 
contrast BerlusPutin attacks Putin’s claims to be a father of the Russian nation and the 	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81 Ibid. 235-7. 
82 Teterin (2005). 
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country’s savior. Playing on the infamous rumour that Putin has engaged in an affair 
with former Olympic gymnast Alina Kabayeva, 31 years his junior, Yepishev, as 
Putin, comically prowls around the stage shouting ‘I need sex’, while a montage of 
Kabayeva’s gymnastic routines plays on a projection screen behind him.84 Faer 
comically satirises and subverts the obsequious representations of Putin as a Tsar-like 
Vozhd, aloof from sexual desire and base human urges, and that Putin’s family ethos 
and sexual control is allied with the notion that he is in control of Russia’s fortunes.  
The key difference between the opposing satiric modes employed by 
BerlusPutin and Putin.doc is in their treatment of Russian democracy. Teterin’s play 
ultimately suggests that the electoral system in Russia under Putin remains fair and 
functional, but has simply been exploited by the government to retain power. This 
power, Teterin argues, stems directly from well-meaning but ultimately misinformed 
support from the Russian electorate in the form of Ivan and Peter. BerlusPutin’s 
vehement Juvenalian satire demonstrates a deep distrust of the democratic system 
under Putin. Faer’s Putin is inherently corrupt and opportunist in his political actions. 
His exploitation of the turbulent political situation in the 1990s, and his actions during 
his presidency have made the idea of modern Russian democracy a grotesque farce. 
BerlusPutin’s rage echoes the mistrust in the political system that occurred when 
Putin announced his intentions to stand as president for a third term in 2011, which 
was for many a moment when the veneer of democracy was finally stripped away, 
revealing the moribund state of political freedom in Putin’s Russia.    
 The variation in satirical tone between Teterin’s Putin.doc, first produced in 
2005, and BerlusPutin, which premièred a month before the 2012 presidential 
elections, perhaps demonstrates a change in attitudes towards Putin’s presidency over 
this period. When Putin.doc was first performed in 2005, at the beginning of Putin’s 
second term in office, there was a focus on why the electorate found Putin appealing 
and how he was able to exploit this. In the intervening years, the regime’s 
authoritarian stance has seen press freedoms decline, journalists murdered, and the 
spectre of election fraud emerge, resulting in Russia’s democracy rating by the NGO 
on political freedom and democracy, Freedom House, change from ‘party free’ to ‘not 
free’ in 2005, and then to ‘consolidated authoritarian regime’ in 2012.’85 As I have 
contended, the tipping point can be identified as Putin’s decision to run for a third 	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85 See White (2011) 355 for results of the Freedom House surveys. 
	   81	  
presidential term, which provoked a wave of large scale anti-government 
demonstrations previously unseen during the Putin era.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined Teatr.doc’s production BerlusPutin, in relation to the 
evolution of Putinism throughout Putin’s presidency. I suggest the play supports the 
verdict that 2012 marked a turning point for the administration, as it experienced the 
first obvious mass mobilisation of dissent caused by what many perceived to be an 
arrogant disregard of the Russian constitution and democratic principles.  
 Although I identify a number of elements about the play that stands in a long 
line of satirical tradition, such as an attestation of risk and the emphasis on ridiculing 
the powerful, BerlusPutin is also firmly rooted in the political discord of 2011-12, 
where anti-Putin protests galvanised previously un-politicised members of society 
into civic action. My argument is that a return of political satire to the Russian stage 
has deeper implications than to simply re-address the chasm left in the Russian arts by 
Putin’s censorship and the state co-option of the media. I further suggest that the 
comic performances of the actors in the play also frame it as a distinctive piece of 
anti-Putin art due to the way in which it connects with the audience, and implies that 
the play is a collective act of opposition by both the creative team and those watching 
it. 
Finally, by comparing BerlusPutin with Teterin’s Putin.doc I have identified a 
dynamic change in the satirical treatment of Putinism by New Drama writers. I argue 
that the differential between Putin.doc’s employment of Horatian satire and the 
Juvenalian mode of BerlusPutin demonstrates a clear turning point in how theatre 
makers interpreted the reason for Putin’s popularity. Teterin sees it as stemming from 
the electorate, while Faer argues it emanates from Putin’s inherent corruption and 
manipulation of the democratic process.  
In the following chapter, I will consider how New Drama has responded the 
pertinent moment in the development of Putinism, the Second Chechen War. Framing 
my discussion of the two case studies within the revival of militarised gender norms 
in Putin’s Russia, I argue that New Drama have staged ‘counter-narratives’ that 
challenge the established discourse of Putinism.
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Chapter Three: Chechnya and Beyond: Staging the Soldier 
in New Drama 
 
Introduction 
On 1 October 1999, approximately 50,000 Russian soldiers advanced over the 
Dagestani-Chechen boarder, marking the start of the ground campaign of what would 
become known as the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). Three years earlier, the 
First Chechen War (1994-1996) had ended with a humiliating and unimaginable 
defeat for the Russian army and the Yeltsin administration after the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the Chechen capital of Grozny in the face of pervasive public 
opinion against the war.1 Although Putin officially concluded the end of the Second 
Chechen War in April 2002, the horrifying brutality of the military campaign meant 
that it became a paramount and defining juncture of his first two terms in office 
during the 2000s. The Second Chechen War has been identified as a propitious nexus 
in both defining and legitimising the policies and themes of Putinism. As Russian 
human rights activist Sergei Kovalev argues, Putin ‘owes his accession to the 
presidency largely to his backing of the war.’2 Scholars of contemporary Russian 
politics Roland Dannreuther and Luke March also attribute Putin’s consolidation of 
power in the 2000s to the war, writing that ‘Putin’s strategy during the war and the 
subsequent pacification of Chechnya have helped construct the post-Yeltsin Russian 
state in a way that has seen the increased centralisation of power and the promotion of 
authoritarian state structures.’3 Russian political scientist Pavel Baev echoes this, 
attributing elements of a ‘personal crusade’ to Putin’s engagement with the military 
campaign, noting that it has become a ‘trademark of Putin’s presidency, from the very 
start.’4  
 This chapter examines the impact of the complex legacy of the Second 
Chechen War on new theatre writing in contemporary Russia. Despite the totemic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For more detailed accounts of the First Chechen War, see Lieven (1999) and Evangelista (2002) 11-
45. Lieven gives a first person account on his experience of reporting in Chechnya during the war, and 
contexutalises Russia’s defeat in the context of the Yeltsin administration.  Evangelista argues that the 
First Chechen War was driven by nationalist sentiment and focuses on the human rights abuse 
violations by Russia during the conflict.  
2 Kovalev (2000). 
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importance of the war in contemporary Russian politics and the manifold New Drama 
productions that respond to the two Chechen Wars, to date no study has examined 
how theatre makers have engaged with the conflicts and military tropes in the twenty-
first century. Theatre director and critic Yana Ross observes that:  
 
a surprising number [of plays] are trying to tackle the current war in Chechnya 
and speak of its aftermath. Plays where soldiers return home, physically and 
emotionally depleted, are not just literal tributes to the daily horrors that 
Russia tends to ignore in the media (officially the war is over) but also 
thoughtful exploration of the long-term effects the war will have on this 
generation.5 
 
Ross’s is one the few accounts to acknowledge and underscore the intersections 
between Putin’s fervent renewal of the Russian army’s involvement in Chechnya and 
the development of the New Drama canon. By considering New Drama’s engagement 
with the Chechen Wars, I will facilitate a wider discussion on how playwrights in 
Russia have directly interrogated one of the core foundations of Putinism: the 
strengthening of the army and patriotic values. By doing, so I aim to demonstrate the 
political potency of New Drama in its facilitation of the creation of new discourses on 
contemporary Russian politics that run in opposition to the established rhetoric of the 
Putin regime. In this context I use the term ‘counter-narrative’ in this chapter as 
defined by political theorist Molly Andrews as ‘the stories which people tell and live 
which offer resistance, either implicitly or explicitly, to dominant cultural narratives’.6 
Counter-narratives are, therefore, in opposition to what are referred as ‘dominant’ or 
‘master narratives’: ‘counter-narratives only make sense in relation to something else, 
that which they are countering. The very name identifies it as an oppositional 
category, in tension with another category.’7 
The case studies for this chapter are Mikhail and Vyacheslav Durnenkov’s The 
Drunks (Pianii, 2009) and The Soldier (Soldat, 2011) by Pavel Pryazhko. My research 
for this chapter is informed by attending a production of The Soldier at Teatr.doc in 
November 2012. My presence at a live performance of this play has informed my 	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6 Andrews (2004) 1. 
7 Ibid.	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analysis of the production. I also benefit from access to a video recording of the 
performance shared with me by co-artistic director of Teatr.doc, Elena Gremina, as 
well as archived video recordings of the production’s post-show discussions. A single 
camera recording also furthers my analysis of The Drunks, which I obtained courtesy 
of the Royal Shakespeare Company’s collections and archives department. I am 
further indebted to Mikhail Durnenkov for providing me with an interview during my 
research of The Drunks, and for a number of stimulating informal conversations on 
the play and contemporary Russian theatre in general.  
One difficultly of discussing the Second Chechen War in relation to Russian 
theatre is the war’s significant position at the fulcrum of Putinism. As Dmitrii 
Muratov, editor of Russian-language newspaper Novaya Gazeta, has lamented 
‘everything that has happened since then and all that is happening today is but a 
consequence of this war.’8 Writing both figuratively and literally about the 
consequences of the conflicts, Muratov evocatively mourns how ‘the first and second 
Chechen wars murdered Russian democracy in its cradle.’9 In my consideration of 
how New Drama has engaged with the Second Chechen War and Putin’s subsequent 
revivification of the military in Russian society, I frame my debate within the specific 
parameters of how the Second Chechen War impacted on Putin’s restoration of the 
military in Russian public life. In contextualising the importance of the military to 
Putin’s presidency, I follow two important studies on the Russian army and gender by 
Russian cultural studies scholars Maya Eichler and Valerie Sperling: Militarizing 
Men: Gender, Conscription and War in Post-Soviet Russia (2012) and Sex, Politics 
and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia (2015). Eichler and Sperling contend that 
Putin’s authority is legitimised by his manipulation of the army to emphasise 
militarised notions of masculinity, foregrounding the political importance of military 
service and the role of soldiers and war veterans as a contested site of hegemonic 
masculinity in contemporary Russia. Taking these studies as a starting point, I argue 
that New Drama has provided one of the most exciting and pertinent challenges to 
this particular facet of the normative discourse of Putinism.  
I begin this chapter with a synopsis of the major events of the Second Chechen 
War, and its importance in securing Putin’s victory in the 2000 presidential election. I 
then identify three key consequences of the war in the development of Russian 	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politics; the Kremlin’s co-option of the mass media and silencing of critics who 
rejected the state-sanctioned coverage of the war, the revivification of the military, 
and the renewal of a debate about the role of conscription in modern Russia. Next, I 
introduce the research of Eichler and Sperling, and consider their use of gender 
theorist R. W. Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity to engage with 
contemporary Russian politics. After this, I examine The Drunks and explore how the 
Durnenkovs use the backdrop of the Chechen Wars to satirise and challenge the 
multifaceted elements of Putinism that arose as a direct result of Russia’s military 
engagement in Chechnya.  I supplement this consideration of The Drunks with a 
detailed analysis of Pryazhko’s The Soldier. Here, I consider how the production 
challenges Putinism by subverting idealised stereotypes of militarised hegemonic 
masculinity.  
 
Context: Putin and the Military: Chechnya and Beyond 
The fulminant outbreak of the Second Chechen War in late August 1999 was a kairos 
moment in Putin’s fledgling political career. Earlier that month, on 9 August 1999, 
Putin had been appointed prime minister by Boris Yeltsin, and announced that he 
would be standing in the 2000 presidential elections under the auspices of the Yeltsin 
administration. Coincident with Putin’s political ascendancy was a renewal of 
tensions and military skirmishes in Dagestan on the Russian-Chechen boarder, as 
Chechen insurgents, led by military commander Shamil Basaev, violated the ceasefire 
effectuated at the end of the First Chechen War in 1996. Then, in September 1999, 
Moscow and the southern Russian cities of Dagestan and Volgodonsk were rocked by 
a series of bomb blasts that ripped through multiple apartment buildings, killing more 
than 300 civilians. These attacks on Russian soil prompted an unleashing of anti-
Chechen sentiment in Russia fuelled by the saturation of graphic news reports of 
Basaev’s invasion of Dagestan.10 Seizing on public opinion, Putin acted decisively in 
a demonstration of trenchant strength that would resonate with the electorate. For six 
months, from September 1999 to February 2000, an exhaustive Russian aerial assault 
pummelled Chechnya’s capital Grozny and other major cities in the region. 
Simultaneous to this relentless carpet-bombing was a brutal ground campaign that 
saw Russian troops slowly encircle Grozny in the opening months of 2000. Although 	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the siege of Grozny ended on 8 February 2000, the Russia army continued to engage 
in a bloody guerilla war in Chechnya. Despite the withdrawal of the Russian army in 
2002 and a handing over of power to pro-Russian Chechen forces - a period known as 
‘Chechenisation’ - Russia did not formally conclude counter terrorism operations 
until 2009. 
  Putin viewed the Second Chechen War as the defining feature in his incipient 
stages of securing power in Russia. Speaking in 2000, he reflected that ‘I had already 
decided that my career might be over, but that my mission, my historical mission – 
and this will sound lofty, but it’s true – consisted of resolving the situation in the 
Northern Caucasus.’11 Putin’s ‘historical mission’ paid off, and he won a landslide 
victory in the presidential elections. According to a 2010 study Stephen White and Ian 
McAllister, Putin’s popularity with the electorate increased by sixty per cent between 
his appointment as prime minister in August 1999 and his succession to the 
presidency in January 2000. White and McAllister attribute this surge in his public 
approval to the success of the Chechen conflict, concluding: ‘it was certainly clear 
that Putin’s vigorous prosecution of the war had been closely paralleled by a rise in 
his own popularity.’12  
The war came to define not only Putin’s first tentative months in power, but 
also his presidency and domestic policies throughout his entire first term in office 
from the end of 1999 to 2004. British journalist Ben Judah claims that ‘Putin was as 
shaped by the apartment bombings and the Chechen war as George W. Bush was by 
9/11 and his wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.’13 In the media, Putin visually aligned 
himself with the war effort and the Russian troops fighting on the front line, engaging 
in grand theatrical spectacles that included flying into Chechnya in the co-pilot seat of 
a Su-25 jet a week prior to the presidential elections in March 2000.14 Putin came to 
embody the Russian war effort: ‘Though Putin has little in common with military 
heroes,’ writes Helena Goscilo, ‘the huge gallery of his PR photographs leaves no 
doubts that he appreciates the psychological significance of the next best thing – the 
spectacle of a leader wearing camouflage, owning a military-style Lada jeep, 
clutching weapons, and visiting army bases.’15 Goscilo points out that Putin continued 	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to perform the role of military man of action throughout his first two terms as 
president. Despite the Chechen War becoming a more marginal issue after his re-
election in 2004, the need for Putin to extol the militaristic values remained at the 
core of Putinism well into his second presidential term.  
 
Consequences of the War 
The impact of the invasion of Chechnya on Putin’s popularity with the Russian 
electorate is pertinent to the Kremlin’s growing censorship and control of the mass 
media. Writing in 2000 at the height of the military campaign in Chechnya, Kovalev 
observed that there was an ‘unprecedented information blockade around Chechnya.’16 
The outbreak of the war saw the first gagging of the Russian media by Putin, with 
reporters pressurised to capitalise on the patriotic sentiment that swept through Russia 
in the early months of the conflict. Putin learnt from the mistakes made by the Yeltsin 
administration during the first Chechen war, which had been undone by public 
opinion in Russia, swayed by graphic and critical news reports from the leading 
television networks. According to Kovalev, Putin blamed Russia’s defeat in 1996 on 
an apostate ‘fifth column’ in Russian society: 
 
It turns out that it is the human rights activists and the ‘unpatriotic’ press who 
are guilty of bringing about the defeat of the Russian army in the last Chechen 
war: their reports created sympathy for the sufferings of the Chechen people 
and thus confused public opinion. No one, by the way, accuses either human 
rights activists or the press of having circulated false or one-sided information. 
In effect, they are accused of objectively reporting on events.17 
 
In other words, Putin viewed the accretion of an obsequious press and civil society 
who conformed to a pro-Kremlin narrative as decisive to the success of the Chechen 
campaign and his popularity with the Russian electorate. In January 2000, just two 
weeks after Putin succeeded Yeltsin as president, Russian war correspondent Andrei 
Babitsky was arrested by Russian federal forces in Grozny while reporting on the war 
for Radio svoboda, the Russian-language arm of the international news broadcaster 
Radio Liberty. Babitsky was detained for nearly a month, before he was exchanged 	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for Russian soldiers held prisoner by Chechen insurgents. A second and more high-
profile example of the dangers of challenging the Kremlin’s official narrative on the 
war was the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaia outside her apartment in central 
Moscow in October 2006. Politkovskaia’s courageous reporting on the Putin 
administration has been published in English-language translations in the books A 
Dirty War: a Russian Reporter in Chechnya and Putin’s Russia. The murder of 
Politkovskaia was widely reported both internationally and in Russia and resulted in 
commentators making a connection between the incident and her provocative 
opposition to the Second Chechen War. As Stephen White observes, Politkovskaia’s 
war correspondence ‘suggested an obvious motive for the attack.’18 Although the 
Kremlin has never been linked to the shooting, Politkovskaia’s murder was evidence 
that independent journalism which aimed to expose the shocking reality of the war on 
the ground did so with the fear of violent repercussions.  
The legacy of the Second Chechen War can further be traced in the 
development and re-integration of the military’s role in civil society by the Putin 
administration. According to Baev, the Second Chechen War should be viewed  ‘not 
just as an attempt by the top brass to take revenge for the defeat of three years earlier, 
but as part of their effort to restore the “proper” place of the army in society and 
check further degradation of the military structures.’19 This meant coalescing army 
and civil society into a relationship that had not existed since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. One facet of this revivification of martial values included the re-
introduction of military education into the school curriculum. This military education 
took the form of a programme of patriotic education in which the military took centre 
stage. Maya Eichler describes how the these programmes, designed by the state, took  
 
an active interest in restoring the link between military service and patriotism 
[and] included courses, conferences, cultural events, exhibitions, and military-
sports games, and also aimed at raising the profile of patriotic themes in the 
media and cultural sphere20 
    
Against the background of this patriotic education program has been the rehabilitation 	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of the military in public performances and spaces in twenty-first century Russia. In 
particular, the auxesis of the annual commemoration of the Soviet Union’s victory in 
the Second World War on 9 May has formed a core facet of Putin’s societal 
rehabilitation of the military in the 2000s and 2010s. The spectacle is a panoply of the 
country’s military strength, and by proxy foregrounds the importance of Putin to 
Russia’s re-emergence on the world stage. These colossal celebrations reached an 
apogee for the 70th anniversary of the end of the war in 2015. One especially notable 
moment during the celebrations was Putin’s central participation in the Immortal 
Regiment (Bessmertnii Polk) procession, an annual Victory Day march initiated in 
2011 that commemorates the memory of the Soviet participants of the Second World 
War. Putin walked at the anterior of the procession, joining the congregation in 
carrying images of their relatives who had fought in the war, as is tradition during the 
parade.21 
 The revivification of the military in the public sphere is not strictly limited to 
traditional parades and military commemoration. In 2005, the pro-Putin youth group 
Nashi (Ours) was founded with the financial backing of the Kremlin. Originally 
formed under the aegis of the Kremlin as a reactionary counter to the ‘coloured 
revolutions’ in Georgia and the Ukraine in 2003-2005, Nashi’s proclivity to engage in 
large-scale activism and publicity stunts saw them emerge as vital propagators of 
Putin’s public reframing of militarised patriotism.22 According to Valerie Sperling, 
Nashi and its militant wing Stal (Steel) recall the cultural memory of the Second 
World War as a means to bolster patriotism and support for Putinism among the 
Russian electorate. Sperling argues that ‘World War II and its commemoration have 
been central to the legitimation strategy of the Russian government under Putin and 
Medvedev and the pro-Kremlin groups who offer support for it.’23 Especially 
pertinent to this study is Nashi and Stal’s organisation of a number of theatrical 
spectacles in public spaces. These have included activists dressing in World War II 
uniforms to promote a new photographic exhibition that celebrated Russia’s 
involvement in the war, and the orchestration of a gathering of sixty thousand 
participants in central Moscow where veterans of the Second World War symbolically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kremlin.ru (2015). Putin carried a black and white picture of his father dressed in a naval uniform 
from the 1930s. 
22 For further discussion on the development of Nashi see Horvath (2013) 99-122.  
23 Sperling (2015) 130-1. 
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passed the baton to the younger generation.24 More recently in 2014, Nashi vocally 
backed Russia’s military intervention in eastern Ukraine and the Kremlin’s support of 
pro-Russian insurgents in the conflict.25 Importantly, Nashi’s evocation of military 
heroism and patriotism is achieved through the embodied presence of young activists 
and army veterans in military dress. As we shall see, contemporary Russian theatre 
makers have comparatively employed the physical presence of the male actor to 
challenge and subvert the idealised stereotype of the war hero to erode a crucial 
stanchion of Putinism. By re-integrating the military into public activism, pro-Putin 
youth groups have strengthened the army’s position as a nexus of civil society in 
contemporary Russia. Specifically, the Putin regime and Nashi have propagated an 
idealised view of heroism embodied by war veterans as a paragon for young Russians. 
Consequently, the reframing of the military has become a contentious and polarising 
facet of Putinism. 
Finally, crucial to a consideration of the Second Chechen War and Putin’s 
revivification of a militarised society is the contested narrative about the Kremlin’s 
promotion of military service and the use of conscript soldiers in Chechnya. Despite 
military rules barring new recruits from serving in conflict zones, conscripted soldiers 
were sent to fight on the front lines in Grozny and other areas of conflict. In the 
1990s, Yeltsin attempted to modernise the cumbersome and out-dated Russian army, 
still heavily reliant on conscripted recruits. On his re-election in 1996, he pledged to 
reconstruct the military with the aim of ending conscription in Russia altogether, but 
by the start of the new millennium no progress had been made. When Russia entered 
into a second war in Chechnya, the armed forces were still ostensibly rooted in the 
model of the Soviet army, and dependant on conscripts from around Russia’s vast 
oblasts (administrative regions). The Russian military differed from the Soviet Red 
Army ‘only in that it was smaller, far more corrupt, and with no empire to patrol’, 
according to Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, it ‘remained well into the Putin era the 
most visibly unreconstructed Soviet institution in Russian life.’26 The Kremlin made 
the draft a key component of their patriotic education programme and emphasised the 
political nature of serving in the Russian army. As Sperling contends, ‘in the eyes of 
the Kremlin, army service and submission to military conscription are both direct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 131. 
25 Balmforth (2015).  
26 Baker and Glasser (2007) 198. 
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forms of supporting the state.’27  
It is impossible to view these multifaceted elements of Putinism in isolation 
from each other. The Second Chechen War was fundamental in shaping the nascent 
foundations of Putinism, and provided a pretext for Putin’s diminution of press 
freedoms and independent correspondence on the war. There was a more prominent 
role for the military in Putin’s state-building strategy in the 2000s, which included a 
re-emphasis on mandatory conscription as a patriotic duty required by all young 
Russian men. It is primarily against this backdrop of the resurgence of the military 
that the scholarly study of gender politics in twenty-first century Russia has been 
framed. I will now turn to a discussion of two important publications in this field that 
consider how military service and war veterans have served as a conduit through 
which militarised gender norms have been reinforced.  
 
Putinism and Militarised Masculinity 
Several scholars of Russian politics have noted that the Putin administration has 
reinforced traditional gender identities and notions of masculinity. Two significant 
monographs recently published in this area of study are Maya Eichler’s Militarizing 
Men: Gender, Conscription and War in Post-Soviet Russia and Valerie Sperling’s 
Sex, Politics and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia.  These studies provide a 
fascinating context to discuss how the identities of Chechentsy (Russian veterans of 
the two Chechen Wars) and conscripted soldiers have been institutionally defined and 
subsequently challenged in contemporary Russian theatre. Both Eichler and Sperling 
frame their debates within the hierarchical model of gender defined by preeminent 
theorist R.W. Connell as ‘hegemonic masculinity’. Connell’s landmark studies on 
gender develop her theories of hegemonic masculinity, which were originally set out 
in her 1987 book Gender and Power. Connell contends that, at any given moment and 
place, some forms of masculinity will be hegemonic – that is, most reified and 
influential – and other forms will be marginalised or subordinated. Hegemonic 
masculinities are established either through consensual negotiation or through power 
and achievement, can vary geographically, and will fluctuate over time. For example, 
Connell notes that the hegemonic ideal of masculinity in current Western culture is a 
man who is independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual, and rational. 	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Hegemonic masculinity may not correspond with the everyday lives of a majority of 
men, but will require men ‘to position themselves in relation to it.’28 Connell 
identifies the military as the most ‘important [institution] for the definition of 
hegemonic masculinity in European/American culture’, and views the figure of the 
hero as central to the Western cultural imagery of masculinity.29 David Morgan 
substantiates Connell’s theories, identifying the military as significant in the defining 
of hegemonic masculinity:  
 
Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed, 
those associated with war and the military are of the most direct. Despite far-
reaching political, social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to 
be a key symbol of masculinity.30 
 
Furthermore, Morgan contends that militarised hegemonic masculinities are 
performed by men at a corporeal level, specifically that ‘men’s bodies are 
predominant in public parades representing state power or military might.’31  
Before engaging in a discussion on hegemonic masculinity in the twenty-first 
century, it is important to trace the narrative of masculinity and gender roles in post-
Soviet Russia to provide a context for Putin’s reframing of militarised gender roles. I 
contend that there had already been a re-appraisal of the role of men and masculinity 
occurring in Russia prior to the advent of Putinism, which was triggered by the end of 
the Cold War and the collapse of communism. Sarah Ashwin asserts that during the 
1990s Russian men went through what has been termed a ‘crisis of masculinity’ 
stemming from the initial loss of their role as the traditional breadwinner in the Soviet 
household, while their position as fathers was similarly redefined in post-Cold War 
society.32 Russian sociologist Elena Meshcherinka also observes that men went 
through a ‘crisis’ period after the end of communism, where they slowly ‘found their 
feet’ in the new society whereas women appeared to adapt to their new environment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) 832. 
29 Connell (2005) 213. 
30 Morgan (1994) 165. Also see Frank Barrett’s claims that ‘militaries around the world have defined 
the soldier as an embodiment of traditional male sex role behaviours.’ (1996) 129.  
31 Morgan (1993) 73. 
32 Ashwin argues that, despite the Bolsheviks’ attempts to supplant traditional gender roles, ‘male 
dominance was very much the norm’ and women in Soviet Russia were still expected to take on the 
burden of child care, while men were ‘encouraged to realize themselves in their work.’ (2000) 11-12.   
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more rapidly.33 Meshcherinka notes that it was women rather than men who made 
‘the first move into the brave new world of commerce’, while many Russian men 
went through a period of dependence on their wives as they adjusted to the post-
communist environment.34 In other words, what occurred was a shifting of hegemonic 
masculinity to a more westernised, capitalist model, rather than the one that had 
developed under Soviet communism. Connell also attests to this shift in gender norms 
as Russia emerged into a capitalist economy, stating: ‘as the Stalinist regimes collapse 
and market economies were installed, Western ideologies of gender were installed.’35  
 Since Putin’s election as president in 1999 scholars of Russian politics and 
culture have analysed how masculinity and gender norms have been impacted by the 
policies of Putinism. Sperling’s monograph is a comprehensive and detailed account 
of gender in Putin’s Russia, which highlights the importance of hegemonic 
masculinity to the augmentation of Putin’s political legitimacy among the electorate. 
Sperling’s research affirms that Putin’s public persona ‘“undoubtedly” represents an 
example of hegemonic masculinity in twenty-first century Russia.’36 It is from within 
this framework of hegemonic masculinity that Sperling contextualises the 
development of Putinism. Sperling’s discussion of conscription is especially relevant 
to this chapter. ‘Military service’ she writes, ‘is closely identified with the notion of 
“being (or becoming) a man.”’37 Sperling identifies how the debate around 
conscription resulting from the Second Chechen War became a binary political 
discourse that was either pro or anti-Putin, and that this contested discourse is 
‘inextricably bound up with gender norms.’38  
 Alongside Sperling’s research into the Putin regime’s manipulation of gender 
norms, scholars have also addressed the impact of the Chechen Wars and the 
militarisation of society on gender identities in the twenty-first century. Eichler’s 
Militarizing Men is an important study on gender and the military in Russia that 
draws on interviews with Chechentsy to investigate ‘the relationship between men’s 
identities and the Russian state’s conscription policy and the waging of war in 
Chechnya.’39 Like Sperling, Eichler argues that Putin’s ‘ability to portray an image of 	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34 Ibid. 113. 
35 Connell (2005) 200. 
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37 Ibid. 142. 
38 Ibid. 168. 
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reinvigorated masculinity’ during the Second Chechen War contributed to the 
restoration of the military in Russian politics and public life.40 Putin’s use and 
appropriation of militarised masculinity helped legitimise and gain public approval 
for the second amongst the electorate:  ‘The image of the soldier became 
personification of Putin’s appeal to the prestige of the military […] tighter control of 
the media coverage during the second war meant that the image of the un-heroic 
conscript soldier was less visible than in the first war.’41 Because Chechentsy have 
been lionized as totemic paragons of masculinity, military service, and patriotism for 
Russia’s younger generations, returning veterans had been coerced into conforming to 
a restrictive paradigm of warrior heroes. Therefore, just as Connell identifies that the 
warrior is an idealised hegemon that dominates over other forms of subordinate 
masculinities, Eichler contends that Chechentsy who do not conform to the 
hegemonic ideal of ‘tough and heroic warriors’ are marginalised by the Kremlin’s 
official narrative of the war.42  
In the analysis of the following New Drama plays, I argue that, although each 
production takes a radically disparate theatrical form and structure, their analogous 
engagement with theories of hegemonic masculinity in their staging and dialogue 
calls into question the circumscribed and tendentious representations of the Chechen 
Wars, militarised patriotism, and conscription in Russia propagated by the Kremlin. 
 
The Drunks 
Vyacheslav and Mikhail Durnenkov have emerged as two of the most prominent and 
dynamic figures of New Drama. Born five years apart, the two brothers moved to the 
southern city of Togliatti with their family as teenagers, where their first plays were 
produced at the May Readings Festival at the Golosova 20 Theatre. Along with fellow 
playwright and friend Yuri Klavdiev, they have become known under the moniker of 
the ‘Togliatti phenomenon’ since making their respective breakthroughs in the mid-
2000s. Although the pair often write alone, it was their joint effort, The Cultural 
Layer (Kul'turnii Sloi, 2003), which brought them to the attention of a wider theatre 
audience outside of Togliatti. Originally produced at the May Readings Festival, The 
Cultural Layer was subsequently performed at the Lensovet Theatre in St Petersburg 	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as part of the 2004 New Drama Festival, and then at the Moscow Arts Theatre under 
the revised title The Last Day of Summer (Poslednii Den' Leta), directed by Nikolai 
Skorik. Latvian director Yana Ross describes the Durnenkovs as being ‘representative 
of Togliatti success. Their work often balances parables and ballads with simple 
poetic language of the everyday.’43 Their theatre is usually topical and focuses on 
many salient issues in contemporary Russia, including the social stagnation and 
decline of Togliatti after the collapse of the Soviet Union (The Cultural Layer), the 
treatment of World War II veterans in contemporary Russia (Mutter, 2001), and the 
2014-15 Russian invasion of the Ukraine (The War Hasn’t Started Yet, 2015). Like 
many New Drama playwrights, the brothers have also written for television. Along 
with Klavdiev, Vyacheslav Durnenkov co-authored the ground-breaking serial School 
(Shkola). In 2008, Mikhail Durnenkov collaborated with Teatr.doc artistic directors 
Elena Gremina and Mikhail Ugarov to create the TV series Love in the 
Neighbourhood (Lubov Na Raione) for TNT, one of Russia’s most popular 
entertainment channels. Since 2013, Mikhail Durnenkov has further acted as the 
artistic director of the Liubimovka New Play Festival – the hugely popular festival of 
rehearsed readings staged every September at Teatr.doc that gives both new and 
established writers the opportunity to see their work-in-progress pieces performed. 
The Drunks premièred on 21 August 2009 as part of a season of Russian-
language theatre organised by the Royal Shakespeare Company in Stratford-Upon-
Avon. The festival, staged under the banner ‘Revolutions: A Celebration of Theatre in 
Russian and the Former Soviet Union’, ran between August and October 2009 and 
was the culmination of a project started by the RSC four years earlier by then artistic 
director Michael Boyd with the aim of securing a stronger and enduring dialogue 
between Russian and British theatre practitioners in the twenty-first century.44 In 
2005, a team of practitioners from the RSC travelled to Moscow to work with twelve 
specifically selected Russian and Ukrainian playwrights on a week-long series of 
lectures and master-classes on playwriting and dramaturgy. The delegates to Moscow 
included Elyse Dodgson, International Director at the Royal Court, who had joined 
the project as a consultant, director Dominic Cooke, and RSC Company Dramaturge 
Jeanie O’Hare. These workshops were intended to illuminate the dramaturgical 	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possibilities that emanate from Shakespeare’s plays, while simultaneously 
encouraging the young Moscow based playwrights to engage with contemporary 
political and social realities in twenty-first century Russia. This burgeoning 
relationship resulted in the creation of nine full length scripts, and by 2009 two had 
been selected to be the centrepieces of the ‘Revolutions’ programme. Alongside The 
Drunks, Natalia Vorozhbit’s history play The Grain Store (Zernokhranilishche, 2009) 
was selected to be staged in repertoire as a full scale production at the RSC’s 
Courtyard Theatre. The Grain Store cast an epic and forceful reflection on the horrors 
of the Holodomor, when million of inhabitants of Soviet Ukraine died in the 
widespread famine of 1932-33, and provided a fascinating counterpoint to the 
Durnenkovs’ contemporary satire.  
The Drunks’s large cast of nineteen, the use of fight and movement directors, a 
live group of musicians, and a team of multiple stage mangers was a departure from 
the cramped studio spaces where New Drama is frequently staged in Russia. As editor 
of Teatr journal Marina Davydova notes in her review of the Revolutions season, ‘the 
plays of these young writers can only be imagined in the cellar of Teatr.doc, or similar 
small underground spaces.’45 The extensive cast and less restricted playing space, 
however, allowed the Durnenkovs to create a large tableau of Russian provincial life, 
and tackle a maelstrom of social and political controversies. Despite being staged in 
an anomalous space from the prototypical New Drama theatres, the sardonic black 
humour in the play means The Drunks stands out as an important theatrical challenge 
to the official state rhetoric on the Chechen war that subverts the idealised stereotype 
of Putin’s hegemonic masculinity.  
 
Staging Chechnya 
The Drunks is a multifaceted and ambitious piece of theatre. The play traverses a 
labyrinthine deconstruction of the Durnenkovs’ frustrations and resentment of 
Russia’s social and political regression under Putinism through the prism of the 
Chechen conflict. In an interview given with The Times newspaper during the play’s 
run at the RSC, Vyacheslav Durnenkov describes that the brothers conceived the 
concept for the play as a response to a real life incident they encountered where a 
Russian soldier had returned from Chechnya to discover that he was believed to be 	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dead and in effect expunged from society. ‘It was a very tragic story’, Durnenkov 
explains; he states that the original premise for the play was their interest in ‘finishing 
the story, to find out what happens to [the soldier] when he comes home.’46 This is 
significant because, by acknowledging a veridical premise for the play, Durnenkov 
places The Drunks in the contested political discourse emanating from Putin’s war in 
Chechnya. In this sense, the play echoes the urgent and provocative campaign by 
Novaya Gazeta to publish a comprehensive list of casualties from the Second 
Chechen War after the army refused to commission an official list of the dead. ‘The 
Book of Memory’ (Kniga Pamyati) became an important documentation of the 
continuing bloodshed in Chechnya that detailed the names, date of conscription, and 
burial place of the often perturbingly young conscript soldiers who did not return 
from the war.47 By continuing the tale of a soldier’s return from war in The Drunks, 
the Durnenkovs provide an artistic and performative identity for the unnamed soldiers 
forgotten after the Chechen conflicts, underscoring contemporary anxieties about the 
state’s partisan coverage of the war, reflected in The Book of Memory.  
At this point, it is useful to offer a short summary of the plot. After recently 
being discharged from the army on medical grounds, conscript soldier Ilya arrives 
back in the unnamed provincial city where he grew up in an attempt to reintegrate 
himself as a civilian. Although he does not view his actions in Chechnya as heroic, 
Ilya has been expropriated as a totemic figure of civic pride and is the unwitting 
cynosure of a combative local mayoral election campaign. Despite his simple motives 
to ‘see my son. To kill some time, go to the river. Sit and talk shit’48 Ilya finds himself 
espoused as a political pawn by the three politically disparate mayoral candidates: 
venal and alcoholic incumbent mayor Boris Ivanovich; Kotomtsev, a bellicose police 
chief with a fetish for military antiques (a satirical reference to former leader of the 
United Russia party and then minister of civil defence, Sergey Shoygu49); and Ilya’s 
old school friend Sergey, a latte sipping liberal journalist. In their scramble for power, 
the three mayoral candidates label Ilya a war hero, and spin his homecoming to fit 	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their own political narrative. The Durnenkovs’ astute satire of the Russian political 
spectrum reminds their audience that in contemporary Russia, the Chechen War has 
become a politically polarising subject.   
The public and political re-framing of Ilya’s military past is echoed in his 
attempts to re-establish a relationship with his estranged wife Natasha, and young son 
Ivan. Eventually, Natasha rebukes Ilya for failing to secure his exemption from the 
draft with bribery, and she reveals to him that, during his prolonged absence, she has 
re-married and that she has led Ivan to believe that his father has died in Chechnya, 
ending Ilya’s hopes of salvaging his old civilian past. Of course, it is not just Ilya who 
has been denied closure by the war. Natasha and Ivan have been left in limbo by 
Ilya’s conscription and deployment to Chechnya. Natasha has been forced to make the 
agonising decision to expunge her husband from her life, while Ivan has lost a 
meaningful relationship with his father.  
In the final scenes of the play Mayor Ivanovich arranges for Ilya to make a 
public speech to the town, convinced that Ilya’s endorsement will secure his 
popularity with the electorate and win him the election. However, unbeknownst to 
Ivanovich, Ilya is also presented with two alternative speeches by Kotomtsev and 
Sergey that detail their own respective political manifestos. As the play concludes, 
Ilya stands on a large podium in the centre of his town as the audience wait to hear 
which candidate he will choose to endorse. Despondent at the hollow political cliques 
promised by each candidate, Ilya rips the speeches to pieces to the fury of Ivanovich 
and Kotomtsev, and the despair of Sergey. 
The plot of The Drunks unfolds over twenty episodic scenes that depict a 
world in continuous and fervent flux that is inhabited by a myriad of characters and 
disparate political ideologies.  The fast-paced scenes span multiple locations and are 
structurally reminiscent of television sitcoms, soap operas, and even comedy sketch 
shows. To this end, the Durnenkovs respond to co-artistic director of Teatr.doc 
Mikhail Ugarov’s provocation to playwrights in ‘The “New Drama” Manifesto’, to 
engage and galvanise younger audience members by countering the artistic hegemony 
of imported Hollywood movies and cable television.50 The influence of prime-time 
television makes the Durnenkovs’ play more immediately accessible for their 
international audience at the RSC, and additionally calls attention to the absence of an 	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artistic engagement with the Second Chechen War on the small screen in Russia. As 
Mikhail Durnenkov acknowledges, portraying or writing about Chechnya on 
television is a taboo topic, resulting in a lack of engagement with the war in Russian 
popular culture.51  
Antithetically, The Drunks makes repeated references to the Chechen wars and 
specific conflict zones, including Grozny and Nazran. This is important in 
establishing the political context of The Drunks, because as I have noted above, there 
is an anxiety articulated by some Russian commentators about the manipulation and 
suppression of an alternative narrative to the war, resulting in what Kovalev describes 
as an ‘unprecedented information blockade around Chechnya.’52 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the limited coverage of the Chechen Wars in the UK 
led British reviews of the production to marginalise the Durnenkovs’ critique of the 
conflict. The British critics unfailingly concluded that the plot was consciously 
reminiscent of Nikolai Gogol’s The Government Inspector (Revizor, 1836). ‘The 
message is a familiar one,’ writes Michael Billington in The Guardian, ‘the new 
Russia, like the old one, is steeped in vodka, violence and corruption.’53 Billington’s 
interpretation of The Drunks as a ‘Gogolian comedy’ was echoed in Benedict 
Nightingale’s review for The Times, while the Evening Standard focused on the 
‘corruption, egomania and lubricious booziness.’54 The message from the British 
reviewers seems clear: The Drunks is dealing with themes of political corruption, 
small-town bureaucracy, and the moral impoverishment of ‘New Russia’ in the 
tradition of Gogol’s satire on the provincial politics of Imperial Russia. Indeed, much 
of the comedic potential of The Drunks does indeed arise from the Durnenkovs’ adroit 
satire on contemporary provincial life - a recurrence in many of their plays. What 
many of the British critics failed to establish, however, is that the fulcrum of the 
play’s narrative is focused around a young conscript’s return to his provincial 
hometown from Chechnya to learn that his civilian life has been extirpated in both 
public and private spheres.  
Ilya’s failure to find a place in the world he returns to conforms to Russian 
theatre critic Elena Kovalskaya’s description of the ‘New Drama Hero’ as ‘a 
declassified dweller of an economically depressed city in which industry centres have 	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been abandoned since Perestroika.’55 Unlike the archetypal protagonist of New 
Drama, however, Ilya is not ‘declassified’ or marginalised due to social class, age, or 
drug addiction. Rather, Ilya inhabits the liminal space occupied by conscript soldiers 
when they return to civilian society. Significantly, the Durnenkovs do not portray Ilya 
as a one-dimensional paradigm of an injured soldier. Instead, they present a complex 
and sympathetic account of the challenges confronting veterans of the Chechen wars 
as they attempt to reintegrate back to their previous civilian roles. The production’s 
examination of the social reintegration of Chechentsy resonates with Eichler’s 
argument that ‘veterans often did not conform to the ideal of tough and heroic 
warriors, but also found it difficult to live up to nonmilitarised notions of masculinity 
such as breadwinner and desirable husband.’56 The Durnenkovs demonstrate a clear 
understanding of how veterans in the twenty-first century are compelled to live up to 
the embodied personification of the Kremlin’s restoration of militarised patriotism, 
facilitating the augmentation of Putin’s power. Because ‘the image of the soldier 
became the personification of Putin’s appeal to the prestige of the military’, 
Chechentsy are therefore defined by their position in civilian life and performance of 
masculinity whether hegemonic or subordinate.57 
The complex interplay between military and civilian identities is played out 
repeatedly in The Drunks. In Anthony Neilson’s production at the RSC, Ilya’s head is 
swathed in thick white bandages and he is enveloped in a large double-breasted 
military trench coat. Throughout the performance, however, the audience is able to 
catch glimpses of a hospital gown underneath his army uniform. This presents a 
conflicting juxtaposition between two institutionalised uniforms, with Ilya’s 
militarised exterior enshrouding his civilian hospital clothes. The physical 
dissimilitude of Ilya’s contrasting outfits reminds the audience of his liminal status as 
soldier and civilian, hero and invalid, foreshadowing some of the contradictions that 
are explored in the play. As will be examined in the ensuing analysis of the 
production, these incongruities are a vital element of The Drunks’s engagement with 
the Chechen War and Putin’s revivification of a hegemonic ideal of militarised 
masculinity. 
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A Hero’s Welcome: Setting the Scene 
In the play’s opening prologue, the audience enter the performance space to take their 
seats as the cast are already positioned on stage. The performers stand around the 
three sides of the thrust stage at the Courtyard Theatre holding shot glasses filled with 
vodka in their hands. It is clear to the audience that they are desperate to drink the 
contents of their glasses, but are unable to do so. The actors’ intense concentration is 
broken when a performer dressed in brightly coloured rags energetically bursts onto 
the stage. In their stage directions, the Durnenkovs foreground the importance of the 
actor’s paradigmatic costume, writing that the performer should be ‘dressed as a 
traditional fool.’58 The fool breaks the silence in the theatre by introducing the play, at 
which point the rest of the performers down their glasses of vodka in a toast. In this 
preliminary introduction to the play, the Durnenkovs appropriate from both British 
and Russian performance traditions. The staging at the Courtyard Theatre, makes it 
clear that the prologue acknowledges the legacy of the Shakespearean fool in British 
performance history.  Furthermore, in societies that maintain long-standing Eastern 
Orthodox traditions, holy fools (yurodivy) represent a unique embodiment of anti-
authoritarian protest and institutional subversion. As Priscilla Hunt argues, ‘Russian 
holy foolishness developed a dialectical relationship with the autocratic and 
bureaucratic state as a cultural proactive antipode to the latter’s potential for 
alienation and violence.’59 The end of state-sanctioned atheism in 1991 after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union facilitated a reimagining of Orthodox heritage and 
traditions in Russia, including holy foolishness.60 Although the Durnenkovs’ fool 
does not explicitly use blasphemy or the Orthodox Church as a means of authoritarian 
critique, the implication is that the presence of the fool on stage augurs the play’s 
critique of contemporary Russian politics and the Chechen Wars. In their reimagining 
of this Russian performance tradition, the Durnenkovs signal the farcical and satirical 
treatment of the modern Russia state in The Drunks, from the vodka-soaked 
impotency of the final years of the Yeltsin era, to the autocratic power structure of 
Putinism.  
The drinking of vodka shots by the actors foreshadows a further theme of the 
play: drunkenness. Throughout The Drunks, alcohol – in particular vodka – acts as a 	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pervasive medicinal tranquiliser that distracts from the political and social realities of 
contemporary Russia. As soon as the fool announces the opening of scene one, a live 
band strikes up and the performers immediately become animated into life taking up 
various positions around the edge of the thrust stage. In one of the opening scenes of 
the play, Ilya negotiates his way to his seat on a moving train that is returning him 
from military hospital to his hometown. Eventually, he is forced to take a seat 
between three obviously inebriated passengers on the packed train. Attempting to 
persuade Ilya to drink with them, the other passengers proclaim: 
 
This is medicine, mate. Medicine you take in very large doses. Down it. Go 
on. You’ll feel better straight away.61 
 
This analogy is repeated throughout the play, such as in a later scene when Ilya’s old 
school teacher, Babitsky, attempts to convince him to drink his homemade liqueur, 
reassuring him that it is simply a ‘medicinal dose.’62 It is important to note here that 
the play’s original Russian-language title Pyanii literally translates as ‘drunk’ or 
‘drunken’. In The Drunks, drunkenness serves as a metaphor for the political 
acquiescence and decay that the Durnenkovs diagnose as an entrenched dysfunction 
in Putin’s Russia. This apathy is highlighted in the train passenger’s account to Ilya of 
the merits of drunkenness: 
 
When I had my first drink – start of a new life. More relaxed, better at 
socialising, started to mingle –all that… bollocks. Don’t remember the exact 
details, but quality of life – no comparison! I’d wake up in the morning –
clueless, still shitfaced. Sit there, trying to remember what happened the night 
before… no fucking idea. All that was left of my memory was a sort of faded 
fax. Genius the memory loss you get with boozing. Past - erased!63 
 
The comical performance of these lines makes a joke of a serious observation. By 
playing on a perceived British stereotype that Russians are heavy drinkers, the 
Durnenkovs shed light on an urgent concern in modern Russia. The Drunks portrays a 	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reality where being in an ataractic stupor can heal the pain of political reality in 
modern life, and the play equally holds to account both the Putin administration and 
the apathy of the electorate as responsible for the diminution of the democratic 
process in Russia.  
As the play develops, its ironic interrogation of contemporary Russian politics 
becomes more specific, exposing and observing explicit facets of Putinism with 
mocking derision. In another of the production’s early scenes, Mayor Ivanovich 
stands on the platform of the town’s train station that has been festooned with flowers, 
waiting to greet Ilya on his return from the front line and obtain a crucial photo 
opportunity. Unknown to Ivanovich and his entourage, however, Ilya has been 
arrested at the previous station after becoming incapacitated from a single shot of 
vodka that he accepted from the passengers. As Ivanovich waits on the platform, he 
invokes the memory of the Second World War and the reception given to 
homecoming soldiers in 1945: 
 
When my dad came back from the war, there were flowers, the whole train 
was covered with flowers, the works. I thought we could put on the same sort 
of show. It’s what you’re taught in school, isn’t it: ‘A Hero’s Welcome.’ 
You’ve got to have a brass band playing, women weeping, lots of dancing.64 
 
Ivanovich’s explicit attempt to re-enact the homecoming rituals of the Second World 
War in a modern context for a veteran of the Chechen conflict parodies Putin’s 
commemoration of the Second World War as a significant legitimising strategy for 
the invasion of Chechnya and his own presidency. Weeks after the fall of Grozny to 
Russian troops in February 2000, Putin made a calculated visit to the city of 
Volgograd (know as Stalingrad before 1961) visiting the Mamayev Kurgan war 
memorial commemorating the Battle of Stalingrad and meeting with Second World 
War veterans.65 Additionally, as has been detailed above, the commemoration of the 
Second World War has taken a prominent place in Putin’s state-building. 
In The Drunks, Ilya’s planned home coming becomes an absurd comic 
pastiche of Ivanovich's description of his own father’s return from battle. Here, 	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although a band has been organised to welcome Ilya home, the musicians are visibly 
drunk, swaying from side to side while playing an upbeat tune. Ilya’s physical 
absence from the celebration adds to the farcical unravelling of the spectacle. As the 
passengers disembark from the train, Ivanovich, desperate to be publically 
acknowledged in his orchestrated ‘Hero’s Welcome’, embraces random passengers he 
assumes to be Ilya only to be physically rebuffed by them. The difference in cultural 
and social attitude towards the Chechen Wars and Russia’s involvement in the Second 
World War has been identified by Russian film director Sulambek Mamilov: 
 
the Great Patriotic War [Second World War], unlike the wars in Afghanistan 
and in Chechnya, was a nationwide war of liberation. The Soviet Union 
defended itself against the aggressor attacking him, and the whole country - 
from soldiers to civilians - knew what it was fighting for.66 
 
The emotional invocation of Soviet soldiers’ victorious return from battle in 1945, 
one of the defining events in the national building of the modern Russian state, is 
replaced by the farcical unravelling of the scene and Ivanovich’s comic desperation as 
he fails to salvage the celebrations.  
The opening scenes of the play outline how the Durnenkovs establish the 
Chechen War as a backdrop to explore and satirise wider issues in contemporary 
Russian society. Ilya’s status as a Chechentsy politicises the narrative of his 
homecoming. In the following analysis of the play’s engagement with Putinism, I will 
show how the Durnenkovs contradict the imagined stereotypes of war veterans, and 
explore how this embodied theatrical incongruity chips away at the Kremlin’s 
idealised image of hegemonic masculinity.   
 
Ripped like Rambo: Contesting the Hegemonic in The Drunks 
In his 2011 article, ‘The problem of reality in “New Drama”’ (‘Problema realnosti v 
“novoy dramaturgii”’), Russian scholar Ivan Kuznetsov observes that the plays of 
Mikhail Durnenkov are characterised by an eschewal of ‘sociocultural stereotypes and 
myths of the mass media’ in contemporary Russia.67 In other words, Durnenkov’s 
theatre challenges the established, normative discourses propagated by the state-	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controlled press, exposing the realities of twenty-first century Russia on stage. 
Throughout The Drunks, Mayor Ivanovich and his aide Kosyta spin Ilya’s 
homecoming story as an expedient to their own political goals in the impending 
election. In Scene 17, Ilya discusses the contents of his speech with the Mayor and 
Kostya, refuting their claim about where he was stationed in Chechnya: 
 
ILYA: It says here I’ve been to Grozny. I’ve never been to Grozny. Our unit 
was based near Nazran. Thirty kilometres away. 
 
AIDE: Not important. What’s important is that everyone understands you 
respect and support the political line upheld by the head of our 
administration.68 
 
Kostya’s response reveals that, in the narrative of the war, facts and truth have little 
relevance to the underlying political advantage that can be gained by politicans. He 
points to the idea that Ilya’s primary purpose is to uphold a narrative espoused by the 
regime and respect the political status quo. A similar sentiment is also demonstrated 
by Ivanovich as he attempts to gain further traction for the election, directly 
addressing the manipulation of the media by the political class. At a meeting in his 
office, attended by a disparate gathering of mute and obsequious officials, the town 
police, and the press, Ivanovich calls to neutralise the scope and power of Sergey’s 
newspaper and suggests replacing political contents with prosaic human-interest 
stories: 
 
You know, I’ve just thought of a policy. We make your paper municipal […] 
We’ll call it The Departmental News. You’ll cover all the dull shit we do. 
Demographics, ice rinks in the square, all that sort of crap. Got it?69 
 
These cogent sketches foreground how the Chechen wars have become a political 
football to exploit. They reveal how the Putin administration has constructed and 
manipulated the media’s coverage of the Second Chechen War, doctoring the facts 
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and distracting the electorate from the brutal realties of the conflict by replacing 
political debate and dissent in the press with prosaic provincial news reports. 
As the production unfolds, a schism occurs between the town’s idealised, 
hegemonic expectations of a war hero, and Ilya’s actual appearance and character. 
This contradiction between reality and the ideal is played out in Ilya’s conscious 
rejection of the narrative that, as a soldier, he is defined by prowess in battle and that, 
as a surviving war veteran, he is elevated to the status of a Russian hero: 
 
SERGEY: You’re a hero. You think you’re weak but you’re not you’re strong. 
You were always stronger than any of us. You’ve been out there fighting for 
your country, you sacrificed everything –  
ILYA: So did a lot of people. What’s so special about me?70 
 
In opposition to the Kremlin’s official narrative of the Chechen War and the 
promotion of an idealised and militarised hegemonic masculinity spearheaded by 
Putin, Ilya does not see his status as a war hero as his raison d’etre in society. He has 
not returned home seeking glory or public recognition; and has done so instead, he 
wishes to re-connect with his family and friends. By positioning himself as one of 
many soldiers glorified by the Putin regime, he asserts himself as an individual, rather 
than a homogenised ideal of a warrior hero. Ilya’s status as a war veteran is exploited 
by both the state and the local media for their own agendas, as his personal and 
private life becomes public and political. As a surviving veteran of the war and the 
army, Ilya has become the property of Russia, the motherland. Because the Russian 
public ‘were the ones who kept you in health, in our thoughts and in our prayers’, Ilya 
has become a nebulous ideal, an emblem of heroism, and a focus of military and 
nationalistic pride for the population.71 He has ceased to be an individual in both the 
state’s and the public’s eyes, failing in his attempts to escape from his stigmatisation 
as a hero of a contentious war. 
Despite Ilya’s frustrated attempt to eschew normative societal expectations, 
the supporting characters in The Drunks often mistakenly impose an archetypal image 
of heroism and hegemonic masculinity on him. After Ilya is reunited with his old 
school friend Sergei in the centre of town, they relocate to a smoke-filled dive bar, 	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patronised by a group of local drunks. The action is comically interspersed by the 
house band’s laboured covers of 1980s hits, including The B-52’s Love Shack and 
Motorhead’s The Ace of Spades, an acknowledgment of the increasing Westernisation 
of provincial Russia.72 When Ilya and Sergei enter the establishment, the barflies are 
engaged in a conversation about the failed party thrown by the mayor at the railway 
station to celebrate Ilya’s return:  
 
FIRST: Hey. Why weren’t you at the station today? 
SECOND: What station? 
FIRST: The hero, you twat. How d’you get away with it? They herded all of 
us up at work. Every other person sent to the train station to give him his big 
welcome. 
SECOND: I haven’t been at work in three days. 
FIRST: Oh, right. 
SECOND: So, what’s he like then? This hero? 
FIRST: Great. Like fucking Rambo. Ripped, battle-scared.73 
 
What the second drunk does not realise is that Ilya never arrived at the station, and 
that the first is simply describing the hegemonic ideal of how a war hero should 
appear. What they are unaware of is that, although he is still dressed in military 
uniform, Ilya is in fact the veteran they are discussing: 
 
SECOND: Anything like this one? 
FIRST: Nah! This fucking gayboy? [He gestures towards Ilya] Doesn’t look 
like a soldier to me. Looks more like a student.74 
 
Ilya’s physical appearance and his association with Sergei, a parody of the liberal 
intelligentsia, is so removed from the barflies’ idealised image of a war hero that they 
fail to realise who he is. As the audience can clearly see, Jonjo O’Neill, the actor who 
played Ilya in the RSC’s production, is of slender build and does not physically 
represent the drunk’s corporeal description: this comic misidentification is a clear 	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expression of Connell’s definition of hegemonic masculinity. The first barfly’s 
expectations of embodied militarised masculinity are offset when Ilya does not 
conform to them. His crude homophobic insult towards Ilya frames masculinity 
hierarchically, where the idealisation of the warrior hero (Rambo) acts as a paradigm 
of heterosexual hegemonic masculinity that marginalises and subordinates gay men.75 
By lampooning the notions of hegemonic masculinity, the Durnenkovs draw their 
audience’s attention to the absurdity of Putin’s construction of Chechentsy as 
paradigmatic of idealised military heroes comparable to action movie characters such 
as Rambo. The Durnenkovs’ text and the embodied presence of the actor who does 
not conform to these stereotypes subverts Putin’s revivification of the military, and by 
association one of the key facets of Putinism.   
Arguably, the most memorable and interesting scene from The Drunks also uses 
the male body to interrogate power structures in contemporary Russia in its portrayal 
of the relationship between Mayor Ivanovich and police chief Kotomtsev. The scene 
begins as Kotomtsev seats himself in a steam-filled banya, surrounded by five 
‘subordinate’ police officers who sit below him on the lower shelves of the bathhouse. 
Neilson’s staging of this scene evokes the typical aesthetic elements of the Russian 
banya: the policemen are dressed in white towels as they lounge on the steps, while 
the set brims with white clouds of steam that envelopes the stage. Another member of 
the group holds a bunch of birch branches to massage himself with. The stratification 
of the bathhouse is used as an important staging device to exhibit the contemporary 
power dynamic that exist in twenty-first century Russia. In the opening of the scene 
this is made explicit through the Durnenkovs’ stage directions: 
 
The banya. It has seven shelves. On the top sits Kotomtsev, and on the three 
shelves lower down, his five subordinates.76 
 
As well as the staging that denotes Kotomtsev’s seniority in rank as chief of police, 
the power he maintains over his subordinates is also sustained through the scene’s 
dialogue:  
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KOTOMTSEV: Yesterday, right. I was shagging this big-arsed cadet. For an 
hour and forty minutes. How about that? Oi! Vassiliev! How long can you 
fuck a bird? And no fibbing. You’re a shit liar 
VASSILIEV (wincing): On average? About ten minutes. 
KOTOMTSEV: Like a fucking sewing machine! Saveliev? What about you? 
SAVELIEV: Twenty-three minutes, seventeen seconds, precisely. When the 
wife and I decided to conceive Mashka, we noted down the times. That was 
the average.77 
 
Kotomtsev’s graphical use of mat (sexual language) to aggressively interrogate 
Vassiliev and Saveliev on the imitate details of their sex life articulates and flaunts the 
power he wields over his subordinates, which is mirrored by his position on the top 
step of the shelf.78 
 The scene is interrupted when Boris Ivanovich and his own group of lackeys 
enter the bathhouse. If the production’s use of the banya shelves to illuminate the 
power stratum is not yet clear, then the re-positioning of the seating positions 
reinforces this concept. As Ivanovich enters the space, he climbs to the top shelf and 
stands next to Kotomtsev looking down at him. After a tense pause, Kotomtsev very 
slowly and reluctantly stands up, relinquishing his position on the top step of the 
banya before climbing down a level. Again, in correspondence with the fluctuating 
power dynamics reinforced by the staging, the Durnenkovs’ use of language in the 
scene also develops as the mayor and police chief discuss Ilya’s mental state.  
 
MAYOR: Don’t dick me about Kotomstev. I know what the score is 
[…] 
KOTOMTSEV: What’s the big deal? He’s just a bit fucked in the head, that’s 
all –  
MAYOR: You’re the one who’s fucked in the head! Shut up and get on with 
it!79 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid. 
78 See Chapter one for a more detailed discussion of mat in New Drama. 
79 Ibid. 
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Kotomtsev’s aggressive diatribe is cut off by Mayor Ivanovich who replies with his 
own use of mat against him. The dialogue calls attention to Kovalev and Muratov’s 
diagnoses that the Chechen War has led to a fractured and subservient political 
discourse in contemporary Russia, but also serves to reinforce Kotomtsev’s 
subordination to Ivanovich. In the masculine, homosocial context of the banya, 
Kotomtsev and Ivanovich’s bawdy language reflects power and dominance over 
women and their subordinates in the hierarchy of the town’s local power structure. 
The production’s visual reproduction of this power stratum produced an uncanny 
visual effect, heightened by the shrouding of the actors’ bodies in smoke and the 
incongruous presence of props extrinsic to a banya, such as Kotomtsev’s leather gun 
holster that remains strapped around his waist.  
Scholar of Slavonic studies Ethan Pollock has identified that the Russian 
bathhouse is a longstanding site where men can ‘wield power’.80 The Durnenkovs 
demonstrate that, in the homosocial world of the Russian bathhouse, hegemonic 
masculinity is an important tool to wield social and political influence. The 
incongruity of this, however, is played out in the scene’s corporeal focus on the men’s 
bodies. In the revealing setting of the banya, the corpulent bodies of Kotomtsev and 
Ivanovich are physically distant from the hegemonic ideal. The two mens’ inability to 
conform to corporeal hegemonic masculinity does not inhibit their individual displays 
of power over their subordinates or their standing in the politicised power structure of 
the play. Connell presents an explanation for this seemingly theatrical contradiction:  
 
this is not to say that the most visible bearers of hegemonic masculinity are 
always the most powerful people. They may be exemplars, such as film actors, 
or even fantasy figures, such as film characters. Individual holders of 
institutional power or great wealth may be far from the hegemonic pattern.81 
 
The satirical paradox of contemporary Russia politics detailed in this scene is that 
individuals who supposedly conform to hegemonic masculinity such as war veterans, 
hold little influence or power in the political sphere. Instead they are manipulated and 
used as political pawns by men who are physically subordinate to the hegemonic 
ideal.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Pollock (2010) 64. 
81 Connell (2005) 77. 
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 By engaging with the contentious subject of the Chechen Wars, the 
Durnenkovs reaffirm the significance of the second conflict as a defining moment of 
Putinism, echoing the claims of a number of Russian political commentators. In The 
Drunks’s exploration of contemporary Russia, the events in Chechnya act as a nexus 
for the playwrights to expose and politicise underlying issues in the early years of 
Putin’s presidency, including nascent Russian democracy, political corruption, the 
venality of politicians, and rising societal tensions. In the context of the Kremlin’s co-
option of the Russian media to produce a sanitised narrative of the war tendentious to 
Putin’s grip of power, The Drunks’ satirical treatment of the war stages an important 
counter-narrative that disrupts the regime’s restoration of militarised patriotism. In the 
following section I will explore how - despite taking a disparate theatrical form - The 
Soldier reproduces this vital artistic engagement with Putinism. 
 
The Soldier 
The continued use of conscripted soldiers by the Kremlin in the Second Chechen War 
brought a renewed debate about, and foregrounding of, desertion by young men who 
did not want to serve in the Russian army.82 In their study on contemporary Russian 
politics, Baker and Glasser conducted vital research into desertion in the Russian 
army in the 2000s, linking the rising phenomenon to the violent hazing of young 
conscripts by their seniors known as dedovshchina.83 This brutal aspect of military 
service that has been ingrained into the Russian army since before the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union has been linked to a list of shocking statistics, prompting 
Politkovskaia to ask the question: ‘what would you think of an Army in which, in a 
single year, 2002, a battalion, more than 500 men, had been killed not fighting a war 
but from beatings.84 Richard Sakwa further records that, 1000 conscript soldiers a 
year committed suicide throughout the 2000s ‘as a result of various barbaric initiation 
ceremonies and dedovshchina.’85 It is within this context that Pavel Pryazhko’s The 
Soldier raises urgent questions about the purpose of the Russian army’s continuing 
policy of conscripting young men. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 As recently as July 2015, the Russian media covered the story of two members of the Russian navy 
who jumped off their cruiser into the Mediterranean sea in an attempt at desertion. See gazeta.ru 
(2015). 
83 Baker and Glasser (2004) 198. 
84 Politkovskaia (2004) 3.  
85 Sakwa (2008a) 396. 
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 Born and raised in Minsk, Belarus, Pryazhko is the only non-Russian 
playwright examined in this thesis. Despite continuing to be based in Minsk, 
Pryazhko’s plays have achieved critical success at Russian theatres in Moscow and St 
Petersburg, as well as outside of the former Soviet Union. He emerged as an 
important voice in Russian-language playwriting in the mid-2000s finding success 
when the Free Theatre in Minsk staged a series of his work including Panties (Trusi, 
2007) in 2007, which won the grand prize at the International Competition of 
Contemporary Playwrights in Minsk and was performed in Moscow in the same year. 
Pryazhko’s diverse output spans longer texted-based productions, including Panties 
and Life is Grand (Zhizn Udalas, 2009), staged at Teatr.doc under the direction of 
Mikhail Ugarov, to shorter performances that play with theatrical form and challenge 
the structure of New Drama: I am Free (Ya Svoboden, 2012), produced by the Post 
Theatre in St Petersburg, took the form of the projection of 535 photographs captured 
by Pryazhko in Minsk which were accompanied by thirteen captions, sequentially 
projected every seven seconds to create a complete, unspoken story. I am Free is one 
of a large number of fruitful artistic collaborations between Pryazhko and Russian 
director Dmitrii Volkostrelov. Born in Moscow, Volkostrelov moved to St Petersburg 
to train at the Russian State Institute of Performing Arts under the world-renowned 
theatre director Lev Dodin. Volkostrelov is the artistic director of Post Theatre, which 
he founded in 2011 in St Petersburg. The theatre does not operate out of a single 
building, but instead uses alternative, non-theatrical urban edifices, such as disused 
office blocks and nightclubs in a similar form to London-based, site-specific theatre 
company Theatre Delicatessen.86   
 The Soldier is another collaboration between Pryazhko and Volkostrelov, 
staged as a joint production between Teatr.doc and the Post Theatre, with the single 
role in the piece performed by the actor Pavel Chinarev. Depending on the 
performance, the production lasts roughly ten to fifteen minutes with an post-show 
discussion that typically exceeds the duration of the play. Despite the ephemeral 
length of the production, The Soldier became a paramount performance in Teatr.doc’s 
repertoire. In 2013, the performance was nominated for a golden mask – the national 
theatre award for drama, opera, ballet and modern dance – in the ‘experiment’ 
category, and, in 2015, the play was included in a list compiled by Teatr journal of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Another example of Post Theatre’s use of site is Volkostrelov’s staging of Pryazhko’s play Parks 
and Gardens (Parki I Sadi, 2014) in the park of Sheremetev Palace in central St Petersburg. 
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most important productions staged at Teatr.doc.87 The show premièred at Teatr.doc on 
23 December 2011, and was staged in an unused office space next to the theatre’s 
main performance space, which is where I saw the production in November 2012. The 
tight square room had only basic technical equipment for a theatrical production and 
could hold a crowd of no more than roughly twenty audience members. The 
promotional material for the production on fliers, Facebook, and Teatr.doc’s website 
propounded a provocative and original performance, reminding the audience of the 
performance’s short running time and including a quote from Ugarov describing the 
play as ‘the most radical performance of the Russian theater!’88 In my discussion of 
the production of The Soldier at Teatr.doc, I shall consider the ways in which the 
‘radical’ nature of the play accrues from both its unconventional structure and 
Pryazhko’s engagement with the Kremlin’s policies of militarised patriotism and 
masculinity.   
  
‘He did not go back the army’ 
The house lights are turned off on the small congregation gathered at Teatr.doc’s 
second space, and the audience’s attention is immediately drawn to the sound of 
running water occurring somewhere off stage. Initially, it is unclear if this is part of 
the show, but the answer is soon revealed by the broadcast of a live video feed that 
begins to play on a large projection screen hanging on the back wall of the space. On 
the screen, the audience sees a video of a naked young man with short, cropped 
blonde hair standing under a running shower. Most audience members will already be 
aware of the production’s title, so the obvious assumption made at this point in the 
performance is that the man who is visible in the film is a young soldier in the 
Russian army. The audience becomes aware that they are engaging in an act of 
voyeurism on a private moment of intense reflection as they watch the man, who is 
only filmed from the waist up, slowly and assiduously washing himself. As he 
showers, the young soldier appears to be caught in emotional turmoil. For long 
periods of time, he stands directly under the showerhead staring upwards towards the 
ceiling in contemplation, spitting out the shower water that runs into his mouth. At 
other moments, he paces around the small cubical, conveying what appears to be an 
inexorable and unspeakable anxiety.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Matvienko (2015).  
88 Teatr.doc (2011).  
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 At this point in the performance, I felt that the actor’s staged unease was 
mirrored by my own discomfort at witnessing this intimate act of ablution unfold. 
This unease was also provoked by the theatrical anomaly of the performer’s absence 
from the stage and our only access to the action manifesting through the medium of 
film. This physical barrier between the actor’s actions offstage creates a frisson of 
anticipation as the audience wait for a revelation into the psyche of the character. In 
one review of the production, Marina Raikina, arts editor of daily tabloid newspaper 
Moskovskij Komsomolets, describes her experience of watching the performance and 
trying to consider the antecedent events to justify the man’s agitation. She contends 
that it immediately raises questions about the negative perception of the army in 
contemporary Russia.89 While the performance never explicitly excoriates the policies 
of Putinism, the filming of an actor taking a shower offstage invites the audience to 
consider how the character’s assumed identity as a young soldier impacts on their 
consideration of his motives. As has been outlined above, the military has become a 
site of contested political narratives accruing from Putin’s prominent revivification of 
the military in civil society. Through just a title and the projected film of the habitual 
act of washing, the play already provokes important considerations of Putinism and a 
salient anxiety in contemporary Russian politics and society.  
 After around five minutes, the man turns off the shower and reaches for a 
towel that has been hanging out of shot. He undertakes the task of drying himself with 
the same sedulous attention as when washing, starting with his hair and meticulously 
working his way down his torso. The diurnal action played out in a typical domestic 
setting means that the audience search for meaning in every action taken by Chinarev. 
Theatre critic John Freedman observes that ‘Volkostrelov had attuned our sense of 
hearing to nuances with the long, monotonous, but not entirely repetitive sound of 
running water […] helping us to construct a detailed narrative in our minds.’90 
Simultaneously, the detailed tight shot of the actor’s face and upper body irradiates 
every facial expression and physical action in greater clarity than if he was present on 
stage, highlighting the somatic narrative of Pryazhko’s play. The structure of the 
performance implies that, from the very start of The Soldier, the audience’s attention 
is focused on the corporeal semiotics of the actor’s body. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Raikina (2011).  
90 Freedman (2014b) 51. 
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 At this point in the performance, a spotlight is slowly raised on a small 
section of the performance space, illuminating the single piece of set dressing in the 
room: an office chair with an army uniform neatly folded over it. With the towel now 
wrapped around his waist the soldier emerges from the shower room and into the 
corridor becoming visible in the flesh to the audience for the first time. In this precise 
moment, he can be glimpsed both standing down the corridor while also still visible 
on the video stream, confirming to the audience that the projection they have been 
watching is live. He silently walks down the narrow hallway towards the audience in 
an understated manner before turning right into a second room that is again hidden 
from sight. Unlike the shower room, however, this area is not filmed, and instead the 
audience must rely only on the sounds that he makes to infer the actions that are 
occurring. Although obscured from view, the sounds that emanate from the adjacent 
room are clear for everyone to recognise: a microwave is being turned on and a hot 
drink is prepared. At this point, Volkostrelov inserts a deliberate lacuna in the 
physical narrative of the performance, as unlike in the shower scene, we cannot see 
the young man’s actions or expressions in this second room. I was left wondering if 
something happened in that moment un-witnessed by the audience that could have 
impacted on the character’s final actions in the play. 
 These final moments occur as the young man enters the corridor again, 
standing at the entrance to the main performance space facing the audience. Under the 
bright spotlight he is still visibly wet from his preceding shower and remains 
undressed apart from the towel that conceals his body below the waist. Despite his 
heightened vulnerability, standing almost naked in front of an expectant crowd, he 
appears calm and collected, leaning against the door and surveying the room. After 
the prolonged silence, the audience hang on every word as finally he speaks slowly 
and purposefully, delivering the play’s two brief lines: 
 
The soldier came home on leave. When it came time to return to the army, he 
did not go back to the army.91 
 
He then steps back closing the door behind him, as the room fades to a black out.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 I use John Freedman’s translation of Pryazhko’s lines as included in Real and Phantom Pains: An 
Anthology of New Drama (2014). 110. 
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Silence and Debate: The Soldier in the New Drama Canon 
The first question that needs to be addressed in a consideration of The Soldier in a 
study of New Drama and Putinism is: how can a piece of theatre that eschews a 
conventional written playtext be included in the canon of New Drama, an idiom that 
specifically privileges the importance of language and the re-emergence of the 
playwright in contemporary Russian theatre? As examined earlier in this thesis, New 
Drama is a mercurial artistic term that describes manifold productions and theatrical 
genres. Pryazhko himself asserts that New Drama can take varied theatrical forms and 
is defined by its consideration of the ‘everyday individual experience. The language 
and structure of the text can take any form you want. It's not about them.’92 Theatre 
critic Pavel Rudnev has elaborated on this explanation, observing that Pryazhko’s 
theatre is directly responsible for the evolution of the New Drama repertoire and the 
theatrical conventions that define it: 
 
Pryazhko was able to change the course of development of modern plays in 
Russia. He turned the ‘New Drama’ from the drama of the theme and the 
drama of the language, to a discussion around the structure of the modern 
play. He made the form of the text and the language of the play topics for 
discussion. Prior to Pryazhko, the ‘New Drama’ was clinging, first of all, to 
plots, boundary conditions.93 
 
In other words, Pryazhko’s playful deconstruction of the established conventions of 
playwriting in twenty-first century Russia has resulted in the enlivening of a debate 
about the form and codification of New Drama. In a further consideration of the 
play’s standing in the canon of New Drama, I also contend that Pryazhko’s 
engagement with the political and social realities of Putinism, and the staging of a 
counter-narrative contra to the Kremlin, further coalesces The Soldier with the diverse 
body of New Drama productions examined in this thesis.  
In an interview given with journalist and theatre director Tatyana Artimovich, 
Pryazhko discusses the original concept for the play: ‘I began to build a story,’ he 
contends, ‘I followed the conventions of plot construction and created some 
characters […] and suddenly I realised that what I needed was only two sentences, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Pryazhko (2011a).  
93 Rudnev (2010).  
	   117	  
and that this was the only option.’94 By condensing the show to fifteen minutes of 
action and two lines of text, Pryazhko directly addresses contemporary anxieties 
surrounding the Russian military, conscription, and desertion. The condensed 
performance directs the audience to consider the importance of the soldier’s reticence 
during the piece. The communicative silence in The Soldier opens and augments 
potential reflection on the Russian military’s contentious engagements in Chechnya, 
described by Mikhail Durnenkov in 2009 as ‘an unhealed wound - it is more of a 
tragedy than ten years of Afghanistan. The wounds are still fresh and it holds a very 
specific position in Russian memory and cultural trauma.’95 The play has been 
acknowledged as one of the most politically provocative productions of the twenty-
first century. Theatre scholar Maria Shevtsova interprets The Soldier as ‘protest at its 
most matter-of-fact; protest that could not be denied.’96 Writing in Teatr journal, 
Elena Levinskaya similarly contends that the play is an act of fulmination and a 
provocative ‘manifesto, a radical gesture of refusal […] a gesture of rejection of 
obsolete institutions.’97 By playing on specific unease and questions surrounding 
Putin’s militarisation of the public sphere, The Soldier acts as a conduit for raising 
political debate through its evocation of Russia’s bloody involvement in the Second 
Chechen War, dedovshchina, and conscription. Although the performance does not 
explicitly name or list these subjects, what is significant in the play’s exploration of 
contemporary attitudes towards the Russian army is that the act of desertion by a 
young soldier asks an important question in contemporary Russia: should the 
country’s youth have the choice about whether to serve in the army or not? 
 In an attempt to explore this, The Soldier does not offer up an explicit answer 
to the question it poses. Instead, Pryazhko and Volkostrelov encourage their audience 
to fill in their own narrative for the soldier’s actions during the performance.98 I 
contend that the production’s form, which challenges preconceived notions of New 
Drama, is vital in generating a discourse about the role of the military in 
contemporary Russian life. In their study of New Drama, Beumers and Lipovetsky 
conclude that ‘the plays discussed in this volume render violence of trauma through 
language, through the interaction between characters, and through the organisation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Pryazhko (2011b).  
95 M. Durnenkov (2009).  
96 Shevtsova (2015). 
97 Levinskaya (2012) 27. 
98 In his article on Pryzanko and Volkostrelov’s theatre, Freedman describes how ‘two years after 
seeing The Soldier […] I debate questions the director raised but did not answer.’ (2014b) 53. 
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theatrical performance.’99 In The Soldier, it is precisely the lack of ‘language’ or 
dialogic ‘interaction’ that communicates a potential embodied narrative to the 
audience. The soldier’s communicative silence throughout the performance hints at an 
ineffable trauma suffered by the young man that provokes important and varied 
discussion on the role of the army in modern Russia. 
 Each performance of The Soldier is followed by a post-show discussion 
between the audience, the creative team, and staff members at Teatr.doc. Although 
the production provokes a series of question relating to the soldier’s actions and his 
decision to desert the army, the post-show discussions often start with an emotive and 
heated debate about the form of the production. For example, in the post-show 
discussion that took place on the show’s opening night, audience members 
interrogated Pryazhko, Volkostrelov, and Ugarov.100 For some audience members, the 
form the performance took was artistically provocative and at odds with their 
perception of theatre, with one speaker asking ‘how is this a viable format of theatre?’ 
A second raised the issue that they did not believe they had watched a piece of 
theatre, instead contending that ‘this is a movie’, while another jokingly asked for a 
refund of their money. The conversations about the performance’s format often 
facilitate a more detailed debate on the Russian military. In the post-show discussions 
I have access to and have witnessed at the theatre, many of the men in the audience 
respond to the play by animatedly sharing their own experiences of military service, 
recalling where they were based and considering the impact it had on their lives. By 
challenging the audience’s expectations of what a theatre performance is, The Soldier 
provokes a debate on the nature of the performance that subsequently facilitates a 
wider dialogue about the Kremlin’s privileging of the military in Russia. In this way, 
The Soldier acts as a locus of cathartic reflection for audience members to consider 
the impact of conscription not only in a theatrical context, but also its impact on 
themselves and their companions at Teatr.doc that evening. By doing so, Pryazhko 
and Volkostrelov provoke the consideration of both the plight of soldiers in Russia, 
but also the role of theatre in challenging the normative discourses of the Putin 
regime.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 301. 
100 I am grateful to Elena Gremina for sharing with me a number of recordings of the post-show 
discussions staged at Teatr.doc. 
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A further observation in the context of my analysis of Putinism earlier in this 
chapter, is that, in a society where individuals who criticise the military are labelled as 
unpatriotic members of a treacherous fifth column, the ability of The Soldier to rouse 
an anomalous public debate about the failings of the army is in itself a vital and 
important act. Additionally, by prompting the audience to share their own and their 
friends and family member’s accounts of military service, which often do not confirm 
to Putinism’s idealised construction of militarised patriotism, these debates facilitate 
the eschewal of hegemonic masculinity of the Putin administration on multiple levels. 
As Connell argues, ‘hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to women and to 
subordinated masculinities’, meaning that the hierarchical framework of hegemonic 
masculinities privileges male dominance over women, but also dominance over men 
who do not conform to the idealised stereotype.101 In the democratic space at 
Teatr.doc, where all members of the audience are given equal time to freely speak in a 
discussion moderated by the theatre’s creative team, the hegemonic masculinity of the 
Putin regime is once again challenged. 
 
Embodied Narratives and Hegemonic Masculinity 
As I observed earlier in this chapter, hegemonic masculinity has been utilised as a 
decisive legitimising tool for Putin’s presidency. Pro-Putin youth groups such as 
Nashi have engaged in live spectacles that promote the hegemonic ideal of the war 
veteran as warrior hero and reinforce the idea that military service is allied to the 
concept of becoming a ‘real man’. The embodied presence of the male actor in The 
Soldier intersects with the Putin regime’s employment of media-friendly PR stunts 
and youth activism on the streets of Russia.  By challenging the connection between 
hegemonic masculinity and the success of the Putin regime, the production aims to 
disrupt the state-sanctioned discourse that ignores and marginalises young men who 
do not conform to hegemonic masculinity. 
 The soldier’s body in the form of actor Pavel Chinarev is visible to the 
audience during almost the entire performance both on stage and through the live 
video stream. Through the projection of the video stream, Pryazhko and Volkostrelov 
highlight how the coverage of military intervention such as the Second Chechen War 
and martial parades have become highly mediated by the state through the Kremlin’s 	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co-option of the mass media. As I have noted, during the Second Chechen War, Putin 
completed a number of high profile macho stunts that aligned him with the war effort 
and attempted to propagate him as the icon of militarised hegemonic masculinity. 
Meanwhile, veterans from both the Second World War and the two Chechen Wars 
have been foregrounded in the public sphere as patriotic heroes who validate Putin’s 
emphasis on military values and conscription. Paradoxically, Pryazhko and 
Volkostrelov challenge these idealised stereotypes of militarised masculinity in the 
embodied enactment of the everyday tasks performed by the soldier. Volkostrelov’s 
directorial focus on the diurnal actions of the character asks the audience to interpret 
the production as more legitimate than the heavily constructed and choreographed 
representations of military vigour presented by pro-Putin youth groups, state news 
reports, and Putin’s own public performances during the Second Chechen War. 
The image of the naked male body in the production has further implications 
for how Pryazhko and Volkostrelov use the embodied presence of the actor to engage 
with militarised gender norms. When he exits the shower, the audience’s attention is 
focused not only on the actor’s body but also the green camouflage uniform that is 
deliberately positioned in their eye line stage left. In her article ‘The Structure of 
Plasticity: Resistance and Accommodation in Russian New Drama’, Slavonic scholar 
Susanna Weygandt argues that New Drama productions integrate ‘material objects as 
actants in the narrative.’102 In The Soldier, the material presence of the soldier’s 
military uniform acts in accordance with Weygandt’s observations on the contribution 
of objects in New Drama. Lighting is used to introduce the presence of the items 
halfway through the performance and Volkostrelov creatively uses the uniform as a 
way to progress the narrative of The Soldier. The neatly folded clothes hint that the 
soldier had laid them out planning to dress after his shower only to conceive his final 
courageous decision to desert the army during the action of the piece. The presence of 
the soldier’s uniform reflects Morgan’s observation that ‘often men in public space 
are, officially or unofficially, uniformed as soldiers, policemen, clergy or 
stockbrokers.’103 Morgan writes that ‘the function of uniform is then to divert 
attention away from the particularities and idiosyncrasies of specific bodies and to 
focus on generalised public roles and statuses.’104 In their public media stunts, Putin 	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and Nashi activists dress in military attire to codify and give authority to their 
performance of militarised masculinity. It is precisely though the actor’s naked body 
that resistance to this facet of Putinism is conducted in The Soldier. The live 
embodiment of a naked man stripped of his uniform and status as a soldier is, 
therefore, a transgression that strips away the Kremlin’s fabricated mediatisation of 
militarised hegemonic masculinity. 
 It is worth pointing out, that like Ilya in The Drunks, the soldier’s body does 
not in fact physically conform to the hegemonic ideal and Morgan’s claim that ‘the 
warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity.’105 Chinarev’s body is not 
muscular or physically imposing, and his appearance betrays a youthful inexperience 
that suggests his subordinate status in the hierarchy of hegemonic masculinity. If 
Pryazhko’s soldier does not conform to hegemonic ideals, then it raises the question 
of what type of masculinity is coded in his image? An answer is provided by James 
Messerschmidt’s definition of ‘oppositional masculinities’: ‘at times and under certain 
social conditions men and women construct oppositional masculinities and 
femininities that in one way or another are extrinsic to and represent significant 
breaks from hegemonic and emphasized patterns, and may actually threaten their 
dominance.’106 Although the body of the soldier does not relate to embodied notions 
of the warrior hero that defines contemporary hegemonic masculinities, his 
concluding statement of intent, and his confident stance as he delivers his message, 
rejects the hegemonic as well as opposing it. The soldier’s words are empowering. He 




The legacy of the Second Chechen War has cast a prominent and enduring shadow 
over the development of the Russian state in the twenty-first century. As Dmitrii 
Muratov soberly reflected in 2014: ‘all that is happening today is but a consequence 
of this war.’107 The war consolidated Putin’s nascent presidency and enabled the 
Kremlin to purge the independent media empires that had emerged in the 1990s in a 
rescinding of press freedoms. In addition, the Kremlin recognised the value that 	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militarised patriotism held in consolidating Putin’s grip on power by demonising a 
supposed fifth column that did not obsequiously conform to these principles.  
 I have argued that New Drama is a complicated and expansive term that 
describes manifold theatrical styles and forms. The two productions examined in this 
chapter are widely divergent in their construction of narrative, staging, acting 
techniques, language, and even the spaces in which they were originally performed. 
The Drunks specifically takes the Chechen Wars as a starting point for its cynical, 
satirical, and often comical examination of contemporary Russian society. 
Contrastingly, The Soldier’s urgent portrayal of a young soldier in the moment he 
takes the life-changing decision to desert the army assaults its audience’s pre-
conceived understanding of New Drama and the artistic role of the playwright in 
contemporary Russia. What unites these two productions is that they both constitute a 
powerful response to Putinism by placing the figure of the conscript soldier on stage. 
Despite their disparate theatrical forms, both plays are framed by their relationship to 
hegemonic masculinity as theorised by Eichler and Sperling. The Drunks and The 
Soldier use the embodied presence of the male actor to challenge and disrupt the 
idealised paradigm of militarised hegemonic masculinity promoted by Putinism. In a 
society where soldiers who do not conform to the regime’s constructed hegemonic 
masculinity are excluded from public discourse, these production open up new 
avenues for debate and opposition towards the Kremlin through the staging of 
marginalised voices and ‘subordinate’ representations of the male body.  
In the following chapter, I will examine the consequences of the expanding 
class and regional divide under the Putin administration as depicted in two plays by 
Vasilly Sigarev. Plasticine (Plastilin, 2000) and Black Milk (Chernoe Moloko, 2001) 
expose the realities of provincial eastern Russia to their Muscovite audiences, 
establishing unique and varied counter-narratives that focus on marginalised sections 
of society at the turn of millennium. Analogous to the two productions discussed in 
this chapter, these plays respond to a key facet of Putinism, foregrounding forgotten 
elements of Russian society who have been disempowered by Putin’s state-building 
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Chapter Four: Social Divide and the Provinces in the 
Theatre of Vassily Sigarev 
 
Introduction 
As I have argued in the previous chapters, New Russian Drama has been shaped by 
and adapted to the political, social, and cultural landscape under Putinism. These 
dramatists have challenged the established, normative discourses of Putinism 
presented in the Russian media and by Putin himself in a variety of disparate 
theatrical techniques, which all fall under the idiom of New Drama. In Chapter Two I 
examine how theatre makers have employed political satire to make sense of Putin’s 
presidency and challenge the normative discourse of Putinism, considering satire’s 
evolution during the Putin era. Chapter Three explores how playwrights have 
responded to the Second Chechen War, demonstrating how New Drama has subverted 
the revivification of militarized gender identities under Putinism and the patriotic 
rhetoric that saturated the Russian media during Putin’s first administration. In 
keeping with the focus of this thesis, this chapter considers how New Drama 
addresses the expanding class divide created under Putin. Despite an economic upturn 
throughout the 2000s, precipitated by an increase in the international price of oil, a 
market in which Russia has a significant share, under the Putin administration the 
disparity in living standards across the majority of the country has grown and 
according to a recent study referenced by The Guardian newspaper, 16% of the 
population currently live below the poverty line.1  
Through an analysis of Yekaterinburg based playwright Vassily Sigarev’s  
Plasticine (Plastilin, 2000) and Black Milk (Chernoe Moloko, 2001), this chapter 
examines how these plays challenge the normative discourse of Putinism, which 
suggests that the 2000s were characterised by stability, contrasting with the social and 
economic chaos of the Yeltsin era.2 Premiéring in 2001 and 2002 respectively, 
Plasticine and Black Milk are the two earliest case studies in this thesis. Despite being 
written during the nascent years of Putin’s premiership, they are important 
productions for theorising and understanding how New Drama has engaged with the 
politics of Putinism.  	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The staging of impoverished and marginalised communities across Russia is 
considered a critical component of New Drama productions in the 2000s. Throughout 
the decade, economic stagnation in the former industrial heartlands of the Soviet 
Union was a regular thematic trope in new theatre writing, and productions depicted 
urban areas in the provinces of Russia as financially and morally destitute.3 For 
example, Russian theatre critic Elena Kovalskaya writes that ‘often the “New Drama 
Hero” is a declassified dweller of an economically depressed city in which industrial 
centers have been abandoned since Perestroika. The hero living here is usually an 
adolescent.’4 Despite, however, the connection between the economic hardship 
experienced by provincial communities in post-Soviet Russia and under the Putin 
administration, the important intersection between contemporary Russian politics and 
Sigarev’s theatre is an element of his plays that has yet to be explored. 
Reflecting the contemporaneous anxieties articulated by a collection of 
Russian journalists and cultural critics, urban decay, crime, poverty, and social 
deprivation became the prevailing characteristic of many writers’ plays and New 
Drama productions. At the time, Russian critics suggested that such motifs were 
designed merely as shock value, and contrived primarily to please foreign audiences 
and mimic Western theatre aesthetics.5 This fascination with the lurid aspects of 
provincial existence in early New Drama plays was not necessarily surprising and can 
be further explained by considering the original geographical locations of many of the 
writers of New Drama. As has already been examined in Chapter 1, although the 
focus of this new wave of playwriting was on the productions staged at theatres in 
central Moscow, young playwrights also emerged from provincial cities far removed 
from the capital, both economically and culturally. Furthermore, The introduction of 
contemporary social motifs to the Russian stage lead to claims that playwrights had 
assimilated themes and aesthetics from foreign theatre cultures, and specifically the 
British phenomenon of ‘In-Yer-Face’ theatre that emerged from London’s Royal 
Court theatre in the 1990s. As Yana Ross summarises:  
 
the influence of the Royal Court cannot be underestimated. Russian characters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Some examples are: Vladimir and Oleg Presniakov, Europe – Asia (Yevropa – Aziya, 2000); 
Vyacheslav and Mikhail Durnenkov, The Cultural Layer (Kul'turnii Sloi, 2003); Yuri Klavdiev, Anna 
(2004). 	  
4 Kovalskaya in Weygandt (2016) 125. 
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now swear, screw, murder, and suffer in violent outbursts addressing the ‘in-
yer-face’ issues of poverty, frustration, alcoholism, and social injustice.6 
 
Through an analysis of Plasticine and Black Milk this chapter will contest the 
argument that Sigarev’s theatre is thematically rooted in the tradition of ‘In-Yer-Face’ 
theatre, and based on shock tactics and the exploitation of rural Russia for box office 
success in Moscow and the West. Instead, I argue that the productions are framed 
within an explicitly Russian context, drawing from Russian and Soviet history to 
interrogate the politics of the twenty-first century.  
This chapter begins by examining the Kremlin’s continued implantation of 
neo-liberal economic policies and the emerging class system in Russia that was 
bolstered at the beginning of Putin’s presidency. I reflect on Russian political scientist 
Lilia Shevtsova’s observation that the divide between the ‘haves and have-nots’ has 
rapidly grown under Putinism.7 I supplement this by considering how critics of the 
Putin regime, including politician Alexi Navalny and journalist Anna Politkovskaia, 
have underscored the impact of social divide throughout Russia in their oppositional 
discourse. Next, through a close reading of Plasticine, I explore how Sigarev stages 
provincial life to expose the growing divides in the living standards of Russians and 
foregrounds those marginalised and excluded from public discourse and space. 
Following Plasticine, this chapter considers how Black Milk addresses the polarity 
between Russia’s prosperous western metropolises such as Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, and the country’s provinces in the south and east.  
 
A Divided Society 
Scholar of contemporary Russian politics, Stephen White, identifies the prevailing 
preoccupation that has concerned ordinary Russians during the Putin era as ‘above all, 
the rapid increases that were taking place in the cost of living, and in the poverty and 
social inequality with which they were associated.’8 In the transitional decade 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered a dramatic downturn in 
its citizens’ wellbeing and standards of living. Under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, 
life expectancy dropped, access to healthcare and education decreased, job security – 	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once taken for granted under the Soviet regime - was eroded, and by the end of the 
1990s there were over four million people homeless throughout the country. The 
situation was exacerbated by the collapse of the ruble in August 1998 and the 
consequent financial crisis that resulted in a further drop in living standards, leaving 
millions living below the poverty line. Although the large western cities in Russia, 
including Moscow and St Petersburg, suffered during the initial recession, provincial 
towns and cities bore the brunt of the economic downturn. White highlights that in 
‘whole towns like Yuzha, 200 miles west of Moscow […] four out of every five were 
living below the poverty line in the late 1990s and many of the unemployed, elderly 
and sick were too poor to have regular meals.’9 This economic depression in the east 
of Russia was heightened by the collapse of many of the Soviet Union’s traditional 
industries, which caused further unemployment and hardship in Russia’s industrial 
heartland to the south-east of Moscow. Furthermore, Russian political scientist Elena 
Chebankova has observed that a trend in Western societies that has been followed in 
Russia since the implementation of neo-liberal, economic policies by the Kremlin is 
the emergence of a ‘functional underclass’, a taxonomy that Chebankov defines as a 
‘derogatory umbrella term uniting people suffering from multiple forms of 
deprivation’.10 
Putin’s victory in the presidential election in March 2000 coincided with the 
global oil boom that augmented the Russian economy. In his book Change in Putin’s 
Russia: Money, Power and People, Russian historian Simon Pirani writes that the 
increase in the price of oil at the turn of the millennium was essential to Putin’s 
securement of power, and his continued success and popularity with the Russia 
electorate. Pirani further suggests, however, that while Putin’s policies in the wake of 
the oil boom raised average incomes and living standards from their depths in the 
1990s, they also exacerbated the economic inequalities rampant in post-Communist 
Russian society:  
 
The gaps between rich and poor, and between rich and poor regions, widened. 
The demographic crisis persisted, with death rates still higher than those of the 
mid-1980s. Health, education and social welfare reforms, guided by right-
wing ‘market’ principles, introduced new inequalities. Worst of all, the 	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government failed to apply Russia’s oil windfall to the most pressing 
problems.11 
 
Putinism focused on modernising European Russia in the west to the detriment of 
provincial cities in the north and south of the country, which experienced an 
escalation of poverty and social deprivation in the 2000s. Indeed, Putin’s first two 
administrations between 2000 and 2008 saw the per capita GDP in Moscow and St 
Petersburg grow to three to nine time greater than the average in the poorest 20 
regions.12 This differential in income and living standards has resulted in a fissure in 
Russia society. As sociologist and activist Carine Clement writes: 
 
Russia is more and more being divided into two camps. There are those who 
can make their plans for the future, who feel the effects of stability and 
improvement of living standards. And there are those who despite all the 
improvements, feel they are in a precarious situation. Something happens – 
and they can sink. They are not the poorest, but they live just a little above the 
poverty line. This is the layer of the population that suffers most from the 
government’s social reforms.13  
 
In other words, while Putinism has resulted in many Russians seeing an improvement 
in their living standards, which had dropped sharply in the 1990s, the gap between 
those who can afford to indulge in new-found Western consumerism and those who 
can’t has augmented.  
Such groups include both the young and pensioners, who have been 
marginalised by many of the Kremlin’s welfare policies and social reforms. This is a 
reflection of a nascent and still fluctuating class system, which has seen the rapid 
growth of the middle class.14 Chebankova notes that this increase in a middle class 
who embrace post-Soviet consumerism has resulted in the prepotency of public 
discourse by this social group, which has resulted in ‘the most important socio-
political problems, as well as the concerns of the largest share of the population 
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[failing to be] properly articulated.’15 This has had the effect, in particular, of 
marginalising both young and old in Russia. In the 2000s, pensioners have formed the 
backbone of one of the strongest anti-Putinist civil movements, and they staged one of 
the first mass protests against the Putin administration in January 2005, when 
thousands of pensioners took to the streets in protest against cutbacks to social 
benefits.16  
A further group who have been forgotten in Russia’s adoption of a neo-liberal 
marketisation is the generation that came of age in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
This generation were the first to do so in Russia with no memory of life in the USSR, 
prompting a number of observers to mention the idea of a ‘lost-generation’ of Russian 
youth, particularly in the provinces where both crime and drug addiction have 
prevailed. This divide has been exacerbated by the fact that a specific generation of 
coetaneous politicians have acquired prominent positions of power throughout Putin’s 
government. This predominant circle of high-profile members of the Putin 
administration had their political outlook and worldview shaped by their formative 
experience of maturing during the Era of Stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev in the 
1970s and early 1980s. Russian political scientists Vladimir Gelman, Dmitry Travin, 
and Otar Marganiya identify several key members of Putin’s team as belonging to this 
generation, including Dmitry Medvedev; Alexei Kudrin, Minister of Finance from 
2000 to 2011; and Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov.17 This has resulted in a 
widening disparity between these two age groups, one who experienced the Soviet 
Union and therefore hold widely disparate ambitions for modern Russian politics and 
society compared to those who came of age in the 1990s and 2000s.  
  
Opposition and dissent 
This growing economic divide in Putin’s Russia has resulted in an augmenting 
discourse that challenges the established narrative that the 2000s has brought 
widespread economic prosperity. Prominent politician and trenchant opponent of the 
Putin regime, Alexi Navalny has charged the Kremlin with exasperating inequality 
and economic disparity by promoting a plutocracy through a culture of fiscal 
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corruption among a wealthy elite.18 In a series of investigations conducted by Navalny 
and his team of researchers, they claim that Russia’s rich have amassed vast wealth 
while facilitating an unequal society.19 Furthermore, on his official website, Navalny 
argues that the new Russian elite have drained the country of its resources, stating 
that: ‘it’s time to choose: hospitals and roads, not the palaces of officials […] it is 
unacceptable that in Russia in the 21st century millions of people still live without 
affordable medicine, without normal roads, without high-quality housing and 
communal services.’20 Navalny makes clear that the solution for an enhancement in 
the quality of life, politicians need to pay more attention to the economic situation in 
Russia’s provinces, stating that there is a need to ‘develop not only in Moscow, but all 
of Russia’.21 
Navalny’s polemical criticisms of the Putin regime have been echoed by a 
small but prominent section of journalists and political commentators in Russia. For 
example, writing in 2000, Sergei Kovalev attributes Putin’s neo-liberal economic 
programme to the influence of right wing political factions in the Duma, criticising 
the president for embracing this economic model as a means of accumulating political 
power.22 More pertinently, journalist and human right activist Anna Politkovskaia, 
whose work has already been discussed in the preceding chapter, frequently reported 
on the economic and regional disparity under Putinism. While working as an 
investigative journalist for the newspaper Novaya Gazetta she travelled around Russia 
during the 2000s, courageously and meticulously exposing institutionalised 
corruption. Politkovskaia’s writings eschew the prominent political discourse of 
Putinism that saturates the state controlled media, and instead privileges ‘the 
dissenting voices, all those who might criticise and come up with alternative ideas.’23 
In her book, Putin’s Russia, Politkovskaia observes that Putin’s power is based on the 
support of oligarchs and billionaires, while ‘millions of Russian pensioners who can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In December 2016 Navalny announced his attention to run in the 2018 presidential election, and The 
Economist subsequently labeled Navalny as the ‘chief threat to Vladimir Putin’ in the election. It has 
subsequently been announced, however, that Navalny is currently barred from running in the 
presidential election due to being sentenced to a suspended five year prison sentence after being 
convicted of embezzlement in February 2017. See the Economist (2017). 
19 See Walker (2015).  
One example is Navalny’s exposé that former president Dmitry Medvedev had amassed a secret 
collection of palaces, yachts, and vineyard. For the full report see Navalny (2017).  
20 Navalny (2016).  
21 Ibid. 
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barley make ends meet weren’t given a thought.’24 Politkovskaia’s journalism address 
the mobilisation of pensioners that I have noted above, attesting that they have formed 
a prominent part of the anti-Putin protests movement, acting as a legitimate and 
vociferous opposition to the government.25 Interestingly, Politkovskaia echoes 
Navalny’s political manifesto that Russia’s provinces have been left behind by Putin’s 
economic policies: 
 
Putin decided to base his power solely on the oligarchs, the billionaires who 
own Russia’s oil and gas reserves. Putin is friends with some oligarchs and at 
war with others, and this is called statecraft. There is no place for the people in 
this scheme of things. Moscow is life-giving warmth and light, while the 
provinces are its pale reflection, and those who inhabit them might as well be 
living on the moon.26 
 
In other words, Politkovskaia highlights how for the urban and Moscow centric 
population, Russia’s provinces are viewed as foreign and uncivilised compared to the 
country’s developed western cities.  
In this opening section, I have considered the consequences of Putin’s 
adoption of a neo-liberal market economy that privileged the west of the country and 
its large, modern cities. In particular, I have highlighted the observations made by 
scholars that connect Putinism’s economic policies with a divarication in society.   
These economic, generational, and regional divides in contemporary Russia have 
acquired significance in the political discourse of vocal opponents of the Putin 
regime. For the remainder of the chapter, I will consider how the theatre of New 
Drama writer Vassily Sigarev addresses these prominent anxieties. I argue that 
although the two plays considered here take divergent stylistic forms, Sigarev’s 
staging of provincial society specifically draws upon Russian contexts and history to 
interrogate this key facet of Putin’s presidency.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Politkovskaia (2004) 197. 
25 Ibid. 216ff. 
26 Ibid. 197. 
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Vassily Sigarev  
Sigarev was born in 1977 in the Sverdlovsk region of Russia in the Urals. After 
dropping out of the State Pedagogical University in Nizhny Tagil, he enrolled at the 
Yekaterinburg State Theatre Institute’s playwriting course, run by preeminent Russian 
playwright Nikolai Koliada. It was under the tutorage of Koliada that Sigarev would 
go on to write many of his formative and most significant plays. Plasticine, written 
when he was only 23 and still a student at Koliada’s school, is arguably the 
antecedent play of New Drama that focuses on contemporary provincial life in Putin’s 
Russia. First performed as a rehearsed reading at the Liubimovka New Writing 
Festival in 2000, the play won the respected Russian literary award the Anti-Booker 
Prize in the same year. As has been discussed in Chapter One, the Anti-Booker was 
an annual award staged by the daily broadsheet newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
between 1995 and 2001 as contra to the British-sponsored Russian Booker Prize. 
Vocal critic of Putin, oligarch Boris Berezovsky, whose media-empire had adopted a 
strongly polemical stance toward the Putin government by 2000 owned Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, and Sigarev’s victory in the Anti-Booker was therefore recognition of both 
his counterculture credentials, but also aligned his work to one of Russia’s most anti-
Putin media outlets.27 Plasticine’s initial successes were significant in marking 
Sigarev’s entry into the canon of New Drama writers. The play’s triumph in the stage 
play category of the Anti-Booker was critical in providing Sigarev with instant 
credibility. The preceding recipients of the award - Maksim Kurochkin in 1998 and 
Evgeni Grishkovets in 1999 – already had full-scale productions commissioned in 
Moscow, and had both been staged at the Royal Court Theatre’s International Season 
in 1999 under the collective title Moscow – Open City (1999).28 Plasticine’s 
performance at Liubimovka, the annual congregation of playwrights and directors 
organised by Elena Gremina and Alexei Kazantsev, was an additional 
acknowledgment of Sigarev’s ascendancy to the echelons of the cumulative new 
writing movement in Russia, and served to promote his work outside of 
Yekaterinburg for the first time. 
  In June 2001 Plasticine premiered in Moscow, when the innovative new 
writing theatre the Playwright and Director Centre (CDR) staged it in a seminal 
production that launched the careers of Sigarev and director Kirill Serebrennikov. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For more information see Judha (2013) 42-46 
28 Grishkovets also performed his one-man play How I Ate a Dog at the Royal Court in 2000. 
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Serebrennikov attests that six different directors had rejected the offer to direct 
Plasticine before he decided to take a risk on staging the production in Moscow.29 At 
this point, it is worthwhile taking a moment to discuss the importance of 
Serebrennikov’s role in the development of New Drama and Russian theatre in 
general as a legitimate oppositional and interventionist movement again the Putin 
regime. Russian theatre critic Pavel Rudnev observes that ‘it is commonly held that 
political theater began in post soviet Russia with Kirill Serebrennikov.’30 Rudnev 
highlights Serebrennikov’s production of nineteenth century Russian playwright 
Alexander Ostrovsky The Forest (Les, 1871) at the Moscow Art Theatre that 
premièred on 23 December 2004 and continues to run in the theatre’s repertoire.31 
The apogee of Serebrennikov’s production occurred when the two actors playing the 
lead roles of Gurmyzhskaya and Bulanov appeared on stage dressed as Putin and 
eminent Russian pop star and celebrity Alla Pugacheva, who has publically supported 
both Putin and the United Russia party. Furthermore, Serebrennikov explicitly 
foregrounds that theatre practitioners are natural opponents of the government who 
can critique the negative cultural policies of the Kremlin. Discussing the Kremlin-
sanctioned protests against the Bolshoi’s contemporary production of Tchaikovsky’s 
Yevgeny Onegin (1879) in September 2006, and the closure of the controversial art 
exhibition Forbidden Art (2006) in the same year, Serebrennikov states:  
 
I think its awful that an artist is taken to court for raising question about 
religion. It’s ridiculous when the Parliament storms the Bolshoi and starts 
teaching them how to write operas. It resembles Soviet times very much, but 
at the same time it allows us to answer; it provokes a struggle.32 
 
After making a name for himself as one of the vanguard directors of New Drama, 
Serebrennikov took the post of artistic director of the Gogol Centre in Moscow in 
2012. Updating the theatre’s repertoire he has produced a series of new writing 
pieces, as well as contemporary modern dress productions of classic plays. In 2017, 
Serebrennikov has become the direct target of the Kremlin’s campaign of artistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Serebrennikov (2009) 11. 
30 Rudnev (2014). 
31 I saw Serebrennikov’s production of The Forest at the Moscow Art Theatre during a research trip to 
Moscow on 30 May 2015. 
32 Serebrennikov (2006) 149. 
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censorship and repression. In May 2017 the Gogol Centre was raided by riot police, in 
an act that was described by Elena Kovalskaya as ‘an act of intimidation to all who 
work in the Russian theater.’33 On 22 August 2017 Serebrennikov was arrested on 
charges of embezzlement and fraud. As of writing he is currently under house arrest 
and awaiting trial.34  
That a trenchant, topical play by a young, unknown Russian playwright could 
be staged at a central Moscow theatre, undoubtedly caused a polarised frisson 
amongst Russian audiences, which is evidenced by the number of amateur reviews 
posted on LiveJournal blogs in the first year of the production. A British premiére as 
part of the Royal Court’s International Playwrights Season followed, and in March 
2002 Plasticine was staged as a full production at the Royal Court Theatre Upstairs, 
directed by Dominic Cooke. Critics, who compared Plasticine with the British ‘In-
Yer-Face’ theatre of Mark Ravenhill and Sarah Kane, responded positively to the 
production and Sigarev became the first foreign recipient of the Evening Standard’s 
Charles Wintour Award for most promising playwright. It has subsequently been 
observed that Sigarev’s play was a defining moment in the early development of New 
Drama: John Freedman describes Plasticine as the ‘play that kicked off the term “new 
drama” in earnest’ and, echoing this, Kristina Matvienko defines Sigarev’s play as the 
‘flagship’ of New Drama.35 ‘Sigarev’, writes Yana Ross, ‘has inspired playwrights 
across the country with his haunting snapshots of teenagers, drugs addicts, and 
marginal characters who live behind the “barbed wire” of socially accepted terms.’36 
The production was the first piece of New Drama to gain attention from the 
mainstream press in Russia, and also the first to be staged in a full production abroad. 
Plasticine’s immediate critical acclaim and commercial success in Russia and 
overseas meant the play became a criterion for the standards and expectations of 
playwriting in Russia, and established a set of clichés that many Russian critics and 
journalists would draw upon when discussing New Drama in the early 2000s. For 
example, editor of leading Russian culture journal Iskusstvo Kino Daniil Dondurei 
states that ‘“New Drama” is associated only with the features of the social typology of 
characters: provincials, prisoners […] down and outs’.37 Similarly, theatre critic Alena 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Kovalskaya (2017).  
34 For more information see Freedman (2017). 
35 Freedman (2011) and Matvienko (2008). 
36 Ross (2006) 29-30. 
37 Boyakov, Davydova and Dondurei (2004) . 
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Karas sees the appeal of New Drama arising from its portrayal of ‘street language, 
brothels, the homeless, [and] homosexuality’.38  
Serebrennikov’s production of Plasticine was performed in the repertoire of 
the CDR from 2001 until 2007. As I have observed above, during the period the 
production played at the CDR the growing social disparity in Russia was regularly 
debated and reported by the Russian media, and notably, the show’s run closely 
coincided with Putin’s first two terms as president between 2000-2008. Despite the 
initial mercurial publicity gained by Sigarev after the play’s opening runs in Moscow 
and London, the enduring appeal of the CDR’s staging of Plasticine suggests that the 
production continued to speak to specific concerns and discourses articulated in 
Putin’s Russia well into the late 2000s and Putin’s second term in office.  
Before analysing Plasticine and Black Milk in closer detail, it is useful to draw 
attention to an important debate surrounding Sigarev’s perceived exploitation of 
Russian poverty and the portrayal of ‘down and outs’. Sigarev is clear that he intends 
his theatre to focus on the indiscriminate violence and social deprivation inherent in 
the provincial life that he experienced during his own youth in the Urals: ‘I played a 
lot of things down, made everything softer’, he explains, ‘it was much worse in 
reality. I don’t think what I wrote was so hard and cruel’.39 Despite this Sigarev has 
faced accusations of cultural tourism from both peers and theatre critics. Translator of 
Sigarev’s play into English, Sasha Dugdale, recalls how one commentator observed 
that: ‘his parents’ flat is fine. They have a fine life. I don’t know what he’s talking 
about’.40 At the same time critics also assailed Sigarev for allegedly courting wider 
audiences abroad at the expense of Russia’s international image. Dugdale explains: 
 
Sigarev’s popularity in the United Kingdom has had […] an effect on how he 
is viewed in Russia. There is some hostility to his work. I interpret this partly 
as a degree of jealousy and the usual dismissal of the widely popular. I have 
also heard Sigarev’s love of ‘lower forms of life’ and his ‘pointlessly obscene 
texts’ criticized, and there even seems to be a sense in which he ‘washes 
Russia’s dirty linen in public’ for Europe’s gratification.41 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Karas (2004)  
39 Sigarev in O’Mahoney (2003)  
40 Dugdale in Aston and O’Thomas (2015) 80. 
41 Dugdale (2009) 22. 
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The implication of these claims is that Sigarev’s forays into Russian impoverishment 
are detached and cynical attempts to exploit a lucrative and commercial market in 
western Europe by playing on recognisable stereotypes of post-Soviet squalor and 
corruption. This can be countered, however, with the fact that Sigarev wrote 
Plasticine while still a student in Yekaterinburg, and had no exposure to the ethos of 
the Royal Court, or even current trends in the Moscow theatre scene.42 This is an 
observation that has recently been emphasized by theatre scholars Elaine Aston and 
Mark O’Thomas, who argue that: 
 
Considering Sigarev comes not from the ‘theatre city’ of Moscow but from the 
industrial wastelands of the central Urals and trained with Nikolai Kolyada at 
the Yekaterinburg Theatre Insitutute, the question of a British in-yer-face 
influence is somewhat spurious. From Sigarev’s point of view it is the bleak, 
urban reality of the Urals that informs the ‘raw emotion’ of his plays.43 
 
Allied to this has been Sigarev’s eschewal of New Drama after his initial success in 
the early 2000s, and in particular a rejection of the linguistic aesthetics he himself 
developed: ‘[mat] has become fashionable, and I am reluctant to follow trends’.44  
Sigarev’s two plays Plasticine and Black Milk are therefore, a paramount 
starting point for a discussion of how New Drama approached this widening gap in 
inequality between the west of Russia, and its provincial cities to the east. Despite the 
two plays taking disparate approaches to their interrogation of the widening social 
divides under Putinism, they are both important case studies for examining New 
Drama’s urgent engagement with this facet of contemporary political discourse. 
 
Plasticine 
A young man enters the stage of the CDR alone. The performance space is empty 
except for an old and battered upright piano that faces away from the audience, 
exposing its inner mechanisms. The young man slowly circles the piano before 
crouching down in front of it. Facing the audience, he huddles into a small ball by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Raikin (2002). Furthermore, Sigarev did not attend any of the Royal Court’s initial workshops in 
Russian in 1999 and 2000, and was only staged in the UK after Elena Gremina presented a finished 
script of Plasticine to Elyse Dodgson after the play’s performance at the Liubimovka Festival. 
43 Aston and O’Thomas (2015) 138. 
44 Sigarev (2009)  
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pulling his knees up to his chest. He tightly holds a lump of grey plasticine, which he 
rubs urgently between his hands and breathes on to warm the malleable putty. As the 
plasticine softens he molds it into a series of bizarre and abstract forms that slowly 
transform before the audience’s eyes to take on the appearance of human shape that is 
roughly the size of a small doll. The young man remains silent, but through his 
sculpting he communicates a nervous tension to the audience, before placing the 
plasticine figure upstage on the floor directly in their eye line as he puts the finishing 
touches to his work.  
 This is the opening scene from Serebrennikov’s original production of 
Plasticine at the CDR. It introduces the protagonist of the play, Maksim, a teenager 
growing up in a communal apartment block with his infirm grandmother – his parents 
are never mentioned and it is implied that he is orphaned – in a decaying town in the 
region of Sverdlovsk. Sequestered in his bedroom Maksim moulds hardened objects 
made of plasticine in an attempt to articulate and retaliate for the series of violent and 
sexual degradations he is subjected to as he traverses his provincial town with his 
solitary schoolmate Lyokha. In Sigarev’s examination of the marginalised 
communities in Russia’s provinces, the urban landscape of Plasticine is unmistakably 
post-Soviet. This is a world where people are opening up to the possibilities of 
Western consumerism and arts, previously taboo in the Soviet era. Maksim’s age, 
fourteen, is important. He represents the first generation of children to come of age in 
Russia who have no experience of life under the Soviet regime. Instead, his moral and 
social grounding is a product of the turbulence of Russia’s development of a free 
market, capitalist economy, and the veneer of Russian democracy cultivated under the 
presidency of Yeltsin and bolstered under Putinism. Maksim inhabits the violent and 
hyper-sexualised world of provincial Russia, moribund after the corrosion of Russia’s 
industrial sector. Plasticine is a nightmarish vision of turn of the millennium Russia, 
seen through the vision of a generation in flux, neither products of the Soviet system 
nor able to coalesce with the world of ‘New Russia’ to the west. 
In a series of thirty-three short linear scenes, Maksim is subjected to a series of 
physical and psychological degradations as he is tormented by the ghostly apparition 
of his friend Spira, who commits suicide at the beginning of the play. In an interview 
given in 2002, Sigarev describes the play as a ‘story made up of different stories. A 
chain of events that occurred with different people – something with me, and 
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something with my brother and friends.’45 The fragmented structure of the play 
foregrounds the stunted parlance of the characters and the fractured moral code they 
exist by in the world of Plasticine. Throughout the production Maksim repeatedly 
experiences physical violence in a series of brutal scenes that similarly occur after he 
is either offered or attempts to initiate sex. Firstly, he is attacked by a young 
bridegroom celebrating his wedding who accuses Maksim of flirting with his new 
wife, then aggressively assaulted by a drunken prostitute after Maksim rejects her 
advances, and finally being savagely beaten by his class mates after Lyokha reveals to 
them that they have had sex in a cinema during a screening of Tinto Brass’s 1979 film 
Caligula. In an attempt to reconcile with Maksim after his betrayal, Lyokha invites 
him to a derelict block of flats on the pretence of having sex with two young women. 
Once inside, however, the two boys realise that they have been deceived and are 
subsequently violently raped by two elder male convicts. A turning point occurs when 
Maksim’s grandmother dies, and he models a knuckleduster out of plasticine in order 
to revenge his rapists. Returning to the convicts’ apartment Maksim is over powered 
by the men who, it is implied, throw Maksim to his death from the window of their 
building.  
Russian critics reviewing the CDR’s productions highlight Sigarev’s stylistic 
employment of realistic ‘street language’ used by modern Russian youth, and the 
frequent and affective use of violent sexualised language [mat].46 Mirroring Sigarev 
and Serebrennikov’s relative youth and lack of professional experience was a young 
cast who were previously unknown by the majority of the audience at the CDR. In a 
recent interview, Serebrennikov reflects that the casting of young and unfamiliar 
actors for his production of Plasticine was a deliberate provocation and reaction to the 
Moscow theatres that continued to employ the same elderly actors in their 
repertoires.47 The lack of star names helped give the production, as one critic phrased 
it, an aura of ‘authenticity’.48 This dialectic and visual ‘authenticity’ was reinforced 
by the production’s use of contemporary fashion, including hoodies, baggy t-shirts, 
jeans, and Converse All Star boots worn by Maksim and Lyokha, which underscores 
that they are part of a nascent generation, emerging from the drab bureaucracy of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Sigarev in Raikina (2002). 
46 Basenina (2001). 
47 ‘At that time [the cast] were either unknown or unemployed […] They were not taken anywhere! All 
the troupes were rammed by some elderly artists.’ Serebrennikov (2017).  
48 Basenina (2001) 
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late Soviet Union. Maksim and Lyokha’s clothes contrast with the stark neutrality and 
black and white tones of the production’s set at the CDR, designed by Nikolai 
Simonov. A number of aesthetic elements of the staging invokes a mental hospital or 
asylum, with meticulous clean white tiles on the walls of the space, bright white strip 
lighting, and the positioning of a wheelchair in the corner of the performance space. 
The sanitised and sterile environment of the set recalls a trope in Putin’s public 
polemics early in his presidency where he described the Russian state as infirmed, 
such as in his first State of the Nation address on 8 July 2000, when he employed a 
medical analogy describing the Russia nation as ‘senile’.49  
In Serebrennikov’s protean production, cast members play multiple roles 
across age differences and gender. For example, actor Vitalii Khaev played Maksim’s 
sadistic teacher, the convict who rapes him, and the kindly old woman who looks 
after him at the market. Theatre scholars Tom Seller and A. M. Pavlov both argue that 
this staging device is not utilised to ‘explore the usual set of drag ironies found in 
postmodern theatre’, but instead serves to explicitly remind the audience that as an 
orphaned teenager, Maksim inhabits an adult world where the rules and hierarchies 
are dictated by nebulous individuals whose values are divergent from his own.50 
Along with his peer Lyokha, Maksim must instead inhabit the adult spaces in 
Plasticine as an outsider or ‘other’ that does not belong in them.  
 
Private and Public in Plasticine 
As Maksim places the plasticine model on the floor in front of the audience, the stage 
comes to life as a chorus of indistinguishable figures appear, shrouded in identical 
black cloaks. In Plasticine, scenes melt into one another, and Serebrennikov’s highly 
stylised, choreographed direction, gave the play an almost dreamlike quality. The 
small and circumscribed space of the CDR was rendered by Simonov’s set design to 
elicit the cramped and claustrophobic atmosphere of a communal Khrushchyovka - 
antiquated five-story Soviet apartment buildings built during the premiership of 
Nikita Khrushchev, which had become notorious for their dilapidation by the 2000s - 
that the characters reside in. Expanding on this aesthetic element of the production, 
Seller observes that Serebrennikov’s use of space in the CDR’s production ‘crowds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 BBC (2000). For a full transcript of the speech see 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21480 [Accessed 11 November 2015]. 
50 Sellar (2004) 70 and Pavlov (2011) 105. 
	   139	  
intimate scenes onto small patches of ground while other activity continues elsewhere 
- a staging reminiscent of the Soviet-style communal apartments.’51 The delineation 
between the public and private space is a key element of Maksim’s provincial town in 
Plasticine, both through Serebrennikov’s staging of the production at the CDR, and 
through repeated reference to space in Sigarev’s text and stage directions.   
In the second short scene, Maksim witnesses the coffin of his recently 
deceased friend Spira being carried out of his ‘shabby five-story block of flats’ by a 
crane as the communal hallways are too tight for the coffin to be carried out.52 One of 
the local children who lives in Maksim’s apartment describes the predicament faced 
by the residents: 
 
The hallway is too narrow for the coffin. It won’t fit through. My nan had a 
flat like that. They unloaded her though, and just carried her out. She was fat, 
so they had a right load of trouble.53 
 
Spira’s red coffin is winched high above the stage by a mechane, as his elderly 
relatives mourn his death. Sigarev, however, emphasises that in the communal world 
of the provincial Khrushchyovka apartments, acts of life and death can be quickly 
forgotten. As the coffin is removed from the jib of the crane, the action around 
Maksim again rapidly transforms, a young boy and girl flirt and kiss while Spira’s 
family quarrel over his meagre possessions. As the production unfolds, the previously 
bare space becomes progressively cluttered with scenery, props, and clothing that the 
performers discard on the stage, such that the performance space is constantly reduced 
and redefined. The claustrophobic evocation of space in these scenes is again echoed 
in one of Sigarev’s later stage directions: 
  
The walls begin to pulse and the room presses in on [Maksim]. Everything is 
alive and moving. Everything is moving a pulsing and laughing at him. The 
room gets smaller and smaller. Now it is no longer a room, but a little box, the 
walls covered in black material. It is no longer a room, it is a coffin.54 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Sellar (2004) 70. 
52 Sigarev (2002) 3. 
53 Ibid 5. 
54 Ibid. 29. 
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Here, the Khrushchyovka becomes a literal coffin for Maksim, who feels unable to 
escape the existence he is trapped in.  
In Plasticine, the Khrushchyovka, or communal apartment, becomes a 
microcosm of provincial life, an area where the delineation between the public and 
private becomes obfuscated. Young couples steal kisses in corridors as everyday life 
continues around them; Lyokha boasts of having sex with girl on the stairwell of his 
apartment block; Maksim is violently harassed by his passive-aggressive neighbour, 
and, as the stage direction and Spira’s suicide foretell, it is where he will eventually 
face tragic death. It is only in the privacy of his bedroom that Maksim is able to 
express himself, silently constructing his plasticine models. For the young teenagers 
in Plasticine, however, there is no hope for a better life or a ‘New Russia’. Sigarev 
‘never promises a “new life”’, write Beumers and Lipovetsky, ‘on the contrary, 
[Plasticine] persistently and purposefully destroys and devastates everything alive’.55 
Maksim’s murder at the end of the play is the moment when Sigarev reveals to his 
audience the final and inescapable injustice faced by Russia’s provincial youth. 
 The significance of space in the production echoes the complex re-framing of 
public and private space that occurred in Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. In the 1990s there was a redefining of public space as socialist monuments 
were pulled down and street names, buildings, and even cities were renamed.56 More 
pertinent here, is how traditional areas of public space under fell under private 
ownership after the collapse of communism across the Soviet Union. Although public 
space under the Soviet regime was strictly controlled and monitored by the state and 
was not permissible for citizens to use independently or to subvert normative state 
doctrines, the reassignment of public areas in post-Communist Russia was a 
prominent anxiety in the 1990s and beyond into the Putin government.57 As I have 
noted above, Chebankova argues that Putinism heralded a further era of transition to a 
market economy and a new wave of unbridled neo-liberalism in Russia. In their co-
edited book The Politics of Public Space, anthropologists Setha Low and Neil Smith 
argue that forceful regulation of public space is a central desideratum of neoliberal 
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restructuring.58 Furthermore, it has also been noted that ‘as cities have redeveloped, 
public space has become a key battleground – a battleground over the homeless and 
the poor and over the rights of developers, corporations, and those who seek to make 
over the city in an image attractive to tourists, middle and upper-class residents, and 
suburbanites.’59 In other words, the collapse of communism and the emergence of 
neoliberal policies under Putinism heralded a redefinition of social-spatial dynamics, 
whereby public space was aggressively co-opted and restructured, resulting in the 
exclusion of marginalised members of society. Contextualising these theoretical ideas, 
social scientists Jolanta Aidukaite and Christian Fröhlich identify that in cities in the 
former Soviet Union, the politics of public space has taken a prominent place. Russia 
has been ‘subject to ongoing neoliberal urban redevelopment’, write Aidukaite and 
Fröhlic.60 ‘Housing privatisation and marketisation, as well as the withdrawal of the 
state from housing and urban policy since the 1990s, have provoked the mobilisation 
of citizens concerned about housing and local public space.’61 In Putin’s Russia, both 
public and private space has been coerced by a plutocratic neo-liberal economic 
regime, and has fallen into the hands of the wealthy. 
In Plasticine, Sigarev further addresses the contentious political reassignment 
of public and private space in post-Soviet Russia in a series of scenes where Maksim 
and Lyokha illicitly smoke in the male toilets at their school. As the two teenagers 
silently pass a single cigarette between them and waft away the smoke to avoid 
detection, their female Russian-language teacher Ludmila Ivanovna enters the space 
catching them in the act. The redefining of space and who controls it is interrogated 
through the invasion of a room considered by Maksim and Lyokha to be sacrosanct 
from adults and teachers. As Maksim tells Ludmila: ‘You’ve got no right to come into 
the men’s toilets’62 Despite this, female teacher Ivanovna repeatedly invades the 
space designed for male students until Maksim retaliates by molding a large plasticine 
phallus that he flashes at a terrified Ludmila when she again confronts them in the 
toilets.  The production calls up the politicisation of spatial reconstruction in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 ‘The neoliberal regime that has taken hold of political and cultural power around the world involves 
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is a central strategy of that neoliberalism.’ Low and Smith (2006) 15. 
59 Mitchell and Staeheli (2006) 144. 
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1990s and 2000s, including how younger and economically disadvantaged sections of 
society have been subordinated during the re-defining of public and private space in 
Putin’s Russia. Ludmila’s physical interrogation of Maksim, where she aggressively 
invades his personal space, resonates with Konstantin Axenov, Isolde Brade and 
Evgenij Bondarchuk’s observations that ‘political and institutional changes, the 
disintegration of established social structures and the introduction of market 
mechanisms have been concomitant with fundamentally new process of spatial 
differentiation’ in modern Russia.63 
 
Articulating the Unspeakable: Language and communication 
Sigarev interrogates Russia’s burgeoning economic inequality by offering important 
insights into contemporary social and political issues encountered by marginalised 
young people living in the provinces. In addition to calling into question the 
redefinition of space in Putin’s Russia, the exclusion of the poor from the normative 
discourse of the regime is another issue that is foregrounded by Sigarev. Maksim’s 
silent sculpting of plasticine in the play’s opening scene, a visual motif repeated at 
later intervals throughout Plasticine, underscores his inability to fully communicate or 
express his anger and despair at the perpetual injustices he endures. In his stage 
directions Sigarev makes clear that Maksim’s mercurial plasticine models manifest 
deep emotions that he is unable vocally to express:  
 
The remains of the plasticine hiss, catching light, and flare up. Smoke rises to 
the ceiling and goes in his eyes. The tears well up. He turns away, but the 
tears continue to roll down his nose and then down to the corners of his 
mouth. Now he is actually crying. He is sobbing. Crying as if he knew 
something.64 
 
The production directly draws the audience’s attention to a concern that the poor and 
the young cannot vocally express themselves. The dialogue is terse and often reduced 
to monosyllabic exchanges between the characters. In an interview given in 2001, 
Serebrennikov explains that in his production at the CDR he stripped back the plot to 
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focus on the characters’ lack of verbal expression.65 As Serebrennikov himself states, 
much of Sigarev’s theatrical language revolves around words and utterances such as 
‘fuck’, ‘yeah’ ‘uh-huh’ and ‘suck’.66 Key scenes in the play are often performed in 
complete silence, or stylistically mimed to music. The upright piano that remains on 
stage becomes a central focus of the production. Throughout the performance the prop 
supersedes dialogue as the primary dramatic expression of agon between Sigarev’s 
protagonists, as the actors use the instrument to fill verbal gaps in the text and 
substitute for vocal expression, imparting the characters’ desire to vocalise their 
emotions and be heard. Explicitly, when Maksim’s neighbour confronts him in the 
hallways of their communal apartment, mistakenly accusing him of setting fire to his 
letterbox, he unstraps his belt and savagely gags Maksim him with it. This act renders 
Maksim verbally unable to defend himself against his neighbour’s accusations, and 
reduced to uttering unintelligible grunts and wavering cries through the leather belt.  
 The inability to communicate verbally also determines Maksim’s attempt to 
form meaningful relationships with his peers. After being caught smoking by 
Ludmila, Maksim and Lyohka’s adolescent prurience leads them to break in through 
the exit door of their local cinema to watch Caligula, which had previously been 
branded as pornographic by the Soviet state.67 As Russian composer Sergei 
Prokofiev’s score Dance of the Knights, the soundtrack to the movie, is blasted over 
the speakers at the cinema, Maksim and Lyohka sit in silent enthrallment watching 
the movie. In Serebrennikov’s production the two actors sit downstage, making direct 
eye contact with the audience. As the film’s score reaches an apogee Maksim and 
Lyokha’s hands slowly drift towards each other and in the darkened cinema they 
mutually masturbate each other. Serebrennikov stages the scene as a comic pastiche 
of masturbation, where the two actors vigorously shake bottles of fizzy drink until 
they explode over themselves and the audience seated in the front rows of the theatre. 
The scene’s slapstick, stylised performance acts as comic relief in the production, but 
is nonetheless a challenging piece of staging in a country that had only legalised 
homosexuality in 1993. Maksim and Lyokha’s are not able to express their sexual 
desire for each other outside of physical action. Despite attempting to create intimate 
relationships throughout the play, Maksim ultimately fails to do so. For Maksim, the 	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plasticine models he creates are a surrogate for his stunted parlance and frustrations at 
the injustices he experiences at the hands of the powerful adults. In this way, Sigarev 
examines how the young in provincial Russia have been excluded from the public 
sphere and silenced from participating in the normative discourse. 
So far we have observed how Plasticine addresses explicit anxieties in 
contemporary Russia, including the Putin regime’s co-option of space and the 
silencing of Maksim’s generation from contributing their own social and political 
discourse. In the following analysis of Sigarev’s play, I will examine the established 
hierarchies and class divide encountered by Maksim and how Plasticine makes use of 
and reimagines traditional imagery from Russian history and culture, framing the play 
in an explicitly Russia context.  
 
Staging Divides 
Russian theatre scholar Yulia Girba has observed a further staging device used in 
Serebrennikov’s production of Plasticine at the CDR, namely a chorus of old female 
pensioners, ‘among them actors who pronounce the text with rough smoky voices 
[…] a genuine Greek choir which comments and moves the poetic and metaphorical 
plot’.68 The production presents this ‘chorus’ of pensioners as a silent but constant 
presence during the performance. Scene twenty-six, when Maksim is sent by his 
grandmother to purchase discounted meat at the shopping centre given out during the 
local elections, arguably demonstrates Sigarev’s most interesting use of his chorus. As 
I have discussed above, one of the results of Putin’s early economic policies was the 
drop in living standards of pensioners, and in many way this scene is paramount to the 
understanding of the play. Sigarev’s bleak portrayal of provincial city life at the turn 
of the millennium has led Beumers and Lipovetsky to assert that Plasticine evokes the 
spirit of preeminent Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s description of carnival 
humour and the grotesque in his book Rabelais and his World:  
 
[Plasticine] captures the moment when the carnival disorder – in many 
respects characteristic for the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet 
system with its symbolical and social order – turns into the norm of existence, 
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when liminality becomes permanent, when all mechanisms of the social 
protection of identity disappear completely.69 
 
An established principle of Bakhtin’s carnival, however, is that it marks the 
‘suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions.’70 What is 
significant about scene twenty-six is that it diverges from the carnivalesque insofar as 
the entrenched hierarchical system of the early years of Putinism are fully formed and 
intact. Sigarev demonstrates a preoccupation with the paradoxes and contradictions of 
twenty-first century Russia, where nascent consumerism, wealth, and privilege is 
negated by extreme poverty and a loss of social support structures for the 
marginalised.  
On one side of the stage the aggregation of pensioners stand rhythmically 
snapping their plastic shopping bags as they slowly advance in the queue. Not only 
does this raise the spectre of iconic images of protracted queues for basic products 
during the late Soviet Union, but it also attests to the erosion of welfare, and the 
growing poverty and hardship in Russia’s provinces.71 For these pensioners the 
benefits of new Russia have evaded them. Juxtaposed to the chorus on the other side 
of the stage, is Maksim’s romantic interest Tanya – also referred to as ‘She’ in 
Sigarev’s playtext. In contrast to the black robes worn by the pensioners, Tanya is 
dressed fully in red, and unlike their restrained repetitive movements she moves freely 
around the stage. This staging recalls the analysis in the opening section of the chapter 
that the Putin administration’s pursuit of neo-liberal economics has sacrificed a 
stratum of Russian society for the prosperity of a small section of the population.72 As 
Lilia Shevtsova identifies, ‘the gap between the haves and have-nots was growing, 
and the average incomes of the 10 percent richest exceeded those of the 10 percent 
poorest by a multiple of 15.2 in June 2004.’73 Moreover, the dialogue between Tanya 
and her mother, where she demands that she purchase her a pair of expensive high-
heeled sandals, invites the audience to consider the growth of consumerism and the 
gap between those who can afford to indulge in it and those who can’t: 
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SHE: Look at these beauties 
MOTHER: I can see them. (She turns to leave) 
SHE: Buy them, Mum 
MOTHER: Haven’t you got enough sandals? 
SHE: Not like these 
MOTHER: You’ve got others 
[…] 
SHE: Stupid cow! You’d have bought them for Galka but you don’t want to 
buy them for me. Stupid cow! I hate you! I’m going to live with Dad! And you 
can go and live with your Galka! Two stupid cows together!74  
 
Tanya, as a manifestation of the new middle classes is oblivious to those who are 
materially far poorer than her, and her manipulation of her mother results in the 
disdain of the shopping centre’s clientele.  What is important about this scene is it 
demonstrates Sigarev distancing himself from the Bakhtinian reading employed by 
Beumers and Lipovetsky. For Bakhtin, the carnivalesque symbolises a ‘temporary 
suspension, both ideal and real, of hierarchical rank created during carnival time a 
special type of communication impossible in everyday rank.’75 In other words, 
Bakhtin’s Carnival offers a suspension of the status quo and class privileges, 
providing specific sections of medieval society a platform to vocalise their own 
marginalised discourses, and the opportunity for them to travesty the ruling elite. 
Although Plasticine does highlight and give voice to disempowered social groups, I 
contend the production rigorously entrenches the new class divisions that were 
emerging in post-Soviet Russia, underscoring normative class divisions represented in 
the dissonance between Tanya and Maksim.  
Throughout Plasticine, Sigarev articulates the divarication between what 
Shevtsova terms the ‘haves and have-nots’ under Putinism and explores this in his 
examination of the divergent consequences faced by Maksim and Lyokha after their 
confrontation with Ludmila in the school toilets. Maksim is expelled after his 
grandmother, who is unsuspecting of his behaviour, is unable to defend him in front 
of the school’s headmaster. In contrast, Lyokha’s mother uses her power and 
connections as the owner of a local swimming pool to bribe Ludmila into overlooking 	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Lyokha’s involvement. Sigarev’s depiction of the divergent fates of Maksim and 
Lyokha reinforces the class stratification of modern Russia, and echoes the discourses 
of a number of Russian commentators who foreground the political consequences of 
Putin’s economic polices on the provinces. Plasticine presents a clear engagement 
and problematisation of the socio-political context of Putin’s early years in power, 
which saw the appearance of a middle class and a growing divide between them and 
the newly created Russian ‘underclass’, represented by both Maksim and the chorus 
of pensioners.   
The chorus of pensioners is not the only time the production evokes traditional 
imagery from the Russian and the Soviet past, incorporating it into the contemporary 
world depicted in Plasticine. In his important study Performing History: Theatrical 
Representations of the Past in Contemporary Theatre, Freddie Rokem identifies the 
potential of theatre and performance to confront ongoing debates and cultural identity 
surrounding the past. ‘Collective identities, whether they are cultural/ethnic, national, 
or even transnational, grow from a sense of the past’, writes Rokem.76 ‘The theatre 
very forcefully participates in the ongoing representations and debates about these 
pasts, sometimes contesting the hegemonic understanding of the historical heritage on 
the basis on which these identities have been constructed, sometimes reinforcing 
them.’77 Theatre scholar Molly Flynn has further identified that Russian playwrights 
in the twenty-first century have staged history to interrogate anxieties in 
contemporary society.78 In Plasticine, Sigarev does not reinterpret specific historical 
moments, but rather deliberately plays with imagery from Russia’s historical past to 
confront and make sense of contemporary social and political realities.  
In the Russian tradition that dates back to the Tsardom of Russia in the 
sixteenth and seventieth centuries - prior to Peter the Great’s policy of westernisation 
of the Russian Empire in the early 1700s - red costumes were worn by women in rural 
communities during wedding ceremonies, associating red outfits with signs of fertility 
and female sexual maturity in pastoral settings. In Serebrennikov’s performance, 
Viktoriia Tolstoganova who played Tanya, is dressed exclusively in red, wearing a 
red beret, overcoat and tights. As the unobtainable representation of Maksim’s desire, 	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Tanya’s outfit is a visual signifier of his inability to transition into adulthood. 
Throughout Plasticine, sex, or the promise of sex, is never comprehensively fulfilled 
for Maksim and is always followed by violent acts of aggression towards him. As has 
been discussed earlier, Maksim’s sexual encounter with Lyokha results in him being 
attacked by a gang of his peers after Lyokha betrays him. In scene eighteen, Maksim 
is again humiliated when after a brief sexual encounter with a prostitute he vomits on 
her and is rejected. Similarly, when Maksim passes a drunken wedding party and is 
seduced by the bride, despite rejecting her advances, he is savagely beaten by the 
groom. Finally, the pair’s rape is ultimately the result of Lyokha being tricked by the 
sadistic adolescent Natasha, who leads them to a block of uninhabited barracks with 
the promise of sex. Again in this scene coloured garments are used to evoke the 
liminality between childhood and maturity. As Maksim and Lykoha prepare to go out 
and meet Natasha, they change out of their dark casual clothes and dress in all white 
suits. The colour of their dress is significant and evokes traditional Russian 
codification of white clothes as an external signifier of transiting social roles, often 
from child to adult. Maksim and Lyokha anticipate that by having sex with Natasha 
they will achieve maturity and transition into adulthood. In Plasticine sex, and the 
loss of one’s virginity becomes an important transition into adulthood. In the dialogue 
between Lyokha and his rapist this is made particularly apparent:  
 
CADET: You still a virgin then? 
LYOKHA: What? 
CADET: Still a little boy?79 
 
Maksim’s failures and repeated humiliations, coupled with the Cadet’s assertion, 
suggest to Sigarev’s audience that Maksim’s generation are stunted in their ability to 
develop into adulthood. They are part of a generation that has been forgotten and left 
behind, marked by the stigma of being a ‘lost generation’.  
 
Plasticine and its Reception 
In this closing section on the play, it is worth exploring the reception of the critics to 
the productions of Plasticine in Moscow and London. A number of British critics 	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interpreted Plasticine as a return to the ‘gritty realism’ of nineteenth century Russian 
literature and theatre. Others, however, saw the play as continuing in the tradition of 
British ‘In-Yer-Face’ theatre popularised by the Royal Court in the 1990s. In his 
review of the London production, Michael Billington suggests that Sigarev was 
attempting to write a ‘Russian Shopping and Fucking’.80 Likewise, Charles Spencer’s 
review for The Telegraph described the production as ‘bog-standard, ‘In-Yer-Face’ 
theatre.’81 ‘In-Yer-Face’ was the appellation given by theatre critic Aleks Sierz to a 
new generation of young British playwrights who emerged in the 1990s. Sierz sees 
‘In-Yer-Face’ as a provocative, taboo breaking, subversive mode of theatre that 
evokes strong and resonant emotions in its audience, while other scholars have further 
argued that ‘In-Yer-Face’ theatre has a ‘territory of social realism’.82 Interestingly, 
Russian critics also made similar observations to their British counterparts in their 
reviews of Plasticine. Reviewing the CDR’s production for newspaper Vedomosti, 
Oleg Zintsov writes that ‘Plasticine looks like a Russian analogue of the most radical 
British plays of the 90s’, specifically recalling the plays of Ravenhill and Kane 
produced at the Royal Court. Comparatively, Vasenina also made a direct reference 
between the play and Ravenhill’s Shopping and Fucking in her review for Novaya 
Gazeta.  
 In my analysis of Plasticine, I argue that Sigarev uses specifically Russia 
imagery from both Soviet and Tsarist history to interrogate contemporary anxieties 
about bourgeoning inequality and the marginalisation of Russia’s provinces. By 
framing these contemporary narratives in the context of Russian culture, Sigarev asks 
his audience to consider the play within a specifically Russian context. I contend that 
comparisons to British ‘In-Yer-Face’ theatre are reductive, and ignore Plasticine’s 
important engagement with Putinism and the mutable political context of the early 
2000s. By illuminating the marginalised and disempowered social groups in the 
provinces through the exploration of space and language, Plasticine dismantles one of 
Putinism’s foundation myths that the regime brought economic stability and 
prosperity across the country.  
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Moscow and the provinces: Sigarev’s Black Milk 
Plasticine is an important play that developed the aesthetics of New Drama. 
Serebrennikov’s innovative production at the CDR set the criterion for New Drama 
performances, with the use of street clothes, minimal set dressing, and intimate 
staging with close proximity between the actors and audience. Contemporaneously, 
Sigarev’s linguistic use of mat, and the play’s interest in provincial life, alongside the 
widening gap in the standards of living positioned Plasticine as an anterior play in the 
New Drama canon. In Plasticine, Sigarev depicts the depravation and bleakness of 
provincial Russian life. His next play Black Milk, explicitly addresses the differences 
between Moscow and the provinces and the extent to which communities in the east 
felt excluded from the discourse of Putinism that proclaims a ‘united Russia’. Unlike 
Plasticine, Black Milk focuses on ideas of money and economy in Putin’s Russia. 
Black Milk is a departure from the darkly surreal tones employed by Sigarev in 
Plasticine, and its use of comic tropes and characters to subvert the perceived 
difference between the capital and Russia’s rural communities foregrounds a 
burgeoning anxiety with Moscow’s financial exploitation of the provinces. Black Milk 
is arguably a more candid play than Plasticine, and at its fulcrum is an urgent comic 
dialogue that explores differing attitudes and communities in twenty-first century 
Russia.  
A year after Plasticine’s première at the CDR, Sigarev’s second full length 
play Black Milk opened at Moscow’s Gogol Theatre in September 2002, directed by 
the theatre’s then artistic director Sergei Yashin.83 Like Plasticine, the play was 
staged by the Royal Court a year later in an English-language translation by Sasha 
Dugdale, and was positively received by British critics. Although staged in the less 
intimate space of the Gogol Theatre, many of the aesthetic and linguistic elements of 
Plasticine were also employed in Black Milk, including the use of contemporary street 
costume. Departing from the fragmented structured of Plasticine, Sigarev divides the 
play between two acts, which in the narrative of the play take place ten days apart 
from each other.  
As the performance begins, an emotive diegesis is provided by a narrator who 
enters the stage alone, introducing to the audience the themes of the play and setting 
the scene for the rest of the performance. Directly addressing the audience, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In August 2012 Yashin stood down as artistic director of the building. His successor, Kirill 
Serebrennikov renamed the space the Gogol Centre. 
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narrator describes the location of the play’s action, setting it in contrast to the 
audience’s physical location at the Gogol Theatre in central Moscow: 
 
Where should I start? I don’t know… with the name of the town, maybe? Well 
it’s not exactly a town. Not even a largish village. Definitely not a village. In 
fact, it’s not really even a populated place. It’s a station. Just a station. 
Somewhere in the middle of My Boundless Motherland. But when I say 
middle, I don’t mean at the heart. Because My Boundless Motherland is a 
strange animal and its heart, as everyone know, is located at its head.84 
 
In these opening lines of the production, Sigarev alludes to a traditional Russian 
proverb from the nineteenth century that proclaims Moscow to be Russia’s ‘head’. 
Sigarev highlights both the geographical expanse between Moscow and Russia’s 
provinces, but also, as the play later reveals, the divergent attitudes towards the 
country’s newfound wealth in these disparate communities. The narrator continues to 
explain to the audience the setting for the play, revealing the name of the village to be 
Mokhovoye, adding that it is November and that there is snow covering the ground. 
He also indicates the exact setting for the action that occurs in Black Milk, the interior 
of Mokhovoye’s barren railway station, which he describes as the ‘wooden building 
with a slate roof, standing next to the railway track’.85 The set of the Gogol Theatre’s 
production, designed by Elena Kachelaeva, reflects the narrator’s spartan description 
of the waiting room, with only a dilapidated ticket counter and a row of broken 
wooden seats included on stage. Across the back wall of the performance space runs a 
line of railway tracks, which Russian theatre critic Maria Odina interprets as 
connecting the Gogol Theatre’s location behind the Kurskii railway station, one of the 
principal railway terminals in Moscow. Odina contends that the railways lines 
running off into the distance on stage appear as a continuation of Kurskii station, 
reinforcing the ‘alienation’ of Mokhovoye’s location in the remote provinces and its 
spacial detachment from Moscow.86 
 The narrator continues to describe the station’s waiting room in further detail 
noting the squalid left luggage lockers and unpainted walls. Before long however, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Sigarev (2003) 3. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Odina (2002).  
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is interrupted by a collection of loud voices off stage that anticipates the entrance of a 
young man and women, who open the door to the ticket hall and enter the playing 
space. The duo that enter are Lyovchik and his pregnant wife ‘Poppet’, a disputatious 
couple from Moscow, who have been unscrupulously selling inferior Chinese 
‘supertoasters’ to unsuspecting locals in the provinces of the ‘boundless 
motherland’.87 As the couple enter the station their supercilious revulsion at the lack 
of cleanliness of both the station and the inhabitants of Mokhovoye raises questions 
about the stereotypical prejudices held by urbanites on life in rural provinces, and 
further sets up the city versus countryside narrative that is the crux of the play. 
 As has been examined earlier in this chapter not only did Putin’s economic 
policies herald a widening in the gap between rich and poor, but also heightened 
economic divisions between wealthy urban areas in the west of the country, and rural 
regions in the provinces. In the play’s first act, this divide is evoked through Lyovchik 
and Poppet’s tense interactions with the locals who confront them at the train station. 
Although Lyovchik and Poppet’s visit to Mokhovoye has been a business success and 
they have succeeded in offloading a multitude of toasters to the unsuspecting 
villagers, they soon realise that due to the limited train service they will have to spend 
the night in the station before the first train back to Moscow the next morning. 
Despite this, Lyovchik and Poppet’s business acumen remains and they succeed in 
selling a toaster to the ticket clerk at the station who purchases the defective 
machinery even though she sees through the couple’s ruse. The dialogue between 
Lyovchik and the clerk foregrounds that the young Muscovites are out of touch with 
the realities of life outside of their city and the actual needs of their customers that 
they hawk their imported supertoasters to: 
 
CLERK: You haven’t got any winter boots? 
LYOVCHIK: ‘Fraid not 
CLERK: Shame. I’d have taken the boots. I’m in these felt ones. No gloves?88 
 
When the villagers, who have tracked the couple to the station, confront them 
after realising they have been conned into making purchases they don’t need through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 In the playtext’s list of characters, Sigarev notes that Poppet’s real name is Shura. However, 
throughout the script she is referred to as ‘Little’ (Melkii). In my analysis of Black Milk, use Sasha 
Dugdale’s translation of her sobriquet as ‘Poppet’. 
88 Sigarev (2003) 13. 
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Lyovchik and Poppet’s chicanery, Poppet is startled into labour by a local alcoholic 
Mishanya, who fires a rifle loaded with blanks in a drunken stupor. Here, Sigarev 
plays on a satirical paradox, that while Lyovchik and Poppet have outwitted the 
residents of Mokhovoye, their basic lack of knowledge about pregnancy is exposed: 
 
 POPPET: But how come? It’s too early. 
CLERK: Well no one asked you. You’re giving birth and that’s it. 
LYOVCHIK: But how come? It’s too early. 
CLERK: How many months? 
POPPET: Eight 
CLERK: That’s it then. Why did you decide to come to the middle of nowhere 
just when you were due? 
LYOVCHIK: But people have babies after nine months… 
CLERK: Who told you that? 
LYOVCHIK: That’s how it’s always been. Says in books.89 
 
Despite being well read, Lyovchik and Poppet fail when it comes to their erudition 
about the basic act of childbirth, demonstrating a gulf in attitudes between the 
Moscow couple and the inhabitants of Mokhovoye.  Indeed, much of the text focuses 
on a comic dialogue between imagined representations of Moscow and the provinces. 
The play is perhaps, best summed up by the speech made by the ticket clerk to Poppet 
and Lyovchik after the dialogue above: 
 
When you get back to [Moscow] you can tell them how people live in Russia, 
‘cause they don’t have the faintest idea. Even if God was supposed to knock 
us out equal, we’re only equal on the outside. Two arms, two legs and a head 
with a body. Every other way we’re different. We’re so different it’s 
frightening.90 
 
The clerk’s speech allows Sigarev’s primarily urban, Muscovite audience to consider 
the wider economic and geographical divisions in twenty-first century Russia, and 
additionally invites them to interrogate their own prejudices about rural society.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid. 34. 
90 Ibid. 35. 
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Furthermore, as has been detailed above critics of the Putin regime including 
Navalny and Politkovskaia have underscored how the glaring neglection of the 
Russian provinces by the Kremlin represents the inherent corruption and failing of 
Putinism. Politkovskaia’s sardonic statement quoted earlier in this chapter that 
‘Moscow is life-giving warmth and light, while the provinces are its pale reflection, 
and those who inhabit them might as well be living on the moon’ reflects a concern 
that the growing divide in both attitudes and wealth between the provinces and the 
west of Russia is dangerous and harmful to the solidarity of the country’s citizens. 
That Muscovites see provincials as ‘from the moon’ implies that they have little 
compassion for them or interest in supporting them for the greater good of Russia. 
Although Sigarev has never publically expressed dissent again the Putin regime, it can 
be assumed that he would expect his audience to recognise the polemical similarities 
between the opinions voiced in Black Milk and the opposition movement.  
The action continues in act two, which is set ten days later in the same station, 
as Lyovchik and Poppet prepare to return to Moscow with their new born baby. The 
second half of the play signals a reversal in the imagined contrasts between the capital 
and Mokhovoye. While in act one the inhabitants are portrayed as violent and 
uncultured alcoholics, Poppet is now attached to life in Mokhovoye, and denounces 
her previously held Muscovite values. Poppet, who has been deeply affected by the 
generosity shown by the inhabitants of the town, experiences a conversion to the rural 
lifestyle of the village and proposes to Lyovchik that they stay, using the proceeds 
from their Moscow apartment to help re-build the town. When Lyovchik replies 
mockingly, Poppet violently accosts him with her appraisal of urban morality:  
 
It’s trendy to be a bitch there…. Trendy to hate and look down on everyone. 
You look at them and feel bitter inside. They look at you and feel bitter inside. 
Everyone joins in…it’s like we’re doomed. Little boy comes up to you in the 
street and asks for bread and you tell him to fuck off. Even if something inside 
you wants to give him a few kopecks. But you tell him to fuck off. ‘Cause no 
one else gives him any money, so why should you.’91 
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Poppet’s speech is a damning attack on Moscow society and the neo-liberal 
capitalism she and Lyovchik exploit. It is a polemical rejection of nouveau middle 
class values in Russia by Sigarev. As Ben Judha observes, these factions in Russia 
disdained the new middle classes accusing them of ‘thinking only as consumers, 
rather than citizens.’92 The role played by the village of Mokhovoye in the second act 
of the play epitomises Poppet’s desire to reject the ‘trendy’ cynicism of Putin’s 
Russia. She finds moral afflatus in the simplicity of rural life, and idealises the 
possibility of raising her daughter in the countryside. Poppet’s imagined future, 
paradoxically contrasts with Siagrev’s portrayal of the inhabitants of Mokhovoye in 
Act One as violent and hostile towards outsiders, especially those from Moscow. 
Poppet’s desire to reject her urban life and help restore the village of Mokhovoye is 
ultimately undermined by the play’s final scene, when she joins Lyovchik on the 
returning train to Moscow. For Poppet, the all-consuming allure of the city and 
capitalism proves to be inescapable and inevitable. As I shall now further examine, by 
juxtaposing Moscow and Mokhovoye as polarised societies in direct conflict with 
each other, Sigarev articulates specific anxieties about Putinism’s response to the 
widening inequality in contemporary Russia. 
 
Temporality and the Provinces 
Some reviewers of the Gogol’s Centre’s production surmise that in Black Milk, 
Sigarev employs stock comic themes of urban cynicism pitted against rural naivety. 
For example, Rudnev summarises that Black Milk plays on easy archetypal myths that 
rural Russian life is simplistic and idyllic, but marred by rampant alcoholism.93 
Similarly to Rudnev, John Freedman is critical of Yashin’s production at the Gogol 
Theatre, arguing that it ‘is blatantly constructed on stock characters and situations’94 
Arguably, however, Sigarev’s contrasting of rural and urban attitudes foregrounds the 
issues addressed in the play as a form of social debate. As in Plasticine, Sigarev 
depicts a world that is in spatial and temporal fluctuation and metamorphosis. In the 
narrator’s opening monologue he details the timetable at the local train station, 
announcing that:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Judah (2013) 143. 
93 Rudnev (2002). 
94 Freedman (2002)  
	   156	  
not even all the trains stop here. The 6.37 and 22.41 Eastbound and 9.13 
Westbound and that’s it. That is it…95 
 
Here, Sigarev sets out the premise that time can take on a different significance in 
provincial Russia. Additionally, it reminds his audience how since the collapse of 
communism rural communities have become increasingly marginalised and isolated 
from the rest of the country. As Russian theatre critic Grigorii Zaslavskii observes in 
his review of the play’s production at the Gogol Centre, ‘if the trains from the station 
[in Mokhovoye] went with Soviet regularity, the play would not have happened’.96  
The temporal dramaturgy of Black Milk is concerned with how time is 
interpreted differently in relation to spatial setting. In act one, Lyovchik and Poppet 
are astonished to discover Poppet has gone into labour, believing that it is too early in 
her pregnancy for her to give birth. Lyovchik explains to the ticket clerk at the station 
that it is impossible that Poppet’s water has broken because she is only eight months 
pregnant and that ‘people have babies after nine months’, knowledge he acquired 
from a book.97 Lyovchik and Poppet’s bookish assumption that birth will occur at a 
defined and fixed period nine months into a pregnancy suggests an understanding of 
time as fixed and linear. Sigarev presents Lyovchik and Poppet as part of a Moscow 
demographic that is insular and whose knowledge is acquired from books rather than 
lived experiences, highlights how time and linearity acquire different meaning in 
different geographical areas. 
Black Milk attempts to challenge the idea of Russian society as unified under 
Putin’s patriotic programme and state building exercises. Putin’s claim that the entire 
country is ‘united around patriotic values to overcome economic problems’ is 
interrogated and dismantled in Black Milk.98 In Sigarev’s text the other characters 
often disparagingly refer to Poppet as a young child. In particular, Lyovchik’s 
denigration of her in the second act repeatedly takes the form of insults that infantilise 
her: ‘how many abortions did you have, little girl?’; ‘What’s wrong, little girl?’99 In 
addition, the clerk at the station similarly asks Poppet ‘what you being like a little 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Sigarev (2003) 3. 
96 Zaslavskii (2002). 
97 Sigarev (2003) 34. 
98 Seddon (2016).  
99 Sigarev (2002) 58 and 59. 
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schoolgirl for?’100 In the Gogol Theatre’s production Poppet’s childlike demeanour is 
heightened by the fact that actor Alla Karavatskaya, who played Poppet, repeatedly 
eats Chupa Chups lollipops throughout the performance. Like Maksim in Plasticine, 
Poppet is portrayed as being in limbo, and unable to reach adulthood despite her 
desire to better herself and be a good mother. Although she becomes a parent in the 
second act she remains stuck in childhood and infantilised by her husband and the 
inhabitants of Mokhovoye. This is contrasted with Lyovchik’s description of Pasha, 
the generous woman who looks after Poppet after she gives birth and nurses her back 
to health, as a ‘chatty old lady’, despite being reminded Pasha is ‘only coming up to 
fifty.’101 Sigarev uses age to distinguish between the two disparate worlds of Moscow 
and Mokhovoye. Poppet’s infantilisation in contrast with description of Pasha as old, 
suggests the idea that Moscow represents the new Russia of Putinism. 
This temporality takes on a further political dimension in act one, when 
communist Mishanya enters the ticket hall in a drunken stupor. In Yashin’s 
production at the Gogol Centre, Mishanya wears a long winter coat with the name of 
leader of the Communist Party of Russia Gennady Zyuganov inscribed on the back. 
As Mishanya drunkenly staggers around the stage he evokes Russia’s communist past 
by singing traditional songs from the Soviet stage. In Mishanya’s comic dialogue with 
the clerk at the ticket booth, Sigarev further recalls the Soviet past, when Mishanya 
shouts ‘Answer, when Comrade Yezhov speaks to you!’102 The humorous context of 
Mishanya’s character raises serious points of contention about contemporary Russian 
politics. Firstly, its highlights the political discord in the country and how communist 
sympathies are still strong in rural areas. Furthermore, it shows the residents of 
Mokhovoye as being out of touch with modern politics. Instead they are entrenched in 
evoking Soviet communism rather than the new neo-liberalism and commercialism 
espoused by the Putin regime. 
Although Black Milk plays on easy comic targets and ‘stock’ stereotypes about 
the disparate characteristics of Moscow and the provinces, the production is a further 
example of how Sigarev’s dramaturgy directly responds to Putinism and echoes 
contemporaneous political anxieties expressed in contemporary Russia. Through the 
play’s comic engagement with Putinism’s erosion of the quality of life in the east of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibid. 34. 
101 Ibid. 43.	  
102 Ibid. 30. 
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the country, Sigarev eschews the official state narrative that the Russian electorate is 
unified behind the Putin regime.  
 
Conclusion 
The impact of economic and social degradation in the Russian provinces, both during 
the 1990s and the supposed ‘boom’ years under the Putin regime, was to effectuate 
the emergence of New Drama and its early thematics. The emergence of a 
consumerist middle class in the 1990s and subsequently under Putinism has helped in 
created a burgeoning divide in society, which Chebankova argues has resulted in ‘the 
most important socio-political problems, as well as the concerns of the largest share 
of the population [failing to be] properly articulated.’103 
Analysis of Sigarev’s two plays Plasticine and Black Milk in relation to the 
emerging debate about the concern over a widening gap in living standards and the 
creation of a new ‘underclass’ in Russia provides vital contexts for the examination of 
New Drama. In this chapter, I have argued that Sigarev’s theatre specifically 
examines provincial life as a starting point for provoking wider debate on the nature 
of Russian politics in the twenty-first century. The productions’ staging of the 
provinces establishes an important context in which theatre makers have sought to 
consider and critique the Putin regime’s economic policies, which have privileged 
Russia’s large cities in the west. By staging marginalised voices and oppositional 
discourses, these two plays articulate and make visible in a public sphere dialogues 
that subvert Putin’s state-building narrative of a ‘united’ and unified population. By 
foregrounding the political context of Plasticine and Black Milk, I have illuminated 
how these plays are rooted in the contemporary reality of twenty-first century Russia 
and Putinism. Plasticine is driven by the examination of social divides and hierarchies 
in contemporary Russia, through the use of space and language to stage and 
foreground demographics excluded from social and political discourse. In Black Milk, 
Sigarev creates a comic conflict between the urban and the rural that highlights social 
divides and subverts the normative discourse of an electorate united behind the 
policies of Putinism. 
 Furthermore, I have suggested that interpretations of Sigarev’s plays as 
archetypal reproduction of British ‘In-Yer-Face’ are reductive and simplistic. Instead, 	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Sigarev weaves Russia themes and contexts into the plays that make use of specific 
historical contexts from both Tsarist and Soviet Russia. I contend that these 
productions do not only hold up a mirror to the plight of the provincial poor for the 
entertainment of urbanite Russian and international audiences in the West, but instead 
form part of the important canon of New Drama plays that explicitly exert Russian 
themes to contextualise contemporary politics and Putinism, exposing their audience 
to alternative and marginalised discourses and oppositional ideas.  
In the final chapter of this thesis I will consider how theatre makers have 
employed documentary theatre techniques to respond the Putin regime’s manipulation 
of the legal system in a series of high profile trials. It will investigate the ways in 
which two significant documentary theatre plays produced by Teatr.doc have 
attempted to articulate contemporary anxieties about Putin’s ‘fictitious legalism’. The 
productions’ staging of verbatim testimony and the reproduction of physical 
documents encourages the audience to be active participants in the documentation of 
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Chapter Five: Dissent and Documentary: Performing 
Justice in Teatr.doc’s The Bolotnaya Square Case and One 




This chapter investigates how theatre makers in Russia have responded to the arrest, 
detention, and trials of those who have dared expose or challenge the power structure 
implemented by the Kremlin. In particular, since 2010 there has been an emergence of 
a national and international debate on the manipulation of the judicial system in 
Russia, emanating from the media coverage of high profile cases such as the trial of 
three members of the feminist punk-rock group Pussy Riot in 2012. A small, but 
vocal minority of Russian academics and commentators have suggested that the 
Russian legal system constructs judicial narratives tendentious to the Kremlin, while 
contemporaneously the authorities have repressed and destabilised those who seek to 
challenge and expose the extant corruption of the Putin regime.1 The litigious 
assailment of groups and individuals through the creation of mistrust and fear aims to 
further deter the spread of wider dissent towards the government.  
This chapter focuses on two documentary plays, The Bolotnaya Square Case 
(2015) by Polina Borodina and One Hour Eighteen Minutes (2010, expanded in 2012) 
by Elena Gremina, which both interrogate and construct their own notion of justice in 
Putin’s Russia. Both plays were originally staged at Moscow’s Teatr.doc, where I 
attended performances of One Hour Eighteen Minutes and The Bolotnaya Square 
Case in October 2012 and November 2015 respectively.2 One Hour Eighteen Minutes 
has been published in an English-language translation by Stephen Nuns and Yury 
Urnov in John Freedman’s Real and Phantom Pains: An Anthology of New Russian 
Drama, and although there is no commercially available script of The Bolotnaya 
Square Case, quotations appear courtesy of an unpublished copy of the text kindly 
shared with me by the play’s director Elena Gremina. The translation is my own.  
Scholarship on twenty-first century Russian drama has paid particular interest 
to the development of documentary theatre and use of verbatim techniques by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Rogov (2012), and human rights activist Lev Ponomaryov’s warning that Putin’s 
decision to slash the jury in trials from twelve members to six would produce greater impartiality and 
manipulation of the legal system, while favouring the prosecution. Berseneva (2015).  
2 I also saw a performance of The Bolotnaya Square Case when it was staged at the Stage Theatre 
Festival in Helsinki on 15 August 2015. 
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playwrights. As a result there is a significant body of work that details a variety of 
plays from 1999 onwards. Birgit Beumers and Mark Lipovetsky’s book Performing 
Violence dedicates a chapter to the rise of documentary theatre at Teatr.doc, focusing 
on Elena Gremina and Mikhail Ugarov’s play September.doc (2005). Molly Flynn’s 
unpublished thesis Documentary Theatre in Twenty-First Century Russia: teatr, v 
kotorom ne igraiut is the first full-length study of the explosion of documentary 
theatre in the 2000s and 2010s. In 2015, the Russian-language journal Teatr published 
a special edition devoted to documentary theatre, with articles and interviews from 
many of Russia’s leading theatre practitioners. These dynamic scholarly works have 
been vital in forming a wider understanding of the copious and varied documentary 
productions staged in Russia since 1999. Scholars underscore documentary theatre’s 
engagement with the political discourse of the 2000s through its ‘normalization of the 
abnormal’.3 These studies, however, make only passing reference to the context of 
Putinism and the opposition movement in their analysis of documentary theatre.  
This chapter examines the relationship between Russian documentary theatre 
and the Kremlin’s politicisation of justice and the legal system. Through close 
analysis of the performances of The Bolotnaya Square Case and One Hour Eighteen 
Minutes and this key facet of Putinism, I argue that Russian theatre-makers have 
employed documentary theatre techniques to challenge the social norms and 
discourses of the regime, while promoting engagement in civic activity. Interrogating 
these plays in the context of the opposition movement raises important questions 
about the origins of documentary theatre in Russia. Critical writing on Russian 
documentary theatre has acknowledged a wide variety of influences on the extensive 
canon of ‘theatre of the real’ performances produced since 2000.4 Some 
commentators, including Moscow-based theatre critic Elena Kovalskaya, 
acknowledge the influence of British drama and pinpoint the Royal Court’s series of 
workshops on verbatim theatre staged by the theatre’s International Department in 
1999 as the chairos moment in the evolution of Russian documentary theatre.5 
Contrastingly, others trace documentary theatre back to pre-existing dramatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 217.	  
4 For a definition of ‘theatre of the real’ see Martin (2013) 5. 5	  Kovalskaya (2015). Kovalskaya’s memorable analogy is that introducing Russian dramatists to 
verbatim theatre was like adding Mentos to a bottle of Sprite. Also see Beumers and Lipovetsky (2009) 
211.	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traditions originally developed in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.6 While these 
are vital theatrical lineages to consider, this chapter re-frames the contested genealogy 
of Russian documentary theatre by linking the performance of documents and 
evidence with a pertinent form of dissent and opposition that occurred in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, known as samizdat. Samizdat was a form of self-
publishing that re-produced literature doctored or banned by state censorship, 
including court proceedings and legal documents. 7 Central to defining samizdat is the 
importance placed on of the act of documentation itself. Russian dissident Vladimir 
Bukovsky attests that the creation, documentation, and re-production of these banned 
texts, facilitated by the technological advances in portable typewriters in the 1950s, 
were an important feature of protest against the Soviet goverment: ‘I would erect a 
monument to the typewriter, too. It brought forth a poem. It brought forth a new form 
of publishing, samizdat, or “self-publishing”: write myself, edit myself, censor 
myself, publish myself, distribute myself.’ 8 Considering samizdat as a paradigm for 
contemporary documentary theatre in Russia foregrounds the act of documentation 
and provides a fresh perspective of New Drama’s precarious engagement with 
Putinism. 
I open this chapter with a survey of a series of high-profile trials in 
contemporary Russia, linking them to anxieties over a potential return to Stalinist 
repression and an augmented scepticism of the integrity of the legal system. Next, I 
describe the influence of verbatim and tribunal theatre on Russian documentary 
theatre. While I acknowledge the important links these theatrical techniques have with 
the case studies, I supplement the narrative by introducing samizdat in the context of 
the productions’ consideration of the Russian juridical system and use of legal 
documentation. Through a close reading of The Bolotnaya Square Case, I move on to 
consider how Borodina’s use of verbatim testimony and documentation resists the 
official discourse of the Putin regime. Finally, this chapter considers how One Hour 
Eighteen Minutes demonstrates the importance of physical documentation as a 
provocation against the Putin regime’s whitewashing of politically motivated 
manipulations of justice.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For example, see Davidova (2015), Radosavljevic (2013), Mizoev (2004), Bolotyan (2004), 
Timasheva (2002), and Chepurov (2001).	  7	  See Feldbrugge (1975)19-20, Skilling (1989) 6-7, and Bukovsky (1978) 241.	  
8 Bukovsky (1978) 115. 
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Justice in post-Soviet Russia 
The election of Putin’s hand-picked successor Dmitry Medvedev as President in 2008 
led to the continuation of ‘Putinism without Putin’, and heralded a rise in 
authoritarian policies, violations of the rule of law, and attacks on civil society. The 
Medvedev administration continued to implement Putin’s authoritarian restrictions on 
media coverage and the activities of Non-Governmental Organisations. Writing three 
years into Medvedev’s term as president in 2011, scholar of Russian politics Stephen 
White opined that ‘press freedom [is] in further decline with the Kremlin relying on 
Soviet-style media management to facilitate a sensitive political transition to deflect 
responsibility for widespread corruption and political violence.’9 As Putin’s grip on 
power strengthened during the 2010s, through the implementation of a series of 
punitive political repressions on civil liberties and legislature, there has been a 
renewed debate on the re-politicisation of justice, which has led some commentators 
to consider the spectre of Stalinism, show trials, and the Great Terror in modern 
Russia. For example, commenting on the prosecution of opposition activists who 
protested at Bolotnaya on 6 May 2012, the Russian broadsheet newspaper Novaya 
Gazeta drew attention to the similarities between the manner of their arrests and the 
execution of Stalin’s purges.10 This is significant because, as Russian scholar 
Rosalind Marsh points out, in the 1990s the horrors of Stalinism were perceived to 
belong to a historical period that was no longer seen as relevant to or commensurate 
with post-Communist Russia.11 The stifling of free speech and civic activism by the 
Kremlin, particularly in the 2010s as Putin returned to the presidency, have been the 
trigger for a greater proportion of Russians to look back to Stalinism and the Soviet 
era as an analogy for contemporary politics. Putin’s re-election in February 2012 
marked a further turn in political repercussions towards those who criticise the power 
structures of Putinism. These trials against politicians and campaigners has varied 
from the global news coverage and international outcry of the trial and subsequent 
jailing for two years of Pussy Riot members Maria Alyokhina, Nadezhda 
Tolokonnikova, and Yekaterina Samutsevich on charges of hooliganism for their 
‘punk prayer’ in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour on 21 February 2012, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 White (2011) 355. 
10 Rogov (2012).  
11 Marsh (2007) 427. 
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the equally contested - although less cited in the western press - corruption charges 
brought against human rights activist and mayor of Yaroslavl, Yevgeny Urlashov, in 
2013.  
In the same Novaya Gazeta article referenced above, Russian academic Kirill 
Rogov has described what he terms ‘Putin’s fictitious legalism’.12 This can be defined 
as Putin’s repressive manipulation of the Russian legal system in order to attack his 
enemies and maintain unmitigated control of power in the Kremlin, coupled with the 
media saturation of a pro-Putin agenda that undermines these nascent threats to 
Putinism. In their coverage of events such as the anti-Putin protests of 2011-2012, 
state television channels broadcast biased material, such as NTV’s pseudo-
documentary The Anatomy of Protest, which aimed to polarise the opposition 
movement and create an atmosphere of fear amongst the general population by 
depicting the protestors as violent aggressors against the state and Russian morals. A 
pertinent example of this manipulation of the legal system to assail political 
challenges and disrupt the process of democracy in Russia has been the trial of 
oligarch and owner of the Yukos Oil Company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in December 
2010. A staunch critic of Putinism, Khodorkovsky had been jailed in October 2003 on 
charges of fraud and tax evasion, but had vociferously continued his polemical attack 
on the government from his prison cell. Viewed as one of the few genuine political 
threats to Putin’s autocracy, Khodorkovsky was tried again between March 2009 and 
December 2010 while still in prison, after new charges emerged of embezzling the 
entire oil production of Yukos and laundering the proceeds. His sentence was 
subsequently extended until 2017.13 Opposition supporters in Russia labelled the trial 
as ‘politically motivated’, and Khodorkovsky’s sentence was interpreted as clear 
evidence of political oppression in Russia spearheaded by the Kremlin against 
potential rivals to Putin and the regime.14 Public support for Khodorkovsky continued 
to be sympathetic and, in the campaign for the 2012 presidential election, all 
candidates, with the notable exception of Putin, pledged to exonerate him if elected. 
According to Richard Sakwa in his recent study of the Yukov affair, Putin and the 
Oligarch, by the end of 2011 only ten per cent of Russians considered the verdict of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Rogov (2012). 
13 Khodorkovsky was subsequently released on 21 December 2013 after being pardoned by Putin the 
previous day. He currently lives in exile in London. 
14 Guardian (2009). 
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the trial to be just.15 In a further damning indictment of the trial verdict in February 
2012 - the same month that Putin was re-elected for his third term as President of 
Russia - an official public inquiry into the 2009-2010 prosecution of Khodorkovsky 
asserted that the result had been ‘illegal’, and called for an annulment of the verdict 
and the immediate release of Khodorkovsky. In 2013 it was announced that Teatr.doc 
would be producing a new show on the Khodorkovsky affair, although to date this has 
yet to be staged.16 
A second example of Putin’s ‘fictitious legalism’ can be seen in the judicial 
affair from which one of this chapter’s case studies takes it name, the Bolotnaya 
Square Case. The Bolotnaya case revolved around the prosecution of 28 protestors 
who had participated in the Moscow demonstrations of 6 May 2012. The case takes it 
name from the square in central Moscow where an estimated 20,000 protestors had 
gathered to hear speeches from leading opposition activists such as Serge Udaltsov 
and Alexei Navalny. As evening approached, pockets of violence broke out as police 
clashed with the protestors and, by the end of the day more than 400 demonstrators 
had been arrested at the square. Most of those detained were quickly released without 
charge, as was often the case after protests; what happened next, however, was 
unexpected and unprecedented in post-Soviet Russia. In the following weeks and 
months, police and detectives gathered evidence on the violence and disorder during 
the rally, before staging a series of aggressive raids and arrests in the middle of the 
night. None of the 28 protestors arrested had police records, nor were any of them 
high-profile figures in the opposition movement. The activists represented a wide 
section of Russian society from young students to older professionals in their fifties. 
The protracted trial of the Bolotnaya protestors was condemned internationally by 
human rights groups, including Amnesty International who, after the conviction of 
eight members of the group in 2014, wrote that  
 
the defendants in this trial were confronted by abusive use of force by police. 
Some of them sought to prevent violence, others to protect themselves. A few 
were just caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. All are victims of a 
politically motivated show trial.17  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Sakwa (2014b) 152. 
16 Lenta.ru (2013). 
17 Amnesty International (2014). 
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To date, many charges are still being brought against the protestors, as the 
case continues to operate as a deterrent to discourage further anti-Putin activism or 
protest. The Bolotnaya Square case marked a turning point in twenty-first century 
Russian politics. It was the first time since the Communist era that there had been the 
wide spread prosecution of political protestors in Russia. The case was evidently 
designed to pressure the opposition into passivity and instill fear into anyone who 
might consider taking part in an anti-government demonstration. Additionally, at the 
same time that the protestors were being rounded up by the police in June 2012, the 
state Duma passed a new law imposing severe penalties for participation in 
unlicensed protests and political rallies - a further tactic to install an atmosphere of 
fear against anyone who might oppose the Putin regime. 
So far I have demonstrated the wider implications of the Kremlin’s use of the 
legal system to prosecute and deter activists and individuals who pose a threat to 
Putin’s authority. Firstly, the evocation of the spectre of Soviet repression and purges 
by Human Rights organisations and Russian commentators, unusual in Russia prior to 
Putinism, is an example of what some critics of the Kremlin see as Putin’s ‘fictitious 
legalism’, and a return to an era of censorship not seen since before Glasnost in the 
1980s. Secondly, a derivative of fictitious legalism was the propagation of a discourse 
in the state media, including NTV’s The Anatomy of Protest, which aimed to incite 
fear and suspicion into civic life dividing the populace against the anti-Putin 
movement. Finally, as the public reaction to Khodorkovsky’s trial and sentence in 
2010 demonstrates, there is a distinctive mistrust of the notion of justice in Russia. 
The draconian trials and jailing of Pussy Riot and the Bolotnaya Square protestors in 
2012 and beyond were intended to be interpreted as the actions of a strong leader 
bringing calm to the country and uniting it against a deviant faction in society. The 
results, however, have been the opposite. Russian society was left deeply fractured, 
and a sense of mistrust and general fear was entrenched in the electorate, right across 
the political divide.18 
Russian dramatists have responded to this upsurge in trials and questions on 
the notion of justice in contemporary Russia by employing documentary theatre 
techniques. In the following section, I will explore and historicise the extraordinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For example see Colta (2012). 
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rise in documentary theatre and the technique of verbatim among Russian dramatists 
in the 2000s. Linking back to this section, I will then identify and contextualise 
documentary theatre of the Putin era in relation to samizdat texts of Soviet Russia. 
While The Bolotnaya Square Case and One Hour Eighteen Minutes undeniably draw 
from the theatrical genealogies of verbatim theatre and tribunal theatre, I argue that 
samizdat’s concern for documenting trial proceedings allows us to use it as a further 
paradigm for understanding Teatr.doc’s staging of documentation in their 
interrogation of the state’s ‘fictitious legalism’.  
 
The Rise of Documentary in Russia 
According to theatre critic Pavel Rudnev, contemporary political theatre is 
synonymous with the technique of verbatim, and he succinctly argues that ‘the 
strongest political focus is visible in the documentary theatre movement’ exemplified 
by Moscow’s Teatr.doc, the Joseph Beuys Theatre, and the Baltic House Theatre in 
St. Petersburg.19 Verbatim theatre is an appellation first used by British theatre 
scholar Derek Paget in his seminal article ‘“Verbatim Theatre:” Oral History and 
Documentary Techniques’ to describe a ‘form of documentary drama which employs 
(largely or exclusively) tape-recorded material from the “real-life” originals of the 
characters and events to which it gives dramatic shape’.20 In the introduction to their 
book Verbatim Verbatim: Contemporary Theatre Practices, Will Hammond and Dan 
Steward further elucidate the definition of the practice:  
 
The term verbatim refers to the origins of the text spoken in the play. The 
words of real people are recorded or transcribed by a dramatist during an 
interview or research process, or are appropriated from existing records such 
as the transcripts of an official enquiry. They are then edited, arranged or 
decontextualized to form a dramatic presentation, in which actors take on the 
real individuals whose words are being used.21 
 
In the latter twentieth century, the verbatim theatre technique has emerged as a global 
practice used by a variety of practitioners to create a diverse theatrical body of work. 	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20 Paget (1987) 317. 
21 Hammond and Stewart (2008) 9. 
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As Hammond and Steward concede, the verbatim term ‘can be used to describe plays 
that are sometimes so dissimilar that the term may appear to be of little value.’22 The 
verbatim technique falls into what American theatre scholar Carol Martin terms 
‘theatre of the real’ that describes ‘documentary theatre, verbatim theatre, reality-
based theatre, theatre of fact, theatre of witness, tribunal theatre, nonfiction theatre, 
restored village performances, war and battle re-enactments, and autobiographical 
theatre.’23 In keeping with Hammond and Steward’s assertion that verbatim is a 
mercurial term that describes multiple techniques rather than a precise theatrical form, 
co-artistic director of Teatr.doc, Mikhail Ugarov, states that New Drama does not 
adhere to a ‘strict verbatim’ and that it is, instead, ‘used with a lot of options and a lot 
of prospects for a variety of applications in the theater.’24 In Russia, the verbatim term 
has manifested as a less formal technique than the one described by Paget and 
Hammond and Steward.  
As I have already set out in Chapter One of this thesis, the British notion of 
verbatim theatre was first introduced to Russian theatre makers through a series of 
seminars and playwriting workshops for young playwrights and directors staged by 
the Royal Court’s International Department in Moscow throughout 1999 and 2000. In 
the case of The Bolotnaya Square Case and One Hour Eighteen Minutes, I argue that 
what unites these two plays is their use of documents and the material act of 
documentation. It is therefore, important to take into account hisotrical further 
precedents for the significance of documentation and its consideration in the political 
context of Putin’s Russia. Given the context of this study it is useful to consider a 
specific development in Russian civic engagement that is analogous to verbatim 




The connection between Russian political dissent and documentation can be traced 
back to the turn from feudalism to capitalism in the 1860s and 1870s. Socialist 
agitators known as the Narodniks circulated unpublished political manifestos and 
tracts containing verbatim and quotidian adages in rural areas under the slogan of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid.  
23 Martin (2013) 5. 
24 Ugarov (2012). 
	   169	  
‘going to the people’. Under a growing climate of new political repression in the 
1920s, banned literature began to be reproduced and circulated independently of the 
state-controlled publishing houses. In the aftermath of the Stalin era, there was a 
further augmentation in the production and distribution of unauthorised documents 
and texts. After a brief period of liberalisation under the premiership of Nikita 
Khrushchev, there was a rescinding of cultural freedoms and personal expression.  
In the 1960s, the term samizdat (self-publishing) appeared as a means to describe the 
manifold collection of documents that ranged from reproductions of banned literary 
works such as Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago (1973) to political 
statements and provocations. Nadezhda Mandelstam’s memoir Hope Against Hope 
(1970), which vividly recalls the arrest, interrogation, and ultimately the death of her 
husband, the poet Osip Mandelstam, for his satirical portrayal of Joseph Stalin in 
1933 became an important part of this illicit literary canon in the 1960s, before it was 
published in an English-language translation in 1970. Although very few physical 
manuscripts of the text circulated, Mandelstam’s documentation of the events was 
further transmitted through word of mouth, entering the oral lore of Soviet Russia.25  
  This private reproduction of literature doctored or banned by official Soviet 
censorship for deviating from the accepted Communist discourse of the Soviet Union, 
was disseminated and shared among readers who were primarily comprised of the 
anti-Soviet intelligentsia. In other words, samizdat constituted an enlivening and 
dilating of civic discourse and debate, and was a vital form of dissent during the 
political and cultural stagnation of the Brezhnev years. Yuli Kim, a prominent 
dissident in the 1960s and 70s whose satirical songs form an important part of the 
body of samizdat material, writes in a self-published samizdat polemic: 
 
If there had been no ‘samizdat’ in Russian literature, we would have lost 
Radishchev’s novel [Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow], Woe from Wit 
of Griboyedov, and many poems by Pushkin. In our times as well, the 
solicitude of a group of readers towards the unpublished word will carry 
forward to better times the genuine creativity of our contemporaries.26 
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  See Holmgren (1993) 21-3.	  
26 Kim in Sosin (1975) 308. 
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Here, Kim articulates a specific concern that if periods of political and cultural 
repression are not recorded or documented they face the danger of being expunged 
from history and the populace’s cultural memories. Furthermore, Kim hints at the 
importance, not just of the creation of social commentary and subversive art, but of 
the ‘solicitude’ of its documentation and dissemination amongst the consumers. As 
has been suggested above, these anxieties about the manipulation of historical 
narratives to suit political motivations have been revived under Putinism, particularly 
in respect of the Russian legal system and the state media’s spinning of acts of 
opposition. In the twenty-first century, these concerns have found a prolocutor in the 
documentary plays of Teatr.doc, and the proliferation of statements made by Russian 
playwrights that address analogous unease about the verisimilitude of state-sanctioned 
discourses. In an interview given with American theatre academic Tom Sellar for the 
journal Theatre, Elena Gremina has attested to the importance of ‘speak[ing] up and 
[continuing] the dialogue [otherwise] it turns into a deeper neurosis’.27 In the 
programme for The Bolotnaya Square Case, director Gremina writes:  
 
Society in the case of the ‘Bolotnaya Affair’ could not change anything, so 
they just try to forget what has happened. But there are people who do not 
want this and cannot do so […] Teatr.doc could not shy away from this.28 
 
Audience members in the post-show discussions for The Bolotnaya Square Case have 
echoed these two statements, where it is often proclaimed that ‘this needs to be 
heard’. Anna Gaskarnova - wife of one of the jailed Bolotnaya protestors, and a 
participant in Teatr.doc’s verbatim research for the play – echoed this in a statement 
she gave after attending a performance of The Bolotnaya Square Case: 
 
I had always wondered whether anything except shame, three and a half lost 
years, and painful memories would remain after the Boltnaya Square trial, 
something decent and instructive – not for us relatives but for those [who] 
were there with us on Bolotnaya Square on May 6, 2012, and for those who 
were not. I think this question has stopped vexing me. Stalin’s purges have left 
us Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago and Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales. The 	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Bolotnaya Square case will leave behind Teatr.doc’s The Bolotnaya Square 
Case.29 
 
The connection made by Gaskarnova here is clear. The undertaking of the sharing and 
witnessing of samizdat documents and facts was an act of protest against the Soviet 
regime that allowed the traumatic history of the Stalin era to survive for future 
generations. Similarly, in The Bolotnaya Square Case the fact that the audience is 
able to hear and experience this testimony is in itself an act of opposition against the 
regime. By hearing the re-telling of these stories in a theatrical context the audience 
are participating in a form of dissent against Putin. Like the producers of samizdat in 
the 1960s, documentary theatre of the 2000s asserts the importance of witnessing 
these political acts and documenting and performing them in public spaces as a form 
of dissent and civic activity. The documentary plays of the 2000s and 2010s are part 
of a wider genealogy of Russian dissent and protest that is concerned with how the 
memory of politically troubled times are documented and remembered in the face of 
oppression. As political stagnation returned in the 1960s under Brezhnev, so did the 
proliferation of samizdat and documentation; and under the autocracy of Putinism, 
these fears are again being explored through the technique of verbatim theatre. 
Martin states that ‘inherent in the very idea of documentary is an anxiety about 
truth and authenticity.’30 Indeed, a deep concern about truth and authenticity is bound 
up with the Russian legal system and its potential for exploitation and politicisation 
by various governments. This is evident in both works of samizdat and the two 
contemporary examples of Russian theatre examined in this chapter. Anxieties around 
notions of justice in Russia have emphasised the importance of the veracity of 
documents, and resulted in the interrogation of trial procedures and sentencing results 
through the documentation and dissemination of testimony and suppressed texts. Both 
Ferdinand Feldbrugge and Gayle Hollander note, in their respective studies of dissent 
in the Soviet Union, that samizdat materials were often concerned with legal 
questions and notions of justice and were a conduit for documenting and protesting 
against Soviet trial practices.31 The concern of these documents was not only to reveal 
the nebulous functioning of Russia’s judiciary, but also to record the measures taken 	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by the Soviet government in repressing dissent among the liberal intelligentsia in 
Soviet Russia, and they were rarely published in an official, state sanctioned capacity. 
Samizdat producers disseminated trial reports including proceedings of criminal 
courts, psychiatric reports on dissidents, and official police reports about searches. 
The precedent for this was the publication of a White Book comprised by Alexsander 
Ginzburg on the trial of writers Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky in 1966, which 
marked a return to the politicised public trials of the Stalin era and was a kariotic 
moment in a return to political repression in the Soviet Union after the so-called 
Khrushchev Thaw. As was common with samizdat, the text was published widely 
throughout the West, including in an English-language translation entitled On Trial: 
The Case of Sinyavsky and Daniel (1967). The book contained transcripts of the court 
proceedings of the trial as well as letters directed to the authorities protesting about 
the verdict of the case, and press statements.  
The importance of these trial reports relied on the detailed transcriptions of 
official court proceedings and the proclaimed authenticity of the text. As Feldbrugge 
writes:  
 
Since […] February 1966, it has been the practice among Soviet dissidents to 
prepare verbatim reports (as far as possible) immediately after the trial by 
comparing notes (usually made surreptitiously) and relying on the memory of 
several observers. An impressive number of reports has been compiled in this 
way, providing not only a vivid account of the confrontation between the Soviet 
regime and its dissident citizens, but also rare information about the actual 
operation of the Soviet legal system. In many cases the final words spoken by the 
accused have been incorporated in the trial reports, but a number of speeches from 
the dock also circulate separately and for this reason have been included in this 
group of documents.32 
 
The samizdat trial transcriptions are concerned with capturing the authenticity and 
verisimilitude of the event (often in a courtroom setting) in a society where factual 
evidence is often spun into propaganda and to coerce acquiescence towards the 
regime. Soviet samizdat and the documentary productions staged by Teatr.doc are 	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cognate in their use of documentation and oral testimony to articulate a concern about 
the fictionalisation of justice and history under subsequent repressive regimes. 
Additionally, Teatr.doc continues the do-it-yourself aesthetics of samizdat, operating 
in small buildings not traditionally used as theatrical spaces, and without state 
funding. The literary nature of samizdat, however, meant that it was a mode of dissent 
widely produced and consumed in private, while the harsh penalties for spreading 
taboo texts restricted readership to a small number of accordant intelligentsia.33 
Documentary theatre in Russia, as I will further explore in this chapter, allows for a 
more direct form of dissent and protest towards the Putin administration due to its 
position of operating in a public and civic forum, which encourages debate and direct 
action. If samizdat made available censored documents and the testimony of Soviet 
dissent, Teatr.doc asks its audience, and by extension Russian society, to specifically 
consider how they themselves can become active accomplices in the opposition to 
Putin. 
 In this section I have set out the contexts in which verbatim theatre developed 
in Russia in the early twenty-first century. As well as tracing the lineage of verbatim 
theatre in Russia to both global theatre practices and Russian documentary traditions, 
I have investigated the rise of documentary theatre in the wider context of Russian 
opposition and dissent during the Soviet era. While the influence of Russia’s own 
theatrical history and the interventions by the Royal Court are important legacies that 
must be acknowledged, I want to suggests that there is also a historical precedent for 
the use of documentary forms during periods of heightened political repression in 
Russia. The rise of documentary theatre and verbatim practices by playwrights cannot 
be viewed in isolation from the political context of Putinism. Like samizdat texts in 
the era of stagnation, documentary theatre has burgeoned during a period when the 
spectre of Stalinist manipulation of trials has been raised and led to scepticism about 
the impartiality of the Russian judicial system. I will now consider these issues in 
relation to the case studies for this chapter, The Bolotnaya Square Case and One Hour 
Eighteen Minutes.  
 
Introducing the Plays 
Putin’s manipulation of the Russian legal system has established a new discourse 	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focused on the status of justice in Russia, and heightened anxieties around testimony 
and verisimilitude. Two verbatim plays created by Teatr.doc, The Bolotnaya Square 
Case and One Hour Eighteen Minutes analogously highlight these concerns and raise 
questions about the role the general public plays in its strengthening of the regime 
through passivity and apathy. Furthermore, both plays challenge pre-conceived 
notions of Russian documentary theatre and demonstrate how the practice has evolved 
during Putin’s presidency. 
These two plays are significant both for their similarities and differences. 
While they focus on perceived acts of political and judicial repression by the state, 
their approach and style are divergent. Additionally, the writers of the two plays, 
Polina Borodina and Elena Gremina, have contrasting backgrounds and represent two 
distinctive generations of Russian playwrights. Gremina was born in central Moscow 
in 1957 into a literary family of successful writers. Her father, Anatoly Grebnev, and 
her older brother, Alexander Mindadze were two of the most renowned and respected 
screenwriters in Russia during the twentieth century.  After graduating from the 
Gorky Literary Institute she made the decision to write under the pseudonym of 
Gremina in order to distance herself from her father’s success in the industry.34 Her 
first major production, The Myth of Svetlana (1984), performed at the Leningrad 
Theatre for Young Spectators, gained critical praise but was, however, subject to 
official state censorship. Over the next ten years Gremina wrote four more plays that 
were performed in Moscow with varying degrees of success. Her breakthrough came 
when the Moscow Arts Centre produced Behind the Mirror in 1994. The play starred 
opera singer Galina Vishnevskaya, whose fame brought an unexpected level of 
publicity to the production. Behind the Mirror achieved unprecedented levels of 
success for a new writing piece in post-Soviet Russia, and performances regularly 
sold out. Further success came with the production of The Sakhalin Wife (1996) at the 
House Actors Theatre, which commentators later highlighted as a turning point in 
attitudes towards new writing in Russia.35 After the establishment of Teatr.doc, 
Gremina stepped back from writing to help promote and produce the next generation 
of Russian playwrights. Sasha Dugdale of the British Council in Moscow, who 
worked with Gremina on the organisation of the New Drama Festival from 2002 to 	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2008, credits her as being responsible for the success of the contemporary new 
writing movement through her eye for talent and tireless work in securing funding and 
revenue for new productions.36  
In contrast, Borodina lives in the city of Ekaterinburg, east of Moscow in the 
Urals. Born in 1990, she is a graduate of Nikolai Koliada’s playwriting course at the 
Ekaterinburg State Theatre Institute. Borodina’s training ties her to the genealogy of 
New Drama and post-Soviet playwriting: Koliada emerged as a forbearer of New 
Drama in the 1990s and his school claims Oleg Bogaev and Vasilly Sigarev among its 
alumni. Before writing the The Bolotnaya Square Case, Borodina’s work had been 
staged at Teatr.doc as part of the Liubimovka New Writing Festival in 2014. In that 
year she co-wrote the play SashBash  with contemporary and fellow Ekaterinburg 
resident Yuroslava Pulinovich about the life of the cult Soviet rock poet Alexander 
Bashlachev. Borodina’s involvement in The Bolotnaya Square Case demonstrates the 
enduring legacy of documentary theatre in Russia, as it has been continued by a new 
generation of young playwrights looking to utilise the form to challenge the pro-Putin 
discourse disseminated by the state media. 
 Although both plays are described as documentary productions, the methods 
of research and reliance on verbatim testimony vary between the two plays. Research 
for The Bolotnaya Square Case had begun almost a year before the première, and 
Borodina spent months gathering material and testimony from family members of 
those arrested. This was subsequently edited and became the central body of the 
performance text. In contrast, One Hour Eighteen Minutes foregrounds the artistic 
licence taken by Russian playwrights when creating documentary theatre, 
substantiating Ugarov’s claim that Teatr.doc does not follow a ‘strict’ practice of 
verbatim theatre.37 The majority of the text is not verbatim material, but is instead 
sourced from a plethora of sources and documents including the diaries and letters of 
Sergei Magnitsky, interviews with Magnitsky’s family members, internet blogs and 
newspapers articles from Novaya Gazeta and Novoye Vremia.38 The documentary 
material drawn upon by the playwrights takes the form of both verbatim testimony 
and official legal documents, but additionally both productions stage physical 
documents, and encourage the audience to be active producers of documentation 	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themselves. In doing so, these two plays are significant examples of how theatre-
makers in Russia have used documentary methods to challenge Putinism. 
 
The Bolotnaya Square Case 
The Bolotnaya Square Case is a collaboration between playwright Polina Borodina 
and director Elena Gremina. It consists of a dramatisation of a series of interviews 
conducted with the friends and relatives of those arrested and subsequently detained 
and tried for their involvement in the protests of 6 May 2012. The highly emotive 
material is presented sequentially starting with an account of the Moscow protests, 
through descriptions of the arrests, leading to an examination of how family bonds are 
both tested and maintained by the protestors’ incarceration. The play opened at 
Teatr.doc’s new venue on Spartakovskaya Ulitsa in the Baumanskaya region in 
Moscow on 6 May 2015, with the date of the production’s Moscow première marking 
the third anniversary of the March of the Millions demonstration that eventuated on 
the eve of Putin’s inauguration as president in 2012. Although the staging at Teatr.doc 
was billed as the official première of The Bolotnaya Square Case, the piece had 
previously been staged under the auspices of the Belarus Free Theatre as a rehearsed 
reading in front of a small audience in Minsk on 21 March 2015.  
Throughout the creative process, a strong link was maintained with the family 
members of those tried in the Bolotnaya Square Case. Those who were interviewed 
have subsequently been invited to attend the performances at Teatr.doc, and many 
were present at the official opening of the show. The four cast members, Varvara 
Faer, Marina Boiko, Konstantin Kozhevnikov and Anastasia Patlai, had participated 
in the demonstrations and rallies that proliferated across Moscow and the rest of the 
country in 2011 and 2012, and during the investigation and trials of the Bolotnaya 
protestors, members of the Teatr.doc’s administrative and creative team further 
participated in demonstrations against the activists’ detainment. In a recent interview 
Borodina notes the impact that researching the play had on her, claiming ‘the stories 
are so heavy and you perceive them so closely that they have a psychological effect 
on you and change your emotional state.’39  
The show is undoubtedly one of the most politically charged and polarising 
productions currently running in any theatre’s repertoire in Russia, and staging the 	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play resulted in an unprecedented show of combativeness and intimidation against 
Teatr.doc by the Moscow authorities. On the eve of the première, members of the 
Moscow city police arrived unannounced at Teatr.doc. In a ritual similar to when the 
company was evicted from its original space in December 2014, the premises were 
thoroughly searched, disrupting the dress rehearsal. On her Facebook page, director 
Elena Gremina posted an ominous photo of Moscow police officers sitting in the 
theatre watching the rehearsals. The following evening a squad of police officers 
stood guard outside the theatre prior to and after the performance. The next day, 
however, a syndicate of police returned to interrogate the staff at Teatr.doc about the 
production in a further display of force. If the authorities had hoped to dissuade 
audience members from attending through coercion, they failed. Despite the heavy 
police presence at the theatre and the threat of a raid on the building during the 
performance that would result in the detainment of audience members (as there had 
been on 30 December 2014), there was an overwhelming demand for tickets during 
the play’s short opening run. Performances of the play were full beyond capacity each 
night, with audience members squeezed into to every available space and even on the 
front of the stage. The continuing popularity of The Bolotnaya Square Case 
demonstrates a considerable desire of theatregoers in Russia to experience a public 
moment of shared collectivism. As Svetlana Orlova wrote in her review of the 
première, ‘the performance was almost a social action group psychotherapy’.40 
Echoing Borodina’s assertion that the stories had a ‘psychological impact’ on her, 
Orlova suggests that the play acts as conduit for spectators to come to terms with the 
collective trauma of the growing oppression of the Putin regime and the shadow being 
cast over Russian civil society by Putinism in the 2010s. Orlova’s focus on ‘social 
action’ further indicates Teatr.doc’s importance as a public space where both artists 
and audience members engage in civic activity that has been restricted and denied by 
the government. As we shall see, the social action and ‘psychotherapy’ in The 
Bolotnaya Square Case takes on a very real precedent in the after-show discussions. 
 
Three quarters of sadness 
By the time I attended a production of The Bolotnaya Square Case at Teatr.doc’s 
newest building on Maly Kazyonny Lane near Kurskaya metro station on 15 	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November 2015, much of the initial posturing by the authorities had died down and, 
from my own perspective, the tumult and tense atmosphere reported during the play’s 
initial run in the Teatr.doc repertoire in May had abated. I could not see any members 
of the Moscow police force present as they were during the play’s initial 
performances, although, as reports also claimed members of the plain-clothed police 
branch were in attendance during the first three performances in May I cannot 
completely validate the statement that no government officials were in attendance at 
the performance. 
 As the performance begins, the audience is confronted by the partisan slogan 
‘Freedom for the defendants in the Bolotnaya Case!’ boldly projected onto the bare 
brick walls at the back of the stage. The banner then fades and is replaced with a 
projection of an extract from the documentary film Winter, Go Away! (Zima, Ukhdi!, 
2012), which chronicled the protest movement on the eve of the 2012 presidential 
election. Co-produced by Ugarov and directed by graduates of his School of 
Documentary Film and Documentary Theatre, the film had been banned at the last 
minute at the ‘KinZA’ film festival in Tyumen with Ugarov blaming Putin’s United 
Russia Party for the decision.41 The projection acts as a counterpoint to the selective 
media images of the protests, and contrasts with the hyperbole of The Anatomy of 
Protest. Furthermore, the film raises the premise of samizdat and asks the audience to 
consider the significance that censoring documents and artefacts can have on public 
opinion, while highlighting the importance of continuing an alterative narration and 
documentation of events even when officials try to silence them.  
Unlike many of Teatr.doc’s previous documentary plays, which de-
emphasised set dressing and props and are played out within the theatre’s empty black 
box space, The Bolotnaya Square Case made more emphatic use of scenery. The 
stage is set to recall a simplistic domestic environment. In the centre of the stage is a 
desk, on which is positioned a warmly glowing desk light, and large pile of sweets in 
colourful wrapping. Down stage, two hammocks are strung up across the performance 
space. The hammocks further emphasise the relaxed domesticity of the setting, but 
also add darker implications to the mise-en-scène. The performers glance through 
them when performing their lines and the shadows cast on their faces appears to the 
audience as if they are peering through prison bars, or wire mesh. Furthermore, the 	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hammocks are strung up around the performance space to delineate and block off 
certain parts of the room, serving as a subtle reminder to the audience of how civic 
space in Moscow and Russia is slowly being encroached on, while avenues of dissent 
are blocked off by the Putin regime. The hammocks also generate a feeling of time 
that has been lost and slipped away. As the performers sit in them, we become 
increasingly aware of the time lost by the accused who must wait in prison for their 
trials, but also those on the outside who remain in emotional limbo over the fate of 
their loved ones.  
The characters in the piece are not named, and are never specifically linked 
with any of the defendants in the Bolotnaya Affair. Instead, they are referred to 
simply by their relation to the accused, for example ‘mother’, ‘grandfather’, and 
‘friend’. As John Freedman summarises in his review of the play for the Moscow 
Times ‘it’s not “who” here that counts, it’s “what.”’42  The opening lines of the play, 
spoken by a fellow student of one of the accused, further sets out an important 
premise and focal point of the production:  
 
There is a saying that when a person goes on the road they take a quarter of 
sadness, and three-quarters remain with those who stay behind, because they 
are the ones who are left waiting.43  
 
By focusing on the families of those who were arrested after the March of the 
Millions, The Bolotnaya Square Case renders what was a very public act of protest, 
reported and broadcast on a global scale, into a domestic setting. Borodina attests to 
the importance of the play ‘talk[ing] about the case, about the fate of the children not 
through themselves and their direct speech, but through stories told by their loved 
ones’.44 Borodina asserts that this methodological decision in her approach made the 
play ‘emotional and warmer, while on the other hand allowed people to understand 
the process of the case and how such a random sample and disparate selection of 
society suddenly found themselves connected to this disaster’.45 Borodina’s 
comments also point to how The Bolotnaya Square Case departs from a specific facet 
of Russian documentary theatre. As Beumers and Lipovetsky observe, ‘all the heroes 	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of doc-theatre are interesting, because they represent a certain social group’.46 In The 
Bolotnaya Square Case, a diverse stratum of Russian society, age, and background 
provide the material that Borodina uses to construct the play. This decision highlights 
a specific unease that the Bolotnaya Affair was a watershed moment in Russian 
politics that marked a turning point in the Kremlin’s stance towards opposition 
activists. Commenting on the seemingly arbitrary prosecution of the Bolotnaya 
protestors by the state, Khodorkovsky echoes Borodina’s comments: 
 
There is a reason why close to 30 people have been plucked out of the crowd 
and thrown onto the defendants' bench in the ‘Bolotnaya case’. In this lies the 
cruel and cynical message of those in power: it makes no difference who you 
are – an engineer, a student, a pensioner, an opposition activist, a theoretical 
physicist, a manager, a mathematician, a commercial director, a scholar, or a 
homeless person. If you came out to a sanctioned rally – we're going to send 
you to jail.47 
 
In other words, the Kremlin delivered a politicised edict with the Bolotnaya Square 
Case, that any act of protest or sympathetic solidarity with the opposition would no 
longer be tolerated. It was a clear message that the veneer of democracy that Putinism 
had operated under in the 2000s had been discarded and that modern Russia is now a 
country ruled by means of fear and oppression. By focusing on the families of the 
accused the play further demonstrates the heterogeneity of those who felt provoked to 
provide testimony and were affected by the trial. For many of the 6 May prisoners 
who found their lives ripped apart by their prison sentences, these family members 
and close friends were all they had left. 
Much of the testimony in the play is seemingly mundane, focusing on aspects 
of family life that have been torn apart by the trial and imprisonment of the 
demonstrators. There is testimony from a father who describes his affectionate rivalry 
with his son over their respective love of local football teams, Spartak Moscow and 
CSKA Moscow. There is a long and poignant monologue delivered by the wife of 
another Bolotnaya protestor who recalls a holiday in Spain with her husband where he 
won her a stuffed toy at an amusement arcade. The play depicts the family members 	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as detached from the rhetoric of the protest movement, and this is vocalised by the 
lines spoken by a mother who claims that, before the trial, she had no idea what 
‘Dozhd’ or ‘Twitter’ were in reference to the independent news organisation Dozhd 
[Rain] that promotes the opposition movement, and social media application Twitter 
that was widely used by the young activists to mobilise the protests of 6 May.48 
Despite the seemingly prosaic nature of the play, my analysis suggests that 
Borodina’s editing process and construction of the script deliberately addresses 
contemporary concerns and debates surrounding Putinism and the Russian legal 
system.  
 
‘Fictitious Legalism’ and the The Bolotnaya Square Case 
As the friends and family members begin to recount their memories, the performers 
move around the set. One lies on a hammock, another sits at the desk and starts to 
unwrap the sweets, re-enacting a speech delivered later in the play that all sweets 
delivered to prisoners must first be unwrapped. The story of the defendants begins in 
medias res, with a detailed description of the events of 6 May 2012, in the form of a 
monologue spoken by a friend of one of the prisoners who also attended the protests: 
 
120000 people.49 Summer, nice weather, a lot of people with kids and 
balloons. Really cool! Apparently there were 80000 yesterday, 120000 today, 
and then tomorrow a million will come and all will be well in the country […] 
Then, suddenly mothers with their children are running to the Kremlin. And 
then we went to the bridge and saw the car, and I realised that it was a 
provocation […] And then, when it’s all beginning to fall apart, that was when 
the OMON [riot police] ran it, and when they started to beat people around… 
And later I found out that everyone had been taken away.50 
 
The actor performing these lines speaks them in an emotionless, matter-of-fact way, 
although as the speech continues the sentences start to lose shape, revealing the 
trauma of recalling the event. The friend’s description of the rhapsodic atmosphere 
amongst the demonstrators contrasts with their bleak description of how what was 	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conceived as a peaceful protest degenerated into violence. The monologue diverges 
from the reports that the protestors initiated the violence. By doing so, it sets the scene 
for the remainder of the play, highlighting the Putin administration’s ‘fictitious 
legalism’ while bringing into question the methods by which evidence is constructed 
and the politicisation of justice by the Kremlin.  
 ‘Governments spin the facts in order to tell stories’, writes Carol Martin. 
‘Theatre spins them right back in order to tell different stories.’51 The temptation for 
the creators of the play could easily have been to react to the propaganda depicted on 
state television on the same level, ‘spinning’ the events of the 6 May protests as a 
simple act of repression against civil liberties by the state. The Bolotnaya Square 
Case, however, does not simply ‘spin the facts’, but instead deconstructs the system 
that has facilitated the manipulation of justice, exposing, and contesting these fictions 
of official history. In this way, the play encourages the audience to consider their own 
role as more than just passive witnesses to these acts of injustice.   
As the play develops and the family members recount their stories, the corrupt 
nature of the Russian legal system and its deployment against the Bolotnaya 
defendants is systematically exposed. In particular, the nature of how evidence is 
manipulated and conscious effort employed to obscure the truth are examined in the 
production. As has been explored earlier in this chapter, there is an unease in 
contemporary Russia about the credibility of evidence used to obtain convictions and 
a general scepticism about the impartiality of trials against opposition activists. In one 
particular scene of The Bolotnaya Square Case, the father of one of the accused 
recalls how, during the trial of his son, a police officer repeatedly provided evidence 
against him. The police officer claimed that the son had injured him in an unprovoked 
attack during the demonstration.  The father, however, then reveals that, when pushed 
by the defence lawyer to substantiate his claims, the officer was unable to do so. 
Ruefully, the father recounts how ‘this evidence is not in the trial record, they do not 
have to publish it’.52 In another monologue spoken by the mother of another of the 
accused, a similar point is made. She describes how her son was subject to police 
brutality after his arrest, and beaten over the head repeatedly. The implication is that 
the police deliberately aimed their strikes towards the head because the injuries are 
less obvious than if inflicted on other parts of the body. She then recalls how 	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He was taken in a convoy. There is no camera at all, nothing. Again he hit him on 
the head. He lost consciousness. And on the second day he was sick. I went to the 
infirmary, and it turns out he was told that it was a concussion, but it is not 
recorded anywhere. They gave him some pills and that’s it.53 
 
Borodina’s use of testimony articulates a particular fixation with the construction of 
evidence and the control of documentation by the Putin regime. The literal covering-
up of evidence by the police in beating suspects over the head where the physical 
trauma is easier to conceal highlights the importance of the act of both documenting 
and sharing acts of oppression for fear they will be whitewashed from history by the 
regime. Like the precedent set by samizdat literature, documentary theatre is used as a 
method of recording these denials of truth, and vocalises the importance of creating 
counter narratives that attempt to dispel the fabrication of official testimony and 
documents.  
The historical precedent for this form of dissent becomes more apparent as the 
performance continues. By including a wide cross section of Russian society in the 
interviews Borodina conducted for The Bolotnaya Square Case, the audience are able 
to hear differing analysis and accounts of the judicial process of the case. Of 
particular significance is the testimony of two grandparents about the arrests of the 
suspects in the months that preceded the protests. The emotive decision by Borodina 
to use the account of two members of this specific generation to describe the process 
of the mass arrests that followed the protests is potent and highly political. The 
grandmother and grandfather reveal their shock in describing how, without warning, 
their home was stormed by police who searched their premises aggressively before 
handcuffing their grandson and arresting him. It is clear that, by including the 
description of the arrests as told by part of a generation who lived through the Stalin 
era, Borodina is deliberately recalls the imagery of the Great Terror in the description 
of the nocturnal arrests of the Bolotnaya Square protestors. This invocation is marked 
by the grandmother’s specific reference to the most intense period of Stalin’s purges, 
the Yezhovshchina: ‘God! What is this? 1937?’54  
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As has been noted above, the stifling of free speech has been a trigger for 
independent Russian commentators to look back to the Stalin era to draw certain 
comparisons and similarities. In his vital and evocative study of Stalinism’s impact on 
the population of the Soviet Union, The Whisperers: Private Lives in Stalin’s Russia, 
historian Orlando Figes reveals how the private memory of the Great Terror survived 
the Cold War through the oral transmission of stories and experiences between family 
members.55 By calling attention to the grandparents’ testimony, Borodina additionally 
reflects on this lineage and the importance of documentary theatre and the technique 
of verbatim as a means of continuing the oral transmission during periods of political 
uncertainty.  
Throughout the play, the spectre of Stalinism remains constant. A similar 
comparison between the events of the Bolotnaya Square Case and the Great Terror is 
made when a second father recalls warning his son about the perils of challenging the 
government: 
 
See the growth of all these protest movements, they all end […] Read the 
Children of Arbat, it is very well written. There too, people did not do anything, 
but they were still arrested.56 
 
The Children of Arbat (1987) is an anti-Stalinist novel by Anatoly Rybakov that 
portrays the intensification of the repression that led to the purges of the 1930s. The 
novel depicts Stalin as a paranoid and malevolent ruler whose policies robbed a 
generation of young Soviets of their freedom. Returning to the context in which this 
play is considered, The Bolotnaya Square Case uses the material gathered by 
Borodina during her research to support a growing sentiment amongst opposition 
supporters and independent commentators that Putin’s growing suppression of the 
protest movement and the manipulation of the legal system is uncannily reminiscent 
of the darkest moments of Soviet repression where dissidents were prosecuted and 
convicted in rigged show trials. The testimony provided by these two individuals 
additionally demonstrates, however, that such comparisons between the crack down 
on civic activism and the Great Terror is not necessarily confined to the pages of 
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liberal broadsheet newspapers such as Novaya Gazeta and international observers, but 
has been vocalised in a wider context of Russian society.  
 
After the Performance 
 As detailed above, the testimony included in The Bolotnaya Square Case 
raises serious questions that relate to the notions of justice in contemporary Russia 
and how evidence and verisimilitude are doctored by the Putin regime. The play also 
foregrounds concerns within Russian society that cases such as the prosecution of the 
Bolotnaya protestors mark a return to political repression not seen since the Soviet 
era. The heart of the play, however, is not simply an exposé of the effect of a corrupt 
legal system on those who challenge the regime, but a consideration of how the 
revivification of authoritarianism can be challenged to prevent a potential repeat of 
history.  
This raises the question: in what tangible way does the production promote 
civic activity and challenge the social norms and discourses of Putinism? As the 
production concludes, the actors join together to sing an old anti-Tsarist revolutionary 
song from the 1870s called Break the Chains: 
 
On the dusty road the wagon rushes 
Flanked by two policemen 
Beat the shackles 
Give me the will 
I will teach you to love freedom 
Young exile in a travelling cart 
With hands tied 
Beat the shackles 
Give me the will 
I will teach you to love freedom 
 
As the actors sing, they encourage the audience to join in with the final stanza ‘beat 
the shackles, give me the will, I will teach you to love freedom’. The action of the 
audience and cast joining together to sing this revolutionary ode to freedom is a 
powerful moment of civic engagement encouraged by Teatr.doc. It supports my 
argument that The Bolotnaya Square Case is not simply a documentation of Putin’s 
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repression of 28 Russian citizens who protested against him, but is instead a 
performance that transforms Teatr.doc into a public forum where people can actively 
resist the official narratives of the state and their promotion of discordance between 
the Bolotnaya protestors and the rest of the population. Moreover, this act of 
solidarity does not end as the actors take their curtain call. If the performance aimed 
to give voice to the families personally affected by the Bolotnaya Square case, then 
the post-show activities allow the audience to document and express their own 
feelings and emotions surrounding the affair. In an act of support and solidarity the 
audience members are provided with pens and paper and encouraged to write letters 
to the demonstrators still held in prison, which Teatr.doc posts to them. Emboldening 
the audience to engage in their own act of documentation to bring ‘freedom for the 
defendants in the Bolotnaya Case’ reflects on Bukovsky’s definition that the creation 
and documentation of samizdat texts was a key facet of protest and civic activism in 
the Soviet Union. It further brings to the attention of the audience that if justice 
cannot be achieved in the courtroom, then there is a responsibility for civic activity 
and theatre to attempt to undermine the social and political institutions that facilitate 
the manipulation of the legal system. The act of letter writing establishes a tangible 
bond of solidarity between the audience and the Bolotnaya Square protestors. By 
acting as a site of communal engagement and activism, Teatr.doc and The Bolotnaya 
Square Case calls upon the legacy of samizdat to emphasise the importance of 
documentation as a means to challenge Russia’s ‘fictitious legalism’. 
As well as providing the opportunity for written expression and 
communication with the Bolotnaya protestors, each performance is also followed by a 
post-show discussion between audience members and the creative team. In a society 
where the government relies on biased news reporting and the oppression of those 
who speak out against Putin as tools to achieve an ataractic society these debates are 
an important part of contesting the politically suffocating environment of 
contemporary Russia. The discussions demonstrate how The Bolotnaya Square Case 
intervenes in the public sphere, operating as a meeting place not only to hear stories 
that contest the official narrative and history of Putinism, but also as an event that 
challenges the passivity of the audience by encouraging them to debate and consider 
their own role in responding to the injustices of the Putin regime. In 2016, the post-
show discussions for The Bolotnaya Square Case took an even more interesting turn. 
Teatr.doc took the decision to invite the police officers who had been present during 
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the rallies of 6 May to the performances and to participate in the after-show 
discussions. One of the few members of the police to commit to the theatre’s offer 
was a senior police major and criminal investigator Ludmila Makeeva, who had been 
involved in the prosecution of the Bolotnaya protestors. The question and answer 
session is led by the cast and director Gremina, although audience members are also 
encouraged to participate in the cross-examination. Unlike a typical theatre 
production that is performed in reverential silence, in the video footage I have 
watched, Makeeva is subjected to interjections and sarcastic murmurings from the 
audience. By inviting Makeeva to take part in these discussions, the performance 
becomes an extension of the Bolotnaya Square Case trial, and provided the audience 
with an opportunity to gain further insight into why this unprecedented mass 
prosecution occurred in an attempt to re-assess and further pursue justice for the 28 
protestors.  
Makeeva’s answers reveal another side of the debate. In a question and 
answers session after a performance of The Bolotnaya Square Case in June 2016 
Makeeva commented that: 
 
You know perfectly well that we are working on your behalf. We have some 
information that maybe you do not have access to, that is not in our interest to 
share […] This is a fine performance on a political matter [but] it is the 
emotional component that excites you […] you have no answer [for how to 
improve the system].57 
 
Although Makeeva’s answer contrasts with the sentiment of the production, I suggest 
that her comment that Teatr.doc has no answers is incorrect. By inviting a wider 
dialogue between the audience and the police implicit in the mass arrests of 6 May 
2012 The Bolotnaya Square Case widens the discourse about the Russian judicial 
system, receding the schism in Russian society that the Putin administration has 
aimed to widen. Although some audience members, such as Gaskarnova, viewed the 
sympathetic portrayal of the protestors and their families as a story that needed to be 
heard above the echo-chamber of state propaganda, others saw it as unrealistic and 
idealist, failing to take into consideration the pressures faced by the authorities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Post-show discussion at Teatr.doc, on 9 June 2016. Details shared with me by Elena Gremina. 
	   188	  
working on the case. Regardless of these differences, the play has become a unique 
opportunity to discuss such controversial issues in a public forum, where both 
protestors and police feel comfortable to debate the process. This itself is a form of 
dissent against Putin, by creating further narrative about justice while also challenging 
the dangerous divide in Russian society.  
 In his introduction to The Whisperers, Figes avers that ‘a silent and conformist 
population is one lasting consequence of Stalin’s regime’.58 As Russian commentators 
speak of a return to Soviet repression, and the Russian population loses its faith in the 
judicial system’s ability to serve them fairly, documentary theatre that records oral 
lore takes on further importance. The Bolotnaya Square Case is not simply a 
documentation of this repression but a demonstration of the importance of resisting 
the regime’s attempt to promote conformity and passivity by encouraging others to 
speak up, enlivening and widening the debate. The determination of Borodina to 
document these accounts points to the enduring importance of recording and 
documenting personal narratives as a testimony of Russia’s endurance in the face of 
oppression.  
 
One Hour Eighteen Minutes 
While The Bolotnaya Square Case explored the ideas of Putin’s ‘fictitious legalism’, 
Gremina’s play One Hour Eighteen Minutes takes this exploration of the Russian 
judicial system even further, interrogating the final hours of corporate lawyer Sergi 
Magnitsky, who died in Moscow's Butyrka prison in November 2009. The silencing 
of information on Magnitsky’s death meant that few witnesses were willing to come 
forward and provide testimony. As a result, the documentation utilised by Gremina 
differs from The Bolotnaya Square Case, relying on media reports and materials 
provided by Magnitsky’s family.  
While working for the UK-based hedge fund Hermitage Capital Management, 
Magnitsky exposed £150 million worth of tax fraud in Russia involving senior police 
officers, members of the judiciary, bankers, and the Russian mafia. Refusing to take 
asylum abroad, Magnitsky chose to stay in Moscow where he was subsequently 
arrested on 24 November 2008, and charged with instigating the fraud himself. A 
deep irony of Magnitsky’s arrest is that he had previously named one of the senior 	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police investigators in charge of his detainment as a prime facilitator of the corruption 
he exposed. Although never officially charged, Magnitsky was held for eleven months 
in pre-trial detention and put under immense pressure to confess to the accusations 
against him. In a series of letters and diaries, Magnitsky recorded the treatment he 
received in prison, and the harsh conditions he was subjected to in order to hasten his 
admission of guilt. In the summer of 2009, Magnistsky became seriously ill, and 
despite being scheduled for an operation was transferred to the squalid Butyrka prison 
in the Tverskoy district of central Moscow. Finally, just eight days before the Russian 
legal limit of one-year's detention without trial, Magnitsky’s health became critical 
and he was transferred to Matrosskaya Tishina detention center for emergency 
hospitalisation. When he arrived, he was instead locked in a solitary cell and allegedly 
handcuffed and beaten. When civilian doctors finally arrived to treat Magnitsky, the 
prison authorities refused them entry to his cell for a further seventy-eight minutes, 
during which time Magnitsky died. The play's title is a reference to the precise 
amount of time Magnitsky took to die in his cell as medical help was denied to him.  
In 2013, Magnitsky was posthumously tried by the state and found guilty of tax fraud. 
William Browder, the American CEO of Hermitage Capital Management who was 
also tried and sentenced in absentia, provocatively described the verdict against 
Magnitsky as the ‘most shameful moment since Stalin’.59 Despite the fact that 
Magnitsky’s family have urged a murder investigation to be opened, the only official 
charged with responsibility of his death, Dr Dmitry Kratov, was acquitted in 
December 2012 after a judge ruled there was insufficient evidence against him.60  
One Hour Eighteen Minutes seeks to provide justice for Magnitsky where the 
state failed to do so. Relying on the sourcing of official documents, including Valery 
Borshev’s report for the Moscow Public Oversight Commission, journalistic coverage 
of the case, and interviews, Gremina constructs a theatrical trial of the key 
protagonists in an attempt to establish a corpus delicti for Maginstsky’s death in 
Matrosskaya Tishina prison in November 2009. As has been discussed above, there is 
a theatrical paradigm for courtroom settings in the tribunal productions of the Tricycle 
Theatre and the German documentary plays of the 1960s. Furthermore, in her analysis 
of One Hour Eighteen Minutes Flynn draws comparisons between the play’s 
theatrical use of a courtroom setting and the mock trials of the early Soviet era, 	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arguing that ‘by setting their performance of justice in a courtroom the creators of 
One Hour Eighteen Minutes call upon the country’s unusually intimate, and 
occasionally lethal, association between judicial and theatrical practice.’61 Unlike 
tribunal theatre, however, One Hour Eighteen Minutes does not draw upon actual 
legal testimony as to date no inquiry into the death of Magnitsky has occurred. 
Instead, as the producers of the play make it clear in their programme notes that ‘this 
performance presents a trial that never happened. A trial that – if justice is served – 
must eventually take place’.62  One Hour Eighteen Minutes is unique in the canon of 
Russian documentary plays due to Gremina’s brave and unflinching decision to name 
the participants responsible for the death of Magnitsky. In the programme, director 
Mikhail Ugarov makes a specific invitation to those depicted in the play to come to 
Teatr.doc and watch the performance, although this offer has not been accepted.63   
The play was first performed at Teatr.doc in June 2010, and was co-directed 
by Ugarov and Talgat Batalov (Batalov also performed in the production): the 
production remains in Teatr.doc’s current repertoire, although in recent years it has 
only been performed sporadically. The play was expanded in 2012 to include a series 
of extra scenes after new witnesses came forward to provide further evidence, and in 
November 2015 the play was once again resurrected at Teatr.doc’s new space to 
commemorate the six-year anniversary of Magnitsky’s death. Unsurprisingly, given 
the global coverage of Magnitsky’s death, the production received wide attention 
abroad and was staged internationally in a number of foreign language translations. In 
November 2011 a production was staged at Amnesty International’s headquarters in 
London by Noah Birksted-Breen’s Sputnik company, and the extended version of the 
play then ran at the New Diorama Theatre in London the follow year. 
Despite the play’s structure resembling trial proceedings, the minimalistic 
nature of the performance does not adhere to Paget’s delineation of tribunal theatre’s 
‘authentic’ staging.64 The actors, dressed in their own street clothes, speak out to the 
audience as if addressing an invisible interrogator, making no claim to naturalism. By 
putting the focus on the words spoken the audience are not allowed to feel distanced 
from the events and the fact that a man was allowed to die, alone and in agony in his 
prison cell. The original play was divided into nine scenes, the first seven of which 	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are monologues given by individuals who either knew Magnitsky, or were connected 
to or witnesses of his death.  
The play begins as one of the seated actors addresses the audience. The 
performer draws their attention to a document they have been handed as they entered 
the performance space, asking them to read the first item listed on the pamphlet. In 
total there are nine items, echoing the number of scenes in the play. Each item names 
a real-life individual linked to Magnitsky’s death, and documents their relationship to 
the deceased. During the production, the protagonists are individually called upon 
from this document to take the stand one by one to provide their testimony seriatim. 
The documentation of this information in a physical booklet shared with the audience 
recalls trial procedures, but furthermore it underscores an endemic cultural anxiety 
about the veracity of official legal testimony in Putin’s Russia. Recalling Bukovsky’s 
appraisal of samizdat as ‘write myself, edit myself, censor myself, publish myself, 
distribute myself’, Teatr.doc have been forced by the paucity of official evidence 
detailing the facts of the Magnitsky affair to produce and disseminate their own 
documentation amongst their audience for posterity.65 As the performance continues, 
it becomes evident that this physical document disseminated among the audience 
details the events of Magnitsky’s death that the defendants’ oral testimony cannot. 
Although One Hour Eighteen Minutes is a dramatic re-imagining of a trial that 
never actually held for Magnitsky, the use of documentary material is an important 
facet of the play, most notably in the form of Magnitsky’s prison diaries and the 
letters he wrote from prison. Gremina’s use of these documents is analogous to the 
samizdat legal texts in that they reveal a particular component of the Magnitsky affair 
that was not part of the official body of documents that detail his arrest and 
imprisonment. Magnitsky’s correspondence reveals a different perspective to the 
official state-sanctioned narrative of his imprisonment. Throughout the duration of the 
performance, a projection of Magnitsky’s final letter written from prison is 
illuminated on the black wall at the back of the stage. In scrawled Russian cursive 
Magnitsky recalls a visit to the prison library and reveals a longing to re-read 
Shakespeare on his release. The diurnal tone of the letter is poignant and does not hint 
at the events that followed. By foregrounding a physical piece of documentation from 
Magnitsky’s final days, the letter acts as an ever present document, reminding the 	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audience that whatever testimony they hear spoken on stage by the officials 
responsible for Magnitsky’s mistreatment - either repudiating the events or defaming 
Magnitsky’s character - the letter stands as irrefutable proof of the government’s 
attempt to fictionalise reality and manipulate the facts. In one scene, the investigator 
into Magnitsky’s prosecution, Oleg Silchencko, reads out further extracts from 
Magnitsky’s letters and, as he does so, he pauses to provide his own contemptuous 
commentary on Magnitsky’s plight. In this way, the play further explores the disdain 
the authorities held even for Magnitsky’s basic requests for care: 
 
Forty fucking pages! Jesus Christ – he was preparing his case for the EU’s 
fucking Court of Human Rights! He actually thought he’d see daylight again 
[…] Look at this: Ten more complaints. What, is he crazy? […] “Toilets in 
cell are simply holes in the floor, with no separation between the toilet facility 
and the cell itself” […] Is he fucking with us? “The toilet was not partitioned” 
[…] Seriously, he is really trying to fuck with us.66 
 
As the defendants continue to make their plea to the audience, a recurring 
theme begins to appear. In their argument for their mitigation, they repeatedly point to 
the obfuscated nature and fluidity of the notion of justice in modern Russia. 
Furthermore, despite the fact the witnesses claim to uphold justice in Russia, their 
own testimony appears to subsequently undermine this. Oleg Silchencko, who was 
responsible for the conditions of Magnitsky’s imprisonment and repeatedly denied 
him access to doctors, highlights this in his assessment of the venal nature of the 
prison system Magnitsky was exposed to: 
 
They could have done something. I mean, everything has a price. Even boiling 
water. […] You want hot water in the cell? You want newspapers? TV? Cell 
phones? You want to bang your wife one night in the cell? They’ll let her in… 
And they’ll hand over a SIM card too. Cell phones, three-course meals… 
Whatever you want. For a price.67 
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Silchencko’s speech demonstrates the arbitrary and inconsistent nature of justice 
under Putinism. Justice, and even basic human rights, have now become a commodity 
depending on your status in modern Russia. As the Putin regime seeks to create a 
fictitious but official narrative of justice, so the system is open to abuse and 
manipulation by the very people who profess to serve it. In Teatr.doc’s imagined trial 
everything has a price, from a cup of hot water to the dismissal of a case. 
 In One Hour Eighteen Minutes though, the perversion of justice is not simply 
seen in the context of Magnitsky’s case. Gremina does not attempt to lionize 
Magnitsky or martyr him as a hero who challenged the regime. In the next scene, Dr 
Alexandra Gauss, a medical doctor at the Matrosskaya Tishina prison where 
Magnitsky died, explains how she refused him medical treatment in the final hours of 
his life: 
 
The suspect was complaining about intense pain. This might have been true, it 
might not have. Prisoners always lie – they try to make their temperatures go 
up; they fake having seizures […] The main thing is you never really show 
concern – otherwise, they can smell your fear and take advantage of you.68 
 
Dr Gauss reiterates this in the final section of her speech, when she concludes, ‘I’m a 
doctor. And the duty of a licensed physician is to expose fakes’.69 Gauss’s comments 
contrast with the assertion made by Magnitsky’s mother Natalia Magnitskaya in the 
opening monologue, where she suggests that her son could not trust or rely on the 
prison medical staff to deliver the drugs he needed for his condition.  
Returning to the testimony of Silchencko, the investigator, he states that 
Magnitsky was implicitly guilty through his legal representation of businessmen who 
were making money through questionable means. The play thus presents a vicious 
circle of mistrust where those who had Magnitsky entrusted to their care have lost 
faith in the authority of the judicial system, and by implication have lost faith in those 
they have sworn to protect. Like Silchencko who claims that Magnitsky’s 
mistreatment was not his responsibility and was due to his own failure to twist the 
system, the doctor also displays a view of Russian civic society that has assiduously 
been dismantled by Putinism through a tactic of dividing the population with fear and 	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scepticism of the communities they live in. One Hour Eighteen Minutes presents a 
picture of contemporary Russia as a country that is ruled by mistrust, and where 
everyone is fearful. In his consideration of the Russian judicial system, White has 
opined that judges have been ‘subject to influence from the executive military, and 
security forces, particularly in high-profile and or politically sensitive cases’.70 In 
other words, the manipulation of the judicial system is allied with the pervasive 
corruption of Russian society as a whole. One Hour Eighteen Minutes’ deconstruction 
of the deficiencies of the legal system and the state’s inability to provide justice for 
Magnistsky71 extends to a wider dialogue on anxieties that the state is dismantling the 
very fabric of Russian society itself, and is a symptom of Putinism’s ‘power vertical’. 
Analysing the documentary productions at Teatr.doc in the 2000s, Beumers and 
Lipovetsky write: ‘the question is not about society as a whole, but about a concrete 
social environment or subculture.’72 My analysis of One Hour Eighteen Minutes 
argues that its assailment of the failings of the Russian judicial system is precisely 
about ‘society as a whole’.  In this chapter’s wider consideration of the phenomenon 
of documentary theatre in twenty-first century Russia, One Hour Eighteen Minutes 
demonstrates these plays are not part of a stagnant or fixed theatrical mode. In their 
examination of contemporary society and politics, documentary theatre-makers in 
Russia employ a malleable agglomeration of theatrical techniques and influences 
ranging from British verbatim, tribunal theatre, and the oppositional samizdat 
documents of the Soviet Union.  
 
The Act of Witnessing. 
Gremina’s weaving of documents and testimony is not simply an attempt to hold a 
mirror up to the venality and political divisiveness of the Putin regime. In addition, 
One Hour Eighteen Minutes challenges how the Kremlin is able to spin and inculcate 
its corrupt and divisive policies in Russian society. In the following two scenes, the 
audience is presented with evidence from two members of the public who were key 
witnesses to the final hours of Magnitsky’s life. The first of these is an unnamed 
woman who drove in the front of the ambulance that transported Magnitsky from one 
prison to another on his final day alive. The second is the testimony from a paramedic 	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named Sasha who worked at the Matrosskaya Tishina prison where Magnitsky was 
detained. While the audience will perhaps not be shocked to hear senior ranking 
officials attempting to clear themselves of responsibilities in a high-profile case, it is 
these scenes that include the testimony of individuals with no apparent political 
motive that are the most telling. 
 In his book Trauma-Tragedy: Symptoms of Contemporary Performance 
theatre scholar Patrick Duggan states: ‘Witnessing brings with it implications of 
responsibility and imperatives to testify, especially within the specifics of law, 
medicine and history narrative.’73 ‘To be made witness’ Duggan argues:  
 
places someone firmly in the first person; witnessing is the act of being 
present at the happening of an event. To bear witness, then, is the act of 
recounting that event to a present audience, to fulfil the role to testifier and 
articulate the event in some form, to perform it and give it space to become 
‘real’ for an assembled crowd […] To bear witness to the events is to take on 
the responsibility of imparting the action to others.74   
 
Like the previous defendants in the trial, Sasha the paramedic and the young woman 
in the ambulance abnegate any responsibility for Magnitsky’s death. Moreover, what 
distinguishes their monologues is that, although they have been called upon as crucial 
witnesses of events that led to the preventable death of someone in their care, it is 
precisely their reluctance to bear witness that is at the nexus of their monologues. 
When the young, unnamed ambulance paramedic is introduced, the audience are 
informed that, as Magnitsky was transferred, she sat in the front of the ambulance 
listening to the radio, never bothering to look back and check on Magnitsky. At first, 
she is unsure why she has even been called to provide evidence, and when called 
upon by the imagined investigator to provide further evidence stutters: ‘I have nothing 
to do with that... Dunno... Don’t remember.’75 She further emphasises that it is her 
‘right’ not to know what happened to Magnitsky in her ambulance, an implication that 
she has a ‘right’ not to bear witness to the events as she witnessed them.  
Additionally, the following scene is delivered by the prison paramedic Sasha. 	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Like the medic in the ambulance, he too is reticent to recall exactly what he 
witnessed, and again defends himself on the grounds that he had nothing to do with 
Magnitsky’s plight: 
 
Shit, I don’t know. Don’t ask me man. They already asked me that. What was 
wrong with him? Fuck man, I dunno.76  
 
Instead of further recounting his own vital experience of Magnistsky’s death, he is 
instead preoccupied with his mobile phone, and engages in what could be interpreted 
as a comic routine about ringtones and WiFi connection. These two scenes reveal that 
Putin’s ‘fictitious legalism’ is embedded far deeper in the Russian legal process than 
just at the apical of the system, and they shock the audience into considering the 
impact of a mute and acquiescent population has in reinforcing the Putin regime. By 
creating a culture of apathy, the government has produced an ataractic and passive 
society that is unwilling to challenge the status quo either through indifference or fear 
of the repercussions. One Hour Eighteen Minutes reminds us that Putin’s success 
cannot simply be accredited to his own manipulation of the democratic system, but 
also to the formation of deep-rooted political and social indifference in the Russian 
electorate.  
 Echoing Duggan’s assertions that the act of witnessing imparts a responsibility 
to document the event, Paget similarly pays specific attention to the importance of 
witnessing in verbatim and tribunal theatre:  
 
Documents have become vulnerable to postmodern doubt and information-
mangagement (a.k.a ‘spin’). But the witness’s claim to authenticity can still 
warrant a credible perspective.77 
 
Paget contends that since Weiss’s productions in the 1960s, there has been a shift in 
documentary theatre, abandoning the written document and instead privileging the 
authenticity of oral testimony. Teatr.doc’s production of One Hour Eighteen Minutes 
demonstrates that the semiosis of documentary theatre in Russia remains as much 
focused on the veracity of the document as by oral testimony. Although it is not the 	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case to say one form of testimony eclipses the other across the broad spectrum of 
productions, in Teatr.doc’s performance of One Hour Eighteen Minutes, written 
documentation such as Magnitsky’s letters and performance documents act as a 
beacon of authenticity in contrast to the incredulity of oral testimony.  
 
One Hour Eighteen Minutes in the Repertoire 
In Gremina’s revised text, the relationship between documents is demonstrated in the 
way the play has been edited and expanded throughout its run in Teatr.doc’s 
repertoire to accommodate new developments in the Magnitsky saga. In late 2012 
Teatr.doc revised One Hour Eighteen Minutes in response to developments in the 
wake of the international outcry over Magnitsky’s death. The 2012 version of the play 
was extended, and included a new scene that integrated the legislative tug-of-war 
fought between Russia and the Obama administration in the United States, as both 
countries sought to manipulate the tragedy of the Magnitsky affair. The revised 
production documents the Dima Yakovlev Act, also known under the moniker of the 
anti-Magnitsky law, passed in December 2012. The bill was instigated in reprisal for 
the Magnitsky Act passed by the U.S Congress, which prohibited those held 
accountable for Magnitsky’s death entering to the United States. The anti-Magnitsky 
law was a response to the Magnitsky Act, devising a comparable list of individuals 
forbidden from entering Russia, and controversially banning the adoption of Russian 
children by citizens of the United States. In the updated staging of One Hour Eighteen 
Minutes, the actors break from their static performances, adopting a more relaxed and 
convivial tone for a new scene that addresses the anti-Magnitsky act. Still in character 
as the individuals who facilitated Magnitsky’s death, the actors address the audience 
directly, continuing to eschew a naturalistic performance style as they recite sections 
from the recently published anti-Magnitsky law, celebrating the ‘good news’ that they 
have been exonerated by the state in the years since the original production in 2010.78 
The augmented staging of One Hour Eighteen Minutes in 2012 demonstrates the 
continued foregrounding of legal documents in Russian documentary theatre, 
communicating how the theatrical documentation of legal texts and laws can also find 
form in non-naturalistic, scripted scenes. Gremina’s darkly comic treatment of the 
anti-Magnitsky act, exposes the farcical extremes the Putin administration will reach 	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in order to construct their own legal narrative in their longstanding concealment of the 
circumstances of Magnitsky’s death.  
One Hour Eighteen Minutes is not, however, just an attack on those who 
would not account for their involvement in Magnitsky’s death, but a challenge to the 
audience to consider their own complicity in this political apathy. During the play, 
Gremina asks the audience not only to judge those responsible for Magnitsky’s death 
but also to consider their own role as potential passive conductors of Putinism. In this 
way the production is not just holding up a mirror to the acquiescence of Russian 
society but is a call to arms for Teatr.doc’s audience to be active participants in the 
witnessing of corruption and the state’s involvement in the judiciary. In this way One 
Hour Eighteen Minutes is issuing a plea for a less politicised judicial system.  
In the narrative of One Hour Eighteen Minutes the mending of the schism in 
Russian society can only be achieved through a refusal to succour the Kremlin’s 
attempt to divide the country in fear and apathy. For Gremina, the despoliation of the 
legal system is illustrative of a nefarious political doctrine that rules with fear and 
division: the first act in making sure there are no more cases like Magnitsky’s is the 
re-politicisation of the electorate and the eschewal of fear. 
 
Conclusion 
Since 2008 there has been a growing concern about the government’s manipulation of 
the judicial system to prosecute and incarcerate individuals who challenge the regime. 
The narrative surrounding these cases has revealed a great anxiety about the way 
Putin has vehemently divided the country through the creation of a discourse that 
situates different factions of Russian society against one another. The Kremlin’s 
punitive measures against opposition supporters revived a concern that Russia is 
returning to an era of political repression not seen since Soviet dictatorship, and 
provoked comparisons with the Stalin era that had previously been avoided in post-
communist Russia. There is an increasing anxiety that Putin’s use of the courts to 
repress civic activism is part of a tactic to divert public attention away from wider 
social issues by facilitating a rupture in society and producing a populace mistrustful 
and fearful of each other. 
 The intersection between the ‘fictitious legalism’ of the Putin administration 
and the act of documentation is a productive framework for a discussion of Russian 
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documentary theatre. Teatr.doc’s documentary productions employ the broad 
aesthetics of Martin’s ‘theatre of the real’ and techniques of verbatim theatre, 
reflecting a deep cynicism about the fairness of the Russian legal system, while 
attempting to establish their own theatrical justice in lieu of the state’s failure to do 
so. Despite drawing from a wide dramatic genealogy, I argue that paramount to 
understanding both these plays’ use of documentary material is their theatrical 
reappropriation of one of the foremost forms of grassroots and societal opposition to 
the Soviet government. Teatr.doc’s documentary plays are distinctive hybrid 
performances that speak to the naturalism of the ‘theatre of the real’, yet employ non-
naturalistic staging and acting techniques atypical of verbatim theatre and tribunal 
theatre. What unites these productions is that they call upon the tradition of samizdat, 
matching the clandestine documentation of Soviet trial procedures to contemporary 
concerns about Putinism’s politicisation of the law. In this return to samizdat in 
theatrical form, documentation in performance has been used as a tool to expose the 
hypocrisy and tendentiousness of the Russian legal system. Gremina’s faith in the 
veracity of physical documents in One Hour Eighteen Minutes contradicts Paget’s 
argument that documentary theatre-makers have rejected the written document in 
favour of oral testimony. As a creative practice, the act of documentation and the 
privileging of the document is a vital feature of documentary theatre in Russia. It 
remains key to understanding how theatre-makers have sought to undermine the 
official discourse of the Putin regime and provoking their audience to consider their 
own role in challenging these manipulated judicial narratives.  
 
 
	   200	  
Conclusion 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have argued that New Drama constitutes one of the most 
important cultural forms of opposition to Putinism. Throughout this thesis I have 
contextualised the plays considered within the framework of Putinism, focusing on 
four key facets of Putin’s presidency that have been identified by scholars and 
Russian political commentators: Putin the man; War and the military; social divide; 
and fictitious legalism. Across the chapters I have given examples of political theatre 
productions that facilitate wider dialogues on contemporary Russian society and 
culture. In my analysis of the plays discussed in this thesis, I have provided critical 
insight into how they foreground key anxieties that have been articulated by critics of 
the Kremlin through close textual readings and in-depth performance analysis to 
explore how New Drama productions have challenged the discourse of Putinism. In 
my consideration of these plays I situate them within the context of Russian theatre 
practice and culture in the twenty-first century, and also provide a wider investigation 
into theatre and performances studies through my consideration of how new 
playwrigting can articulate new oppositional dialogues. This thesis shows how 
contemporary Russian theatre has provided a venue for the interrogation of Putin’s 
normative discourse, and offers an original consideration of how theatre can 
contribute to the public sphere. 
By examining works of New Drama I show how theatre makers in twenty-first 
century Russia have employed innovative theatrical aesthetics to contest the 
authoritarian rhetoric of the Putin regime by articulating the experience of 
marginalised citizens. New Drama has emerged as a significant locus of opposition 
despite the state’s oppressive censorship of media and the arts, which manifests as an 
increasingly aggressive campaign of intimidation and coercion towards those who 
provide alternative narratives to the official state discourse. As stated in the 
introduction, one of the aims of this thesis was to explore how theatre makers have 
responded to the authoritarianism of the Putin regime. As the case studies 
demonstrate, Russian theatre makers have continued to defy active state censorship 
and anti-democratic legislation through their continued production of plays that 
boldly engage with cotemporary politics and society. In this way, this thesis engages 
with recent scholarly work on censorship and the arts in the field of performance 
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studies, such as Helen Freshwater’s monograph Theatre Censorship in Britain: 
Silencing, Censure and Suppression. Freshwater’s exploration of censorship in British 
theatre has ‘opened up difficult and important questions’ over the relationship 
between the arts and censorship in contemporary society.1 She observes that ‘it seems 
that overt censorship can also be an inadvertent spur to creativity.’2 In other words, 
even when artists are faced with the spectre of censorship, they find creative ways of 
challenging and overcoming state oppression. As the plays discussed in this thesis 
clearly demonstrate, New Drama playwrights have continued to write new shows and 
produce theatre under the increasing censorship of the Putin regime. Using 
contemporary Russia as an in-depth case, I have sought to show how theatre practice 
operates within this framework and how opposition discourses are vocalised in a 
theatrical context despite the very real threat of censorship, closure, and arrest for the 
artists. Freshwater’s suggestion that theatre makers will often find creative responses 
to counter the state’s active involvement in arts and culture is articulated in New 
Drama as the provocative confrontation of important political anxieties and the 
amplification of marginalised voices in Putin’s Russia. In this way Russian theatre 
makers have provided an opportunity for oppositional discourses to be enlivened and 
debated in a public space. In the post show discussions at Teatr.doc, audience 
members are further encouraged to eschew this censorship by engaging in important 
conversations about contemporary political events, and the role new playwrigting can 
play in subverting Putin’s autocracy.  
In his book The Theatrical Public Sphere, theatre academic Christopher 
Balme examines the relationship between live performance and the public sphere, 
analysing how theatre can impact on public issues and debate. Balme’s work 
‘explores what role theatre and performance play in this realm, how a specific 
theatrical public sphere can be defined and in what way performance and theatre 
theory can contribute to the debates.’3 He identifies that there has been an upsurge in 
academic studies in the relationship between publics and performance, noting that the 
‘revival of interest in the public sphere is a direct response to change in ecology of 
theatre and performance as well as the arts in more general terms.’4 In examining 
theatre’s potential to create an oppositional public sphere, Balme expands extant 	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critical theory on  ‘the relationship between performance and the public sphere, 
theatre’s efficacy as an interlocutor in public debates, and the mediatized forms that a 
theatrical public sphere employs today.’5 The relationship between performance and 
the public sphere have been debated in other recent studies, including by theatre 
scholar Janelle Reinelt. Reinelt writes that theatre ‘can contribute to the public sphere 
by offering its public performances to join with other sorts of interventions by similar 
and different publics to negotiate the determinate matter of our everyday local and 
global lives. It can engage politics by feeling political, and stimulating political 
thoughts and actions, and by attending to the arrangements of our ongoing sociality.’6 
 In this thesis’s engagement into how New Drama has countered and responded 
to the politics of the Putin regime, I have similarly attempted to contextualise how the 
staging of these plays provides an important site for provoking political debate and 
civic engagement in twenty-first century Russia.  Drawing on how the New Drama 
canon highlights social injustice, I have considered how these productions have 
situated themselves in the context of the nascent opposition movement in Russia. I 
have placed these case studies in a wider discussion of how theatre and performance 
can intervene and provoke audience members to consider their own role in the public 
sphere and the democratic process. In this way, this thesis contributes to both the 
study of contemporary Russian theatre, as well as providing a unique engagement 
with recent debates in the field of theatre and performance. The close reading of these 
plays demonstrates how theatre makers in twenty-first century Russia have produced 
a body of theatrical work that intervenes in the public sphere and provides a site for 
political and social debate.   
 The first chapter in this thesis aims to situate New Drama in the contexts of 
Russian theatre and global theatre practices. It examines how the transnational 
exchange of theatrical ideas that influenced and facilitated the development of New 
Drama has been at odds with the increasingly nationalistic cultural polices of the 
Putin regime. By considering the historical context of the movement, it argues that 
while the Royal Court Theatre played a significant factor in the galvanisation of New 
Drama, there was already a pre-exiting new writing culture in the 1990s and the 
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theatre of Liudmila Petrushevskaia in the 1970s and 80s, which vocalised 
marginalised discourses and stage alternative narratives that challenged the status quo. 
 Chapter Two investigates how New Drama writers have employed political 
satire to critique and travesty Putin and Putinism through analysis of the plays 
BerlusPutin and Putin.doc. By examining disparate satirical forms, I suggest that 
there has been a turning point in how Putin’s autocracy is viewed in Russia. 
Putin.doc, written in 2005, focuses its satirical critique on Putin’s supporters, 
identifying how their fevered devotion to the president has been responsible in 
bolstering his political standing. In Varvara Faer’s BerlusPutin, however, Putin’s grip 
on power is presented as stemming from his creation of a media persona and his 
authoritarian leadership. Furthermore, this chapter shows how New Drama writers 
have situated more traditional forms of political theatre such as satire within the 
artistic context of New Drama. For example, the setting of a neutral black box space 
and the use of video projection in BerlusPutin demonstrate the assimilation of 
tradition forms of political critique into the aesthetics of New Drama. Finally, this 
chapter shows how New Drama has aligned itself with the nascent anti-Putin protest 
movement in Russia, asking its audience to consider how theatre and art can act as 
protest and a political act. 
 Chapter Three examines the Second Chechen War and its legacy on the 
development of Putinism in the 2000s. It observes that as a direct result of the Russian 
invasion of Chechnya, Putin revived the role of the military in public life, and 
emphasised the notion of militarised masculinity. I contextualise this chapter within 
the work of gender theorists R. W. Connell, Maya Eichler, and Valerie Sperling. The 
case studies for this chapter are Mikhail and Vyacheslav Durnenkov The Drunks and 
The Soldier by Pavel Pryazhko. These two New Drama productions are widely 
divergent in their construction of narrative, staging, acting techniques, language, and 
performance spaces in which they were performed. This chapter illustrates how, 
despite this, both plays provoke important and varied discussions about the role of the 
army in modern Russia. The plays foreground the embodied presence of the male 
actor to subvert the ‘hegemonic masculinity’ of the Putin regime providing ‘counter-
narratives’ to the official discourse of Putinism. Furthermore, in this chapter’s 
consideration of The Soldier, I argue that through the format of the play Pryazhko 
provokes a debate about the form theatre should take, facilitating a wider dialogue on 
politics and Putinism. 
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The fourth chapter analyses two plays by Vassily Siagrev in the context of 
augmenting social divide in Russia during Putin’s presidency. Plasticine and Black 
Milk articulate a subversive narrative that undermines the rhetoric of Putin’s state-
building narrative concerning the economic success of his policies. In its portrayal of 
marginalised anti-hero Maksim, Plasticine raises important questions about the co-
option of public space and the communities in Russia’s provinces excluded from the 
economic benefit experienced by the large cities in the west of the country. In Black 
Milk, Sigarev creates a comic conflict between the urban and the rural that highlights 
social divides and subverts the normative discourse of an electorate united behind the 
policies of Putinism. Additionally, I suggest that interpretations of Sigarev’s plays as 
archetypal reproduction of British ‘In-Yer-Face’ are reductive and simplistic. Instead, 
Sigarev weaves Russia themes and contexts into the plays that make use of specific 
historical contexts from both Tsarist and Soviet Russia. I contend that these 
productions do not only hold up a mirror to the plight of the provincial poor for the 
entertainment of urbanite Russian and international audiences in the West, but instead 
form part of the important canon of New Drama plays that explicitly utilise Russian 
themes to contextualise contemporary politics and Putinism, exposing their audience 
to alternative and marginalised discourses and oppositional ideas.  
The final chapter of this thesis examines two documentary plays produced by 
Teatr.doc that engage with Kirill Rogov’s definition of the Kremlin’s ‘fictitious 
legalism’.7 I argue that like the precedent set by samizdat literature, documentary 
theatre is used as a method of recording these denials of truth, and vocalises the 
importance of creating counter narratives that attempt to dispel the fabrication of 
official testimony and documents. Through my analysis of Polina Borodina’s The 
Bolotnaya Square Case and Elena Gremina’s One Hour Eighteen Minutes, this 
chapter demonstrates how Russian documentary theatre can vary in style and form. 
Both plays foreground the significance of documentation in different ways. One Hour 
Eighteen Minutes underscores the importance of the physical documents that record 
Magnitsky’s alleged mistreatment and murder, while The Bolotnaya Square Case 
encourages audience members to engage in their own production of documents after 
the show. The documentary material drawn upon in these productions takes the form 
of verbatim testimony, but additionally their productions stage physical documents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Rogov (2012). 
	   205	  
and materials, including personal artefacts and letters. Through this chapter’s 
examination of the status of material documents in the ‘theatre of the real’, it makes a 
contribution to wider international studies on documentary and verbatim theatre by 
scholars including Carol Martin and Derek Paget. By historically contextualising 
twenty-first century documentary theatre practices within both national and 
international documentary traditions, it reaffirms the act of documentation and the 
privileging of the document in Russian documentary theatre to expose the hypocrisy 
and tendentiousness of the legal system.  
Drawing on interviews with Russian theatre makers, archival work, and my 
experience of attending New Drama performances in Russia, has provided me with an 
important framework for situating the plays within the social and political context of 
the state. In particular, what has arisen from my research is the way in which many 
New Drama performances provide an important independent space for audience 
members to openly engage in political dialogue, challenging the political 
acquiescence towards the Putin regime. It is through this creation of an alternative 
dialogue that New Drama can be seen to challenge the praxis of Putinism. 
The plays examined in this thesis illustrate how wide ranging New Drama 
productions engage with the politics of Putinism. In my analysis of the case studies, 
this thesis has shown how the New Drama canon has emerged as a key cultural 
opposition to the Putin regime, which has resulted in the creation of a distinct political 
engagement within the Russian theatre. I have observed throughout my thesis that the 
plays considered here do not always provide an explicitly anti-Putin dialogue. For 
example, much of Polina Borodina’s verbatim testimony included in The Bolotnaya 
Square Case focuses on the diurnal experience of the family members of the 
imprisoned protestors. Instead of focusing on the impassioned rhetoric of the protest 
movement, the majority of their testimony recalls the mundane aspects of everyday 
life and relationships between friends and family. In a similar way, Pryazhko’s The 
Soldier focuses on the performance of a series of routine daily acts, such as showering 
and preparing a cup of coffee. In this performance it is the communicative silence and 
the embodied presence of the male actor that resists the militarised hegemonic 
masculinity of the Putin regime. Instead these plays provide an opposition to the 
discourse of the Kremlin by staging those marginalised and excluded by the Putin 
regime. By doing so, they provide a vital alternative narrative to the state sponsored 
media. As Reinelt states in her work on theatre and the public sphere, theatre’s 
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‘efficaciousness is not solitary – theatre cannot change the world – but it can and 
sometimes does work towards change alongside the other multiple avenues of public 
expression.’8 While New Drama may not always directly subvert Putin’s grip on 
power the performances of these plays provides a vital component in the creation of a 
cohesive oppositional discourse. Through their performance of alternative voices, 
New Drama playwrights highlight the importance of alternative narratives and 
theatre’s role in challenging audience members to consider their own role in Putin’s 
autocracy. 
In my consideration of New Drama, I have identified an important connection 
between the emergence of the movement in the early 2000s and the rise of Putinism. I 
have argued that New Drama positions itself directly in relationship to the policies of 
the Putin regime and the social and political developments in Russia. More 
importantly, this study contends that New Drama, and in particular Teatr.doc, has 
facilitated new cultural and political attitudes that challenge the pervasive discourse of 
the Putin regime. By investigating the intersection between New Drama and the 
politics of Putinism, this thesis has illustrated how contemporary Russian playwriting 
has emerged as one of the most important and exciting artistic interventions to 
challenge the Putin’s presidency. In the introduction to this thesis I stated that the 
appearance of New Drama at the turn of the millennium marked a significant moment 
in the history and evolution of Russian theatre. In my examination of the New Drama 
movement I have contextualised these plays within an important framework of 
Russian theatre and politics, but also provided an original contribution to performance 
studies on how theatre makers can produce plays and performances that impact on the 
public sphere and offer alternative cultural narratives.  
When I started my research for this project in 2013, it was impossible to 
predict the dramatic developments that occurred in the following four years in relation 
to New Drama’s precarious engagement with Putinism. Since Putin’s re-election to 
the presidency in 2012 there has been a shift in the Kremlin’s attitude towards art and 
culture that was contemporaneous to the rapid development of the anti-Putin protest 
movement in 2011-13. In particular theatre makers have found the political climate 
increasingly repressive and restrictive. In May 2014, the state Duma banned the use of 
mat (vulgar language and swearing) throughout the arts and media, with fines for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Reinelt (2015) 48-9. 
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breaking the ruling reaching 50,000 rubles. On 30 December 2014, during the final 
night at Teatr.doc’s original space on Trekhprudnyi Pereulok – a free screening of a 
documentary film Stronger than Arms (Silnee, chem Oruzhie, 2014) about the public 
protest at Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kiev the following year– the evening was 
interrupted by police officers who stormed the building claiming there had been a 
bomb threat reported. After searching for explosives, members of the Ministry of 
Culture closed the space and welded the entrance to the theatre shut. Then in May 
2015, a week after the premiére of The Bolotnaya Square Case, the landlord of 
Teatr.doc’s new space on Spartakovskaia Ulitsa abruptly terminated the company’s 
lease after an order from Moscow’s Department of Property. As I reached the 
completion of this thesis in August 2017, Kirill Serebrennikov, artistic director of the 
acclaimed Moscow theatre the Gogol Centre was arrested on politically motivated 
charges of embezzlement and placed under house arrest that has now been extended 
until July 2018, in a case described by John Freedman as a ‘show trial.’9 At the time, 
my Facebook wall was filled with messages of concern from Russian theatre makers 
wondering what the wider implications were for this on theatre practice in the 
country. Contemporaneous to this, however, has been an increasing politicisation of 
Russian society. As Varvara Faer observes, many of her friends have become 
politically active, producing posters for rallies and attending opposition meetings.10  
It remains to be seen how playwrights and theatre practitioners will respond to 
these political developments in their art in the future. What is clear, however, is that 
despite the tactics of intimidation detailed above, Russian theatre practitioners have 
continued to produce urgent and important productions that subvert the state’s 
normative discourse. As Freshwater reminds us: ‘overt censorship also tends to 
generate resistance’ within arts and culture.11 In the wake of Putin’s re-election for a 
further six years on 18 March 2018, Russian theatre makers’ continuing response to 
the authoritarian politics of Putinism remains a vital and important subject in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Freedman (2017). 
10 Faer (2012b). 
11 Freshwater (2009) 165.	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